George Tridimas
Biographic Data
| ID | 3093828 |
|---|---|
| NAME | George Tridimas |
| GIVEN NAMES | George |
| FAMILY NAME | Tridimas |
| SIGNATURE | TRIDIMAS G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Ulster |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3182-0322 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 46 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
A political economy perspective of the constitution of ancient Sparta
Uniquely in Ancient Greece the constitution of Sparta provided for two kings from different dynasties reigning simultaneously, an aristocratic upper house, an annually elected board of overseers, an assembly, and a society of warriors to rule over an enslaved neighbouring population. It contributed to Sparta’s elevation to a great power and lasted almost unaltered for five hundred years until the middle of the third century BCE. The paper argues …
The political economy of the original “Thucydides’ Trap
The Peloponnesian War, 431–404, between democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta was a long, destructive war ending with the total surrender of Athens. Scholars of Thucydides, the ancient historian of the conflict, have dwelt on two different explanations of the causes of the War. First, the “Thucydides’ Trap”, which argues that Sparta’s fear of the growing power of Athens rendered peace arrangements non-credible and made war inevitable. Second, t…
The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars
In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon’s law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three grou…
Constitutional monarchy as power sharing
In the transition to democracy some autocracies transformed to republics while others evolved to constitutional monarchies. The paper inquires how constitutional monarchy is established. It models a hereditary king and a liberal challenger who coexist over a succession of periods and fight for power which brings office rents and the right to decide one’s preferred policy. The outcome of the confrontation is uncertain and may vary from period to p…
Is the UK Supreme Court rogue to un-prorogue Parliament
On 24 September 2019, in a unanimous judgment the UK Supreme Court ([2019] UKSC 41) ruled that the Prime Minister’s action to prorogue (suspend) Parliament for 5 weeks in the run-up to the 31-10-2019 deadline of the UK leaving the European Union, was unlawful and of no effect, as it prevented Parliament from carrying out its constitutional functions without reasonable justification. Although the Court did not pronounce on the merits and demerits …
Democracy without political parties
Political parties, formal, durable and mass organizations that inform voters on public policy issues, nominate candidates for office and fight elections for the right to govern, are ubiquitous in modern representative democracies but were absent from the direct participatory democracy of ancient Athens. The paper investigates how the political institutions of Athens may explain their absence. The arguments explored include voter homogeneity; the …
Making direct democracy work
The specific way the Athenians set up their democracy presents both theoretical and empirical challenges. Decisions were taken by majority vote in the Assembly. To keep politicians in line, the Athenians first used ostracism, which however was replaced by the graphe paranomon around 415 BCE. The latter provided that anybody who had made a proposal in the Assembly could be accused of having made an unconstitutional suggestion, bringing a potential…
Constitutional choice in ancient Athens
Contrary to modern representative democracies where elections tend to take place years apart, in the direct democracy of ancient Athens the assembly of the citizens met to decide policy up to forty times per year. The paper explores a model of constitutional choice where self-interested citizens decide how long to wait until they vote by maximising the net gain from an uncertain voting outcome. It is found that the frequency of voting increases u…
Conflict, democracy and voter choice
Ostracism, the removal of a political leader from ancient Athens for a period of ten years without any additional financial sanction or other punishment, was an important and rather unique institutional aspect of the direct democracy. The present study explains the adoption of ostracism as the utility maximizing choice of a self–interested constitutional writer—cum—political actor to resolve violent political conflict and illustrates that it acte…
Rent seeking in the democracy of ancient Greece
The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political economy, although it can also take place in personal relations and within firms and bureaucracies. Rent seeking, which involves the unproductive use of resources, is however primarily associated with pol…
On the overthrow or endurance of kings
Constitutional choice in ancient Athens
A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens
Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece
The Economics and Politics of the Structure of Public Expenditure
Constitutional choice in ancient Athens
A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens
Making direct democracy work
The specific way the Athenians set up their democracy presents both theoretical and empirical challenges. Decisions were taken by majority vote in the Assembly. To keep politicians in line, the Athenians first used ostracism, which however was replaced by the graphe paranomon around 415 BCE. The latter provided that anybody who had made a proposal in the Assembly could be accused of having made an unconstitutional suggestion, bringing a potential…
Constitutional monarchy as power sharing
In the transition to democracy some autocracies transformed to republics while others evolved to constitutional monarchies. The paper inquires how constitutional monarchy is established. It models a hereditary king and a liberal challenger who coexist over a succession of periods and fight for power which brings office rents and the right to decide one’s preferred policy. The outcome of the confrontation is uncertain and may vary from period to p…
Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece
On the overthrow or endurance of kings
The political economy of the original “Thucydides’ Trap
The Peloponnesian War, 431–404, between democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta was a long, destructive war ending with the total surrender of Athens. Scholars of Thucydides, the ancient historian of the conflict, have dwelt on two different explanations of the causes of the War. First, the “Thucydides’ Trap”, which argues that Sparta’s fear of the growing power of Athens rendered peace arrangements non-credible and made war inevitable. Second, t…
Democracy without political parties
Political parties, formal, durable and mass organizations that inform voters on public policy issues, nominate candidates for office and fight elections for the right to govern, are ubiquitous in modern representative democracies but were absent from the direct participatory democracy of ancient Athens. The paper investigates how the political institutions of Athens may explain their absence. The arguments explored include voter homogeneity; the …
Constitutional choice in ancient Athens
Contrary to modern representative democracies where elections tend to take place years apart, in the direct democracy of ancient Athens the assembly of the citizens met to decide policy up to forty times per year. The paper explores a model of constitutional choice where self-interested citizens decide how long to wait until they vote by maximising the net gain from an uncertain voting outcome. It is found that the frequency of voting increases u…
Conflict, democracy and voter choice
Ostracism, the removal of a political leader from ancient Athens for a period of ten years without any additional financial sanction or other punishment, was an important and rather unique institutional aspect of the direct democracy. The present study explains the adoption of ostracism as the utility maximizing choice of a self–interested constitutional writer—cum—political actor to resolve violent political conflict and illustrates that it acte…
The Economics and Politics of the Structure of Public Expenditure
The Economics and Politics of the Structure of Public Expenditure
Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece
A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens
Constitutional choice in ancient Athens
Rent seeking in the democracy of ancient Greece
The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political economy, although it can also take place in personal relations and within firms and bureaucracies. Rent seeking, which involves the unproductive use of resources, is however primarily associated with pol…
On the overthrow or endurance of kings
Conflict, democracy and voter choice
Ostracism, the removal of a political leader from ancient Athens for a period of ten years without any additional financial sanction or other punishment, was an important and rather unique institutional aspect of the direct democracy. The present study explains the adoption of ostracism as the utility maximizing choice of a self–interested constitutional writer—cum—political actor to resolve violent political conflict and illustrates that it acte…
Constitutional choice in ancient Athens
Contrary to modern representative democracies where elections tend to take place years apart, in the direct democracy of ancient Athens the assembly of the citizens met to decide policy up to forty times per year. The paper explores a model of constitutional choice where self-interested citizens decide how long to wait until they vote by maximising the net gain from an uncertain voting outcome. It is found that the frequency of voting increases u…
Making direct democracy work
The specific way the Athenians set up their democracy presents both theoretical and empirical challenges. Decisions were taken by majority vote in the Assembly. To keep politicians in line, the Athenians first used ostracism, which however was replaced by the graphe paranomon around 415 BCE. The latter provided that anybody who had made a proposal in the Assembly could be accused of having made an unconstitutional suggestion, bringing a potential…
Democracy without political parties
Political parties, formal, durable and mass organizations that inform voters on public policy issues, nominate candidates for office and fight elections for the right to govern, are ubiquitous in modern representative democracies but were absent from the direct participatory democracy of ancient Athens. The paper investigates how the political institutions of Athens may explain their absence. The arguments explored include voter homogeneity; the …
Is the UK Supreme Court rogue to un-prorogue Parliament
On 24 September 2019, in a unanimous judgment the UK Supreme Court ([2019] UKSC 41) ruled that the Prime Minister’s action to prorogue (suspend) Parliament for 5 weeks in the run-up to the 31-10-2019 deadline of the UK leaving the European Union, was unlawful and of no effect, as it prevented Parliament from carrying out its constitutional functions without reasonable justification. Although the Court did not pronounce on the merits and demerits …
Constitutional monarchy as power sharing
In the transition to democracy some autocracies transformed to republics while others evolved to constitutional monarchies. The paper inquires how constitutional monarchy is established. It models a hereditary king and a liberal challenger who coexist over a succession of periods and fight for power which brings office rents and the right to decide one’s preferred policy. The outcome of the confrontation is uncertain and may vary from period to p…
The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars
In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon’s law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three grou…
A political economy perspective of the constitution of ancient Sparta
Uniquely in Ancient Greece the constitution of Sparta provided for two kings from different dynasties reigning simultaneously, an aristocratic upper house, an annually elected board of overseers, an assembly, and a society of warriors to rule over an enslaved neighbouring population. It contributed to Sparta’s elevation to a great power and lasted almost unaltered for five hundred years until the middle of the third century BCE. The paper argues …
The political economy of the original “Thucydides’ Trap
The Peloponnesian War, 431–404, between democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta was a long, destructive war ending with the total surrender of Athens. Scholars of Thucydides, the ancient historian of the conflict, have dwelt on two different explanations of the causes of the War. First, the “Thucydides’ Trap”, which argues that Sparta’s fear of the growing power of Athens rendered peace arrangements non-credible and made war inevitable. Second, t…
Law (14 works) · Political science (14 works) · Politics (14 works) · Law (12 works) · Democracy (9 works) · Economics (9 works) · Political economy (8 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Classical Antiquity Studies (6 works)