Diane Reyniers
Biographic Data
| ID | 287797 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Diane Reyniers |
| GIVEN NAMES | Diane |
| FAMILY NAME | Reyniers |
| SIGNATURE | REYNIERS D |
| AFFILIATIONS | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0677-2020 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Insuring Replaceable Possessions
Equivalencebetween insuring income and what is bought with income is commonly assumed. It seems to be implicitly held that uninsured but replaceable goods will always be replaced if they fail. This does not follow. People may have difficulty coming up with the money to pay for a replacement out of pocket. Also, the income effect of a loss may mean that replacement is not worthwhile. We show that as a result, equivalence breaks down. Both theory a…
Generalised Reciprocity and Reputation in the Theory of Cooperation: A Framework
We study the Iterated Bilateral Reciprocity game in which the need for help arises randomly. Players are heterogeneous with respect to ‘neediness’ i.e. probability of needing help. We find bounds on the amount of heterogeneity which can be tolerated for cooperation (all players help when asked to help) to be sustainable in a collectivity. We introduce the notion of Generalised Reciprocity. Individuals make a costly first move to benefit another u…
On the failure of social theory
Deprivation in heterogeneous organizations
We present a model of rivalry in an organization consisting of a single authority and N subordinates. A number Nh of subordinates are highly able whereas the rest, Nt=N—Nh, are less able. This information is common knowledge among the subordinates. The authority organizes a contest in which n (≤ N) promotion opportunities or rewards of value B each are offered. Each member decides whether to participate in the contest to obtain a reward. Particip…
Cooperation in Contests: A Model of Mixed Organizational Culture
We use a contest framework to investigate the nature of organizational culture. Organization members decide whether to participate in the contest and if they do participate they have two possible modi operandi: be helpful or not. We state sufficient conditions, in terms of contest design, for the existence of various types of organizational culture and we show the possibility (at equilibrium) of a mixed organizational culture, i.e. the coexistenc…
On the failure of social theory
Deprivation in heterogeneous organizations
We present a model of rivalry in an organization consisting of a single authority and N subordinates. A number Nh of subordinates are highly able whereas the rest, Nt=N—Nh, are less able. This information is common knowledge among the subordinates. The authority organizes a contest in which n (≤ N) promotion opportunities or rewards of value B each are offered. Each member decides whether to participate in the contest to obtain a reward. Particip…
Cooperation in Contests: A Model of Mixed Organizational Culture
We use a contest framework to investigate the nature of organizational culture. Organization members decide whether to participate in the contest and if they do participate they have two possible modi operandi: be helpful or not. We state sufficient conditions, in terms of contest design, for the existence of various types of organizational culture and we show the possibility (at equilibrium) of a mixed organizational culture, i.e. the coexistenc…
Deprivation in heterogeneous organizations
We present a model of rivalry in an organization consisting of a single authority and N subordinates. A number Nh of subordinates are highly able whereas the rest, Nt=N—Nh, are less able. This information is common knowledge among the subordinates. The authority organizes a contest in which n (≤ N) promotion opportunities or rewards of value B each are offered. Each member decides whether to participate in the contest to obtain a reward. Particip…
Generalised Reciprocity and Reputation in the Theory of Cooperation: A Framework
We study the Iterated Bilateral Reciprocity game in which the need for help arises randomly. Players are heterogeneous with respect to ‘neediness’ i.e. probability of needing help. We find bounds on the amount of heterogeneity which can be tolerated for cooperation (all players help when asked to help) to be sustainable in a collectivity. We introduce the notion of Generalised Reciprocity. Individuals make a costly first move to benefit another u…
On the failure of social theory
Insuring Replaceable Possessions
Equivalencebetween insuring income and what is bought with income is commonly assumed. It seems to be implicitly held that uninsured but replaceable goods will always be replaced if they fail. This does not follow. People may have difficulty coming up with the money to pay for a replacement out of pocket. Also, the income effect of a loss may mean that replacement is not worthwhile. We show that as a result, equivalence breaks down. Both theory a…
Economics (5 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Social science (3 works)