Who Punishes the Leader? Leader Culpability and Coups during Civil War

Bibliographic Data

ID6285575
AuthorsJun Koga Sudduth (0000-0003-3319-3382, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume65
Issue2-3
Pages427-452
Publication date2021-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002720950429
OpenAlexW3044556879
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited45

Who punishes leaders via coups during civil war? By distinguishing between different types of internal audiences within the government and their attempts to remove a leader forcefully, I illuminate the mechanisms that explain variation in who punishes the leader during wartime. I claim that whether leaders are culpable for the initiation of the war has an important implication for whether they are punished by members of the ruling coalition (i.e., those with access to decision-making and political power), or by those outside the ruling coalition. Empirical evidence supports my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely to experience coup attempts led by those outside the leaders’ ruling coalition, should the war go poorly; and (ii) nonculpable leaders are more likely to experience coups executed by members of their ruling coalition. The findings have important implications for how leaders respond to audience pressures as they consider whether to fight or settle

Criminology · Culpability · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access