Elections in Non-Democracies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9713398 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Georgy Egorov (0009-0006-8835-9094, Northwestern University), Konstantin Sonin (0000-0003-1581-9951, University of Chicago, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 131 |
| Issue | 636 |
| Pages | 1682-1716 |
| Publication date | 2021-05-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueaa123 |
| OpenAlex | W3157075165 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
| References cited | 47 |
Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system, but elections are common in other regimes as well. Such an election might be a pure farce, with the incumbents getting close to 100% of the vote. In other instances, incumbents allow opposition candidates to be on the ballot and run campaigns, limit electoral fraud, e.g., by inviting international observers, all to make elections appear fair. In our model, the incumbent is informed about his popularity, and having a fair election allows him to signal his popularity to the people. After casting their vote, heterogeneous citizens decide whether or not to participate in a protest, and they are more willing to do so if they expect others to protest as well. We demonstrate theoretically that regimes that have a high level of elite repression are less likely to have fair elections, but regimes with a high cost of protesting for ordinary citizens make fair elections more likely
Ballot · Cornerstone · Democracy · Economics · Elite · Law and economics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Popularity · Turnout · Voting · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud
Towards Non-Adversarial Democracy
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information
Incumbency Advantage and the Role of Political Parties in the Electoral Authoritarianism
Electoral college and election fraud
Crafting Compliance The Role of Inclusion and Participation in Constitution-Making
The Penchant for Technology in Non‐Democratic Elections
Migration and informational autocracy
Saving an old regime with new elites? The unintended effects of co-opting foreign-educated councilors in China
Collective procrastination and protest cycles
Electoral autocracy with powerful local elites
Electoral Integrity, the Concession of Power, and the Disciplining Role of Protests
The Punisher’s Dilemma
Governance and electoral competition in authoritarian regimes
Synthesizing Theories of Authoritarian Elections
Authoritarian Power Sharing
Is there really a dictator's dilemma? Information and repression in autocracy
Election-induced fiscal policy cycles in democratic and non-democratic emerging market and developing economies
Can Elections Motivate Responsiveness in a Single-Party Regime? Experimental Evidence from Vietnam
Voting for Autocracy
Electoral Malpractice
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Self-Enforcing Democracy
The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change
Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
The Logic of Political Survival
The Political Terror Scale (PTS)
Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships
Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections
The Cingranelli and Richards (Ciri) Human Rights Data Project
Strategies of Election Rigging
Regularizing Rioting
Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution
The Struggle over Political Order in Egypt
Signaling in a Global Game
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government
Office Insecurity and Electoral Manipulation
Elections, Protest, and Alternation of Power
Which Elections Can Be Lost
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Constraints and Choices
Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes
Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics
Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes
Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control
Elections Under Authoritarianism
Informational Autocrats
The Chilean Elections of 1989 and the Politics of the Transition to Democracy
Moral Bias in Large Elections
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media
Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,9 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 19 |