Kjell Hausken
Biographic Data
| ID | 269488 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kjell Hausken |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kjell |
| FAMILY NAME | Hausken |
| SIGNATURE | HAUSKEN K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Stavanger |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7319-3876 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The evolution of fixed-supply and variable-supply currencies
Competition is analyzed between a fixed-supply currency (e.g. Bitcoin) and a variable-supply currency (e.g. a fiat currency). Two kinds of players support the currencies differently and choose their volume fractions of transactions in each currency. The variable-supply currency enables money printing/withdrawal and inflation/deflation, which counteract each other in each player’s utility. The exponentially increasing 1959–2021 US M2 money supply …
Do national development factors affect cryptocurrency adoption
The adoption of cryptocurrencies is uneven across businesses, industries, and countries. Different forces drive cryptocurrency adoption (CA) dependent on the national level of development. We empirically assess the relationship between certain macro-national developmental indicators and cryptocurrency deployment across 137 countries. Linear regressions determine specific associations with cryptocurrency adoption. We report that CA correlates posi…
The Shapley value of coalitions to other coalitions
The Shapley value for an n -person game is decomposed into a 2 n × 2 n value matrix giving the value of every coalition to every other coalition. The cell φ IJ ( v , N ) in the symmetric matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row coalition I is beneficial, neutral, or unbeneficial to column coalition J . This enables viewing the values of coalitions from multiple perspectives. The n × 1 Shapley vector, replicated in the botto…
Additive multi-effort contests
This article analyzes rent seeking with multiple additive efforts for each of two players. Impact on rent seeking occurs even when a player exerts only one effort. This contrasts with models of multiplicative efforts with impact on rent seeking only when a player exerts all its available efforts. An analytical solution is developed when the contest intensities are below one, and equal to one for one effort. Then, additional efforts causing interi…
Innovation, Development and National Indices
Government protection against terrorism and crime
A game theoretic model is developed where a government protects against a terrorist seeking terrorism and criminal objectives. A terrorist can recruit a benefactor providing funds by remaining ideologically pure, or may resort to crime. The model accounts for the players’ resources, unit costs of effort, unit benefit and valuations and contest intensities for terrorist and crime objectives. We determine and quantify how these factors and the gove…
Al Qaeda at the bar: Coordinating ideologues and mercenaries in terrorist organizations
Inpatient service providers’ perspectives on service user involvement in Norwegian community mental health centres
Background: For two decades, mental health services in Norway have focused on service user involvement. Despite this, there is little knowledge about how inpatient mental health services have promoted user involvement. Aim: To examine service providers’ reports of service user involvement at the individual and departmental levels in Norwegian community mental health centres (CMHCs). Methods: One hundred and eighty six (186) inpatient service prov…
Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models
Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies
Containing Contagious Financial Crises: The Political Economy of Joint Intervention into the Asian Crisis
The impact of actor heterogeneity on the provision of international public goods
The article formally analyses the conditions under which actor heterogeneity may have positive effects on the likelihood that international public goods will be provided, and when a hegemon chooses to act benevolently versus coercively toward the other actors. Within the theory of international cooperation the game‐theoretic model crucially rests on the key concepts of hegemonic stability theory. It illustrates with Nash equilibria the conditions…
Hegemons, Leaders and Followers: A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Postwar Dynamics of International Political Economy
The article introduces the concept of hegemony to leadership theory, which has developed mainly as a critique of hegemonic stability theory. We argue that it makes sense to combine the two theories by introducing the concept of 'size' into neoliberal thinking about International Political Economy. We accept the neo-institutional hypothesis that a hegemon is not needed to provide public goods, and demonstrate with non-cooperative games how multipl…
Hegemonic Decline and International Leadership
Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction
This article develops a multi-level framework for modeling rational action in context at any level of abstraction. It first shows how standard n-person collective action problems are affected by the presence and nature of external competition from other groups. The use of public goods produced within a group as means for between-group competition for a prize is shown to help overcome Prisoner's Dilemmas and hence facilitate the emergence of coope…
Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies
Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models
Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction
This article develops a multi-level framework for modeling rational action in context at any level of abstraction. It first shows how standard n-person collective action problems are affected by the presence and nature of external competition from other groups. The use of public goods produced within a group as means for between-group competition for a prize is shown to help overcome Prisoner's Dilemmas and hence facilitate the emergence of coope…
Innovation, Development and National Indices
Government protection against terrorism and crime
A game theoretic model is developed where a government protects against a terrorist seeking terrorism and criminal objectives. A terrorist can recruit a benefactor providing funds by remaining ideologically pure, or may resort to crime. The model accounts for the players’ resources, unit costs of effort, unit benefit and valuations and contest intensities for terrorist and crime objectives. We determine and quantify how these factors and the gove…
The impact of actor heterogeneity on the provision of international public goods
The article formally analyses the conditions under which actor heterogeneity may have positive effects on the likelihood that international public goods will be provided, and when a hegemon chooses to act benevolently versus coercively toward the other actors. Within the theory of international cooperation the game‐theoretic model crucially rests on the key concepts of hegemonic stability theory. It illustrates with Nash equilibria the conditions…
Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction
This article develops a multi-level framework for modeling rational action in context at any level of abstraction. It first shows how standard n-person collective action problems are affected by the presence and nature of external competition from other groups. The use of public goods produced within a group as means for between-group competition for a prize is shown to help overcome Prisoner's Dilemmas and hence facilitate the emergence of coope…
Hegemonic Decline and International Leadership
Hegemons, Leaders and Followers: A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Postwar Dynamics of International Political Economy
The article introduces the concept of hegemony to leadership theory, which has developed mainly as a critique of hegemonic stability theory. We argue that it makes sense to combine the two theories by introducing the concept of 'size' into neoliberal thinking about International Political Economy. We accept the neo-institutional hypothesis that a hegemon is not needed to provide public goods, and demonstrate with non-cooperative games how multipl…
The impact of actor heterogeneity on the provision of international public goods
The article formally analyses the conditions under which actor heterogeneity may have positive effects on the likelihood that international public goods will be provided, and when a hegemon chooses to act benevolently versus coercively toward the other actors. Within the theory of international cooperation the game‐theoretic model crucially rests on the key concepts of hegemonic stability theory. It illustrates with Nash equilibria the conditions…
Containing Contagious Financial Crises: The Political Economy of Joint Intervention into the Asian Crisis
Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies
Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models
Inpatient service providers’ perspectives on service user involvement in Norwegian community mental health centres
Background: For two decades, mental health services in Norway have focused on service user involvement. Despite this, there is little knowledge about how inpatient mental health services have promoted user involvement. Aim: To examine service providers’ reports of service user involvement at the individual and departmental levels in Norwegian community mental health centres (CMHCs). Methods: One hundred and eighty six (186) inpatient service prov…
Government protection against terrorism and crime
A game theoretic model is developed where a government protects against a terrorist seeking terrorism and criminal objectives. A terrorist can recruit a benefactor providing funds by remaining ideologically pure, or may resort to crime. The model accounts for the players’ resources, unit costs of effort, unit benefit and valuations and contest intensities for terrorist and crime objectives. We determine and quantify how these factors and the gove…
Al Qaeda at the bar: Coordinating ideologues and mercenaries in terrorist organizations
Innovation, Development and National Indices
The Shapley value of coalitions to other coalitions
The Shapley value for an n -person game is decomposed into a 2 n × 2 n value matrix giving the value of every coalition to every other coalition. The cell φ IJ ( v , N ) in the symmetric matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row coalition I is beneficial, neutral, or unbeneficial to column coalition J . This enables viewing the values of coalitions from multiple perspectives. The n × 1 Shapley vector, replicated in the botto…
Additive multi-effort contests
This article analyzes rent seeking with multiple additive efforts for each of two players. Impact on rent seeking occurs even when a player exerts only one effort. This contrasts with models of multiplicative efforts with impact on rent seeking only when a player exerts all its available efforts. An analytical solution is developed when the contest intensities are below one, and equal to one for one effort. Then, additional efforts causing interi…
The evolution of fixed-supply and variable-supply currencies
Competition is analyzed between a fixed-supply currency (e.g. Bitcoin) and a variable-supply currency (e.g. a fiat currency). Two kinds of players support the currencies differently and choose their volume fractions of transactions in each currency. The variable-supply currency enables money printing/withdrawal and inflation/deflation, which counteract each other in each player’s utility. The exponentially increasing 1959–2021 US M2 money supply …
Do national development factors affect cryptocurrency adoption
The adoption of cryptocurrencies is uneven across businesses, industries, and countries. Different forces drive cryptocurrency adoption (CA) dependent on the national level of development. We empirically assess the relationship between certain macro-national developmental indicators and cryptocurrency deployment across 137 countries. Linear regressions determine specific associations with cryptocurrency adoption. We report that CA correlates posi…
Economics (10 works) · Political science (10 works) · Game Theory and Applications (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Psychology (5 works)