The Prince—or Better No Prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor

Bibliographic Data

ID6284128
AuthorsKai A Konrad (0000-0002-2225-2271, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich, Germany), Vai‐lam Mui (0000-0001-7079-5142, Monash University), Vai-Lam Mui (Monash University)
Year2017
Volume61
Issue10
Pages2158-2182
Publication date2017-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002716631103
OpenAlexW2182864370
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited46

Appointing a successor (the “prince”) allows the ruler (the “king”) to alter the structures of conflicts that take place between him and his potential challengers, as well as the structures of conflicts that take place among his potential challengers. Motivated by historical examples and using an infinite horizon rulership competition game, we show that while an appointed prince constitutes a powerful and dangerous threat to the incumbent ruler (the elevated threat effect), the appointed prince can also offer the incumbent ruler increased protection against other potential challengers (the barrier effect). We determine conditions when the overall effect of appointing a successor benefits the incumbent ruler and enables him to acquire a larger share of the governance rent in equilibrium

Competition (biology · Corporate governance · Economics · Management · Political economy · Political science · Ruler · Sociology · Successor cardinal · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics

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