Anne Schwenkenbecher
Biographic Data
| ID | 334308 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anne Schwenkenbecher |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anne |
| FAMILY NAME | Schwenkenbecher |
| SIGNATURE | SCHWENKENBECHER A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Murdoch University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2207-3043 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
How Knowledge Brokers Shape the Evidence-Based Policy Landscape
Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in the philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science–policy interface.We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest…
Why We Cannot Separate Evidence From Values in Public Policy
Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at t…
Are Corporations Like Psychopaths? Lessons On Moral Responsibility From Rio Tinto's Juukan Gorge Disaster
There seems to be a striking parallel between the features of psychopaths and those of agential groups, including states and corporations. Psychopaths are often thought to lack some of the capacities that are constitutive of moral agency. Two features of psychopaths are commonly identified as grounds for limiting their moral responsibility: (i) their lack of relevant emotional capacities and (ii) their flawed rational capacities. Roughly, the fir…
Knowledge brokers at the science–policy interface: Insights from biosecurity and environmental management
Revisiting the Base in Evidence-Based Policy
Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they “follow the science,” because …
Science-policy research collaborations need philosophers
Commentary for NASSP Award Symposium: Response to Commentators
Collective inaction, omission, and non-action: When not acting is indeed on ‘us’
The statement that we are currently failing to address some of humanity’s greatest challenges seems uncontroversial—we are not doing enough to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 °C and we are exposing vulnerable people to preventable diseases when failing to produce herd immunity. But what singles out such failings (inactions) from all the things we did not do (non-actions) when all are unintended? Unlike their individualist counterparts, col…
How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations
Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two sugg…
Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations
It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis‐à‐vis large‐scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of peo…
Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge
Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations
The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a 'tripartite' social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this 'three-sizes-fit-all' approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripart…
Joint Moral Duties: Joint Moral Duties
Larry May paraphrases Edmund Burke, sayingthat “All that is necessary for evil to triumph in the world is for good people to donothing” (May 1992, 105). And further down he notes: “Inaction leads to seriousharm in the world,just as certainly as intentional,active wrongdoing”(105–06).Heargues that many problems that cannot be solved by individuals can be addressedby collective action.May is right. There are countless situations and circumstances i…
Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations
In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discussed by philosophers. Notions of collective or joint duties have been invoked especially in the debates on global justice, world poverty and climate change. This paper enquires into the possibility and potential nature of moral duties individuals in unstructured groups may hold together. It distinguishes between group agents and groups of people whi…
Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry
This book engages with the most urgent philosophical questions pertaining to the problem of terrorism. What is terrorism? Could it ever be justified? Assuming that terrorism is just one of many kinds
Is there an obligation to reduce one's individual carbon footprint
Moral duties concerning climate change mitigation are – for good reasons – conventionally construed as duties of institutional agents, usually states. Yet, in both scholarly debate and political discourse, it has occasionally been argued that the moral duties lie not only with states and institutional agents, but also with individual citizens. This argument has been made with regard to mitigation efforts, especially those reducing greenhouse gase…
Is there an obligation to reduce one's individual carbon footprint
Moral duties concerning climate change mitigation are – for good reasons – conventionally construed as duties of institutional agents, usually states. Yet, in both scholarly debate and political discourse, it has occasionally been argued that the moral duties lie not only with states and institutional agents, but also with individual citizens. This argument has been made with regard to mitigation efforts, especially those reducing greenhouse gase…
How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations
Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two sugg…
Revisiting the Base in Evidence-Based Policy
Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they “follow the science,” because …
Science-policy research collaborations need philosophers
Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge
The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a 'tripartite' social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this 'three-sizes-fit-all' approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripart…
Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry
This book engages with the most urgent philosophical questions pertaining to the problem of terrorism. What is terrorism? Could it ever be justified? Assuming that terrorism is just one of many kinds
Is there an obligation to reduce one's individual carbon footprint
Moral duties concerning climate change mitigation are – for good reasons – conventionally construed as duties of institutional agents, usually states. Yet, in both scholarly debate and political discourse, it has occasionally been argued that the moral duties lie not only with states and institutional agents, but also with individual citizens. This argument has been made with regard to mitigation efforts, especially those reducing greenhouse gase…
Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations
In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discussed by philosophers. Notions of collective or joint duties have been invoked especially in the debates on global justice, world poverty and climate change. This paper enquires into the possibility and potential nature of moral duties individuals in unstructured groups may hold together. It distinguishes between group agents and groups of people whi…
Joint Moral Duties: Joint Moral Duties
Larry May paraphrases Edmund Burke, sayingthat “All that is necessary for evil to triumph in the world is for good people to donothing” (May 1992, 105). And further down he notes: “Inaction leads to seriousharm in the world,just as certainly as intentional,active wrongdoing”(105–06).Heargues that many problems that cannot be solved by individuals can be addressedby collective action.May is right. There are countless situations and circumstances i…
Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations
The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a 'tripartite' social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this 'three-sizes-fit-all' approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripart…
Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations
It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis‐à‐vis large‐scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of peo…
Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge
Collective inaction, omission, and non-action: When not acting is indeed on ‘us’
The statement that we are currently failing to address some of humanity’s greatest challenges seems uncontroversial—we are not doing enough to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 °C and we are exposing vulnerable people to preventable diseases when failing to produce herd immunity. But what singles out such failings (inactions) from all the things we did not do (non-actions) when all are unintended? Unlike their individualist counterparts, col…
How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations
Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two sugg…
Commentary for NASSP Award Symposium: Response to Commentators
Science-policy research collaborations need philosophers
Are Corporations Like Psychopaths? Lessons On Moral Responsibility From Rio Tinto's Juukan Gorge Disaster
There seems to be a striking parallel between the features of psychopaths and those of agential groups, including states and corporations. Psychopaths are often thought to lack some of the capacities that are constitutive of moral agency. Two features of psychopaths are commonly identified as grounds for limiting their moral responsibility: (i) their lack of relevant emotional capacities and (ii) their flawed rational capacities. Roughly, the fir…
Knowledge brokers at the science–policy interface: Insights from biosecurity and environmental management
Revisiting the Base in Evidence-Based Policy
Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they “follow the science,” because …
How Knowledge Brokers Shape the Evidence-Based Policy Landscape
Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in the philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science–policy interface.We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest…
Why We Cannot Separate Evidence From Values in Public Policy
Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at t…
Political science (12 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Business (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Climate Change and Geoengineering (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works)