Deprivation in heterogeneous organizations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10142476 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Diane Reyniers (0000-0003-0677-2020, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author), Diane J Reyniers |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 59-76 |
| Publication date | 1998-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0022250x.1998.9990213 |
| OpenAlex | W2093712706 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 13 |
We present a model of rivalry in an organization consisting of a single authority and N subordinates. A number Nh of subordinates are highly able whereas the rest, Nt=N—Nh, are less able. This information is common knowledge among the subordinates. The authority organizes a contest in which n (≤ N) promotion opportunities or rewards of value B each are offered. Each member decides whether to participate in the contest to obtain a reward. Participation requires additional effort above the explicitly contracted effort. This additional effort is lower for the able individuals than for the others (Eh < Et ). Following Kosaka (1986) and Abell (1996), deprivation is defined as the ratio of contest participants who fail to get promoted to organization size. We show that, as long as Nh/N is not too large, maximal deprivation in organizations with homogeneous (in terms of ability) individuals is larger than in comparable organizations with heterogeneous individuals. Deprivation in the heterogeneous organization exceeds deprivation in the homogeneous organization only for low prize densities n/N. Furthermore, although highly able individuals face better promotion opportunities, their deprivation level is larger than that of the less able. Notes I would like to thank Kenji Kosaka and Peter Abell for helpful suggestions and comments
Business · Combinatorics · CONTEST · Economics · Face (sociological concept · Face value · Homogeneous · Microeconomics · Political science · Promotion (chess · Rivalry · Social science · Sociology · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,07 |
| Citation span | 1996 - 2019 (24) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |