How We Fail to Know
Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6344909 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anne Schwenkenbecher (0000-0003-2207-3043, Murdoch University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 901-918 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00323217211000926 |
| OpenAlex | W3157764373 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 42 |
Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems: (1) that our epistemic obligations concern not just our own knowledge and beliefs but those of others, too and (2) that our epistemic obligations can be held collectively where the epistemic tasks cannot be performed by individuals acting in isolation, for example, when we are required to produce joint epistemic goods
Business · Epistemology · Excuse · Group (periodic table · Ignorance · Order (exchange · Philosophy of science · Political science · Sociology · Wrongdoing · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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Psychology of Personal Political Engagement in Russia
Shared Agency
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Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?
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The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility
Pluralistic Ignorance and the Perpetuation of Social Norms by Unwitting Actors
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Group Agency
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Skepticism about Moral Responsibility
Pluralistic ignorance in the bystander effect
Collective ignorance
Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge
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Collective Obligations
Pluralistic ignorance
Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |