Antoine Dubus
Biographic Data
| ID | 3084798 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Antoine Dubus |
| GIVEN NAMES | Antoine |
| FAMILY NAME | Dubus |
| SIGNATURE | DUBUS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | ETH Zurich |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5726-155X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Competition and the two margins of privacy
This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data – the extensive margin of privacy – as well as the precision of information – the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policy…
Fighting free with free
Mobile phones, mobile Internet, and employment in Uganda
We analyze the relation between mobile phone use – mobile Internet in particular – and employment, self-employment and job regularity in Uganda. We find no evidence of any positive impact of mobile Internet use on employment or job quality, suggesting that either respondents do not use mobile Internet for job search practices or as a job tool, or that these uses are ineffective. However, we find that the adoption and use of basic mobile phones ar…
Determinants of mobile broadband use in developing economies
Asymmetric awareness and heterogeneous agents
We consider a principal-agent model with moral-hazard and asymmetric awareness and show how the heterogeneity of agents on their aversion to effort affects contract design. We discuss the optimal contract adopted when a principal is aware of all the impacts of an agent's action, while agents ignore some of them. When a principal faces two types of agents, where one type is more effort-averse than the other, the equilibrium contract is shaped by a…
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Determinants of mobile broadband use in developing economies
Asymmetric awareness and heterogeneous agents
We consider a principal-agent model with moral-hazard and asymmetric awareness and show how the heterogeneity of agents on their aversion to effort affects contract design. We discuss the optimal contract adopted when a principal is aware of all the impacts of an agent's action, while agents ignore some of them. When a principal faces two types of agents, where one type is more effort-averse than the other, the equilibrium contract is shaped by a…
Mobile phones, mobile Internet, and employment in Uganda
We analyze the relation between mobile phone use – mobile Internet in particular – and employment, self-employment and job regularity in Uganda. We find no evidence of any positive impact of mobile Internet use on employment or job quality, suggesting that either respondents do not use mobile Internet for job search practices or as a job tool, or that these uses are ineffective. However, we find that the adoption and use of basic mobile phones ar…
Fighting free with free
Competition and the two margins of privacy
This article analyzes the relationship between privacy protection and market competition. We consider a model where firms collect data to price discriminate consumers in a competitive product market, and we distinguish two margins of privacy. Firms strategically choose the number of consumers on whom they collect data – the extensive margin of privacy – as well as the precision of information – the intensive margin of privacy. We show that policy…
Business (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (3 works) · Internet privacy (3 works) · Computer security (2 works) · Digital Platforms and Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · ICT Impact and Policies (2 works) · Mobile computing (2 works) · Telecommunications (2 works)