Hegemons, Leaders and Followers
A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Postwar Dynamics of International Political Economy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12433261 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kjell Hausken (0000-0001-7319-3876, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, corresponding author), Thomas Plümper (0000-0002-1461-0737, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Pages | 35-93 |
| Publication date | 1997-02-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of World-Systems Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1076-156X • E-ISSN: 1076-156X |
| Publisher | University Library System, University of Pittsburgh (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5195/jwsr.1997.118 |
| OpenAlex | W2168502905 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 37 |
The article introduces the concept of hegemony to leadership theory, which has developed mainly as a critique of hegemonic stability theory. We argue that it makes sense to combine the two theories by introducing the concept of 'size' into neoliberal thinking about International Political Economy. We accept the neo-institutional hypothesis that a hegemon is not needed to provide public goods, and demonstrate with non-cooperative games how multiple leaders may jointly provide public goods. A game-theoretic model is developed illustrating with Nash equilibria the conditions under which a hegemon rationally switches from hegemony to leadership. It also shows why followers rationally switch from free-riding in their consumption of the public goods to taking part in leading, in the sense of contributing to covering the cost of the production of the public goods. The emergence of joint leadership leads to multiple equilibria in the sense of allowing for multiple stable leadership constellations. The actors are in a mixed-motive or coordination game where they have different preferences for the equilibria, and thus different preferences for which strategies to choose, and for who is to take part in covering the cost of the production of the public goods. Two aspects of joint leadership 'after hegemony' are treated, namely coercive and benevolent leadership on the one hand, and collective action in the sense of joint leadership on the other hand. Finally, future leadership constellations and the quest for international order are discussed
Action (physics · Collective action · Economic system · Economics · Hegemony · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public good · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · World Systems and Global Transformations
The Political Economy of International Relations
The Penn World Table (Mark 5)
The Modern World-System II
Cooperation among Nations
After Hegemony
The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977
The Logic of Collective Action
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
An Economic Theory of Alliances
The World in Depression
Managing the dollar
Managing the Dollar
Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe
State Power and the Structure of International Trade
Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy
International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations
Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups
The Game Theory of International Politics
Games Real Actors Could Play
Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy
Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International Political Economy
Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy
The Persistent myth of lost hegemony
The mysterious case of vanishing hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain really dead
The limits of hegemonic stability theory
The public choice view of international political economy
Modeling the forms of international cooperation
The hegemon's dilemma
Leadership Games in Collective Action
International regimes, transactions, and change
Politics Among Nations
Reputation and Hegemonic Stability
The Twenty Years' Crisis
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,04 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 1999 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |