The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9728142 |
|---|---|
| Authors | FRANCESCO CASELLI (London School of Economics and Political Science), Tom Cunningham (0000-0002-9550-4353, Harvard University), Massimo Morelli (0000-0002-2405-7410, Columbia University), Inés Moreno de Barreda (University of Oxford) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 81 |
| Issue | 323 |
| Pages | 397-418 |
| Publication date | 2014-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecca.12060 |
| OpenAlex | W1986429800 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 37 |
Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re‐election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re‐election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re‐election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit
Commit · Distribution (mathematics) · Economics · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Political science · Politics · SIGNAL (programming language) · Signalling · Skew · Telecommunications · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Mathematics · Media Influence and Politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,7 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |