The Voters' Curses
Why We Need Goldilocks Voters
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6229809 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Carlo Prato (0000-0002-3643-9707, Georgetown University), Stephane Wolton (0000-0003-1405-650X, London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 726-737 |
| Publication date | 2016-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12223 |
| OpenAlex | W2468293727 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 46 |
Scholars have long deplored voters' lack of interest in politics and argued in favor of greater political engagement. We present a formal theory of elections where successful communication of campaign messages requires both effort by candidates and attention from voters. Voters' interest in politics affects their attention and impacts the effectiveness of the electoral process as a screening and disciplining device. In line with existing theories, there exists a curse of the uninterested voter: When voters have little interest in politics, the electoral process performs poorly, and voters' attention to politics is low. Surprisingly, we uncover a curse of the interested voter, by which the same happens when voters have a strong interest in politics. Our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between voters' interest and attention, two notions often conflated in empirical studies. Moreover, policy interventions aimed at subsidizing the cost of acquiring political information can have unintended consequences
Curse · Economics · Goldilocks principle · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Process (computing · Public economics · Sociology · Subsidy · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Social Media and Politics
Electoral contests over voter beliefs
Political Agency and Implementation Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring
Political Agency and Implementation Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring
Restoring unanimity
Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies
A Model of Focusing in Political Choice
Electoral Imbalances and Their Consequences
Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability
The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information
When strategic uninformed abstention improves democratic accountability
The Effect of Sustained Transparency on Electoral Accountability
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
Electoral Competition, Control and Learning
Choices and echoes in Presidential elections
What Americans know about politics and why it matters
Thinking about the Presidency
Audacious Reforms
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
The Responsible Electorate
The Rational Public
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
An economic theory of democracy
The Reasoning Voter
Information and Elections
Government transparency and policymaking
Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections
A Theory of Conservatism
Modes of Communication
The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
Deliberation as Self-Discovery and Institutions for Political Speech
Job Market Signaling
Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage
Cognition and Strategy
The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform
Do the Advantages of Incumbency Advantage Incumbents
The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information
Volunteer's Dilemma
How Do Campaigns Matter
Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement
Learning to Love Democracy
Electoral Competition through Issue Selection
Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy
Leadership and Pandering
Does Collective Responsibility for Performance Alter Party Strategies? Policy-Seeking Parties in Proportional Systems
Electoral Competition, Control and Learning
Auntie Knows Best? Public Broadcasters and Current Affairs Knowledge
Knowing and Caring about Politics
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
The Two Faces of Issue Voting
Is Voter Competence Good for Voters
Policy Voting and the Electoral Process
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
Searching for Good Policies
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,44 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |