Angela Sycafoose Matthews
Biographic Data
| ID | 339113 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Angela Sycafoose Matthews |
| GIVEN NAMES | Angela Sycafoose |
| FAMILY NAME | Matthews |
| SIGNATURE | MATTHEWS A S |
| AFFILIATIONS | East Carolina University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8972-8329 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 62 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Party gatekeeping of working-class candidates under closed-list proportional representation
If You’ll Be My Bodyguard: Presidential Guard Units and Leader Capture During Coups d’état
Coup “handbooks” emphasize the capture the incumbent leader as a key objective for plotters to enact successful regime change. However, the literature has yet to empirically assess this relationship. We also lack a robust understanding of how leaders prevent their own capture during coups d’état. Using novel data on leader statuses during coups from 1950 to 2017, I find evidence that incumbent leader capture has a positive and significant relatio…
When Heads of Government and State (Hogs) Fly: Introducing the Country and Organizational Leader Travel (Colt) Dataset Measuring Foreign Travel by Hogs
Despite representing a crucial day-to-day diplomatic tool, travel by heads of government and state (HOGS) has remained an under-investigated topic in international relations, inhibiting our ability to better understand how these visits change foreign aid, interstate conflict, diplomatic affinities, and more. Here, we fill that gap by introducing the first global dataset on the foreign visits of state leaders, the Country and Organizational Leader…
Was “The Revo” a coup d'etat? An assessment of the 1979 regime change in Grenada
Bearing witness: Introducing the Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD)
The risk factors and consequences of atrocities are deeply interconnected with questions of intra- and interstate stability and conflict, economic development, colonialism, and gender equality, as well as atrocity crime monitoring and prevention. However, there is no globally comparable measure of lethal and less-lethal atrocities. The Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD) is a country-year measure of atrocities with accompanying narratives. B…
Elite Threats and Punitive Violence in Autocratic Regimes: Evidence from Communist Eastern Europe
Which autocratic elites are more likely to be punished after being removed from office? Purges are an important tool of autocratic survival, helping dictators to eliminate potential rivals. However, expulsion is not always the end for victims, as some also suffer detention or execution. Although we have compelling theories on why certain elites are purged, we still lack strong understanding of why punishments may differ. Using individual-level da…
Elite strategy in resilient authoritarianism: Equatorial Guinea, 1979–2023
The Equatoguinean dictatorship under Teodoro Obiang Nguema has spanned forty-four years, making him the longest-serving current head of state. Since his entry to power through a 1979 coup, Obiang has evolved in his style of governance. First ruling through a military junta, then a single-party regime, and finally competitive authoritarianism. Across these eras, he has relied on a cadre of supporting elites to occupy top spots in the state adminis…
Do Safety Expectations Affect the Location Strategies of Large Service Delivery Ingos
Large service-delivery international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) help shape the lives of millions worldwide, contributing significantly to the betterment of global health, development, education, and more. However, these organizations operate on limited financial resources and must deliver services on-the-ground, requiring them to make calculated decisions about their location strategies for operations. Although these INGOs should aim t…
The Politburos of Communist Eastern Europe
Who comprised the political bureaus of the Eastern Bloc? There exists a wealth of literature on the former communist party elites, studying their personal biographies and group dynamics. However, we still lack an accessible resource cataloguing these individuals and documenting their personal and professional histories. This research note introduces new individual-level data on 787 candidate and full members from the ruling politburos of nine com…
Brothers in Arms No Longer: Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge
Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they pro…
Identifying Patterns in the Structural Drivers of Intrastate Conflict
Quantitative methods have been used to: (1) better predict civil conflict onset; and (2) understand causal mechanisms to inform policy intervention and theory. However, an exploration of individual conflict onset cases illustrates great variation in the characteristics describing the outbreak of civil war, suggesting that there is not one single set of factors that lead to intrastate war. In this article, we use descriptive statistics to explore …
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain sufficient competence in their regimes to alleviate popular and foreign threats, but also how dictators nullify elite threats. Dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites, who are more powerful because they can negotiate their role from a …
Measuring and Forecasting the Rise of China: Reality over Image
The rise of Chinese capabilities relative to those of the United States has received widespread attention. Some argue that a transition in relative capabilities has already occurred, others that it is unlikely within this century. This article presents a new multidimensional measure of relative national capabilities and forecasts using the International Futures model across 29 alternative scenarios. This article finds that Chinese capabilities su…
The Nomination and Electoral Competitiveness of Working Class Candidates in Germany
The working classes are underrepresented in nearly every legislature around the world. Here, we examine several understudied questions about working class representation in legislatures. We are interested in which parties nominate working class candidates, and whether voters or parties discriminate against legislative candidates from the working class. Using data on the occupational background of German state legislative candidates, we find extre…
Don't turn around, der Kommissar's in town: Political officers and coups d'état in authoritarian regimes
How do dictators coup-proof their armed forces from within the barracks? Coup-proofing is an important aspect of autocratic survival, but execution can be challenging due to the secrecy of plots and the vast size of the armed forces. Counterbalanced state security forces are more effective at resisting coups, but less effective at noticing signs of plots before they can be launched. If dictators wish to prevent coup attempts from occurring in the…
Mixed-member electoral systems, best loser rules, and the descriptive representation of women
Unpacking Heat: Dueling Identities and Complex Views on Gun Control among Rural Police
Using 20 semistructured interviews with police officers from a rural sheriff's department, we present what we believe is the first in-depth examination of U.S. rural officers' views on gun control. We find that officers possess complex views about gun control, reflecting their multiple identities as both gun-oriented rural citizens and police who seek to control the situations they encounter at work. Specifically, we observed that rural police of…
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain sufficient competence in their regimes to alleviate popular and foreign threats, but also how dictators nullify elite threats. Dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites, who are more powerful because they can negotiate their role from a …
The Nomination and Electoral Competitiveness of Working Class Candidates in Germany
The working classes are underrepresented in nearly every legislature around the world. Here, we examine several understudied questions about working class representation in legislatures. We are interested in which parties nominate working class candidates, and whether voters or parties discriminate against legislative candidates from the working class. Using data on the occupational background of German state legislative candidates, we find extre…
Mixed-member electoral systems, best loser rules, and the descriptive representation of women
When Heads of Government and State (Hogs) Fly: Introducing the Country and Organizational Leader Travel (Colt) Dataset Measuring Foreign Travel by Hogs
Despite representing a crucial day-to-day diplomatic tool, travel by heads of government and state (HOGS) has remained an under-investigated topic in international relations, inhibiting our ability to better understand how these visits change foreign aid, interstate conflict, diplomatic affinities, and more. Here, we fill that gap by introducing the first global dataset on the foreign visits of state leaders, the Country and Organizational Leader…
Don't turn around, der Kommissar's in town: Political officers and coups d'état in authoritarian regimes
How do dictators coup-proof their armed forces from within the barracks? Coup-proofing is an important aspect of autocratic survival, but execution can be challenging due to the secrecy of plots and the vast size of the armed forces. Counterbalanced state security forces are more effective at resisting coups, but less effective at noticing signs of plots before they can be launched. If dictators wish to prevent coup attempts from occurring in the…
Unpacking Heat: Dueling Identities and Complex Views on Gun Control among Rural Police
Using 20 semistructured interviews with police officers from a rural sheriff's department, we present what we believe is the first in-depth examination of U.S. rural officers' views on gun control. We find that officers possess complex views about gun control, reflecting their multiple identities as both gun-oriented rural citizens and police who seek to control the situations they encounter at work. Specifically, we observed that rural police of…
Identifying Patterns in the Structural Drivers of Intrastate Conflict
Quantitative methods have been used to: (1) better predict civil conflict onset; and (2) understand causal mechanisms to inform policy intervention and theory. However, an exploration of individual conflict onset cases illustrates great variation in the characteristics describing the outbreak of civil war, suggesting that there is not one single set of factors that lead to intrastate war. In this article, we use descriptive statistics to explore …
Measuring and Forecasting the Rise of China: Reality over Image
The rise of Chinese capabilities relative to those of the United States has received widespread attention. Some argue that a transition in relative capabilities has already occurred, others that it is unlikely within this century. This article presents a new multidimensional measure of relative national capabilities and forecasts using the International Futures model across 29 alternative scenarios. This article finds that Chinese capabilities su…
Elite strategy in resilient authoritarianism: Equatorial Guinea, 1979–2023
The Equatoguinean dictatorship under Teodoro Obiang Nguema has spanned forty-four years, making him the longest-serving current head of state. Since his entry to power through a 1979 coup, Obiang has evolved in his style of governance. First ruling through a military junta, then a single-party regime, and finally competitive authoritarianism. Across these eras, he has relied on a cadre of supporting elites to occupy top spots in the state adminis…
Bearing witness: Introducing the Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD)
The risk factors and consequences of atrocities are deeply interconnected with questions of intra- and interstate stability and conflict, economic development, colonialism, and gender equality, as well as atrocity crime monitoring and prevention. However, there is no globally comparable measure of lethal and less-lethal atrocities. The Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD) is a country-year measure of atrocities with accompanying narratives. B…
Do Safety Expectations Affect the Location Strategies of Large Service Delivery Ingos
Large service-delivery international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) help shape the lives of millions worldwide, contributing significantly to the betterment of global health, development, education, and more. However, these organizations operate on limited financial resources and must deliver services on-the-ground, requiring them to make calculated decisions about their location strategies for operations. Although these INGOs should aim t…
The Politburos of Communist Eastern Europe
Who comprised the political bureaus of the Eastern Bloc? There exists a wealth of literature on the former communist party elites, studying their personal biographies and group dynamics. However, we still lack an accessible resource cataloguing these individuals and documenting their personal and professional histories. This research note introduces new individual-level data on 787 candidate and full members from the ruling politburos of nine com…
Brothers in Arms No Longer: Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge
Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they pro…
Unpacking Heat: Dueling Identities and Complex Views on Gun Control among Rural Police
Using 20 semistructured interviews with police officers from a rural sheriff's department, we present what we believe is the first in-depth examination of U.S. rural officers' views on gun control. We find that officers possess complex views about gun control, reflecting their multiple identities as both gun-oriented rural citizens and police who seek to control the situations they encounter at work. Specifically, we observed that rural police of…
Mixed-member electoral systems, best loser rules, and the descriptive representation of women
Measuring and Forecasting the Rise of China: Reality over Image
The rise of Chinese capabilities relative to those of the United States has received widespread attention. Some argue that a transition in relative capabilities has already occurred, others that it is unlikely within this century. This article presents a new multidimensional measure of relative national capabilities and forecasts using the International Futures model across 29 alternative scenarios. This article finds that Chinese capabilities su…
The Nomination and Electoral Competitiveness of Working Class Candidates in Germany
The working classes are underrepresented in nearly every legislature around the world. Here, we examine several understudied questions about working class representation in legislatures. We are interested in which parties nominate working class candidates, and whether voters or parties discriminate against legislative candidates from the working class. Using data on the occupational background of German state legislative candidates, we find extre…
Don't turn around, der Kommissar's in town: Political officers and coups d'état in authoritarian regimes
How do dictators coup-proof their armed forces from within the barracks? Coup-proofing is an important aspect of autocratic survival, but execution can be challenging due to the secrecy of plots and the vast size of the armed forces. Counterbalanced state security forces are more effective at resisting coups, but less effective at noticing signs of plots before they can be launched. If dictators wish to prevent coup attempts from occurring in the…
Do Safety Expectations Affect the Location Strategies of Large Service Delivery Ingos
Large service-delivery international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) help shape the lives of millions worldwide, contributing significantly to the betterment of global health, development, education, and more. However, these organizations operate on limited financial resources and must deliver services on-the-ground, requiring them to make calculated decisions about their location strategies for operations. Although these INGOs should aim t…
The Politburos of Communist Eastern Europe
Who comprised the political bureaus of the Eastern Bloc? There exists a wealth of literature on the former communist party elites, studying their personal biographies and group dynamics. However, we still lack an accessible resource cataloguing these individuals and documenting their personal and professional histories. This research note introduces new individual-level data on 787 candidate and full members from the ruling politburos of nine com…
Brothers in Arms No Longer: Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge
Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they pro…
Identifying Patterns in the Structural Drivers of Intrastate Conflict
Quantitative methods have been used to: (1) better predict civil conflict onset; and (2) understand causal mechanisms to inform policy intervention and theory. However, an exploration of individual conflict onset cases illustrates great variation in the characteristics describing the outbreak of civil war, suggesting that there is not one single set of factors that lead to intrastate war. In this article, we use descriptive statistics to explore …
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain sufficient competence in their regimes to alleviate popular and foreign threats, but also how dictators nullify elite threats. Dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites, who are more powerful because they can negotiate their role from a …
Bearing witness: Introducing the Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD)
The risk factors and consequences of atrocities are deeply interconnected with questions of intra- and interstate stability and conflict, economic development, colonialism, and gender equality, as well as atrocity crime monitoring and prevention. However, there is no globally comparable measure of lethal and less-lethal atrocities. The Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD) is a country-year measure of atrocities with accompanying narratives. B…
Elite Threats and Punitive Violence in Autocratic Regimes: Evidence from Communist Eastern Europe
Which autocratic elites are more likely to be punished after being removed from office? Purges are an important tool of autocratic survival, helping dictators to eliminate potential rivals. However, expulsion is not always the end for victims, as some also suffer detention or execution. Although we have compelling theories on why certain elites are purged, we still lack strong understanding of why punishments may differ. Using individual-level da…
Elite strategy in resilient authoritarianism: Equatorial Guinea, 1979–2023
The Equatoguinean dictatorship under Teodoro Obiang Nguema has spanned forty-four years, making him the longest-serving current head of state. Since his entry to power through a 1979 coup, Obiang has evolved in his style of governance. First ruling through a military junta, then a single-party regime, and finally competitive authoritarianism. Across these eras, he has relied on a cadre of supporting elites to occupy top spots in the state adminis…
If You’ll Be My Bodyguard: Presidential Guard Units and Leader Capture During Coups d’état
Coup “handbooks” emphasize the capture the incumbent leader as a key objective for plotters to enact successful regime change. However, the literature has yet to empirically assess this relationship. We also lack a robust understanding of how leaders prevent their own capture during coups d’état. Using novel data on leader statuses during coups from 1950 to 2017, I find evidence that incumbent leader capture has a positive and significant relatio…
When Heads of Government and State (Hogs) Fly: Introducing the Country and Organizational Leader Travel (Colt) Dataset Measuring Foreign Travel by Hogs
Despite representing a crucial day-to-day diplomatic tool, travel by heads of government and state (HOGS) has remained an under-investigated topic in international relations, inhibiting our ability to better understand how these visits change foreign aid, interstate conflict, diplomatic affinities, and more. Here, we fill that gap by introducing the first global dataset on the foreign visits of state leaders, the Country and Organizational Leader…
Was “The Revo” a coup d'etat? An assessment of the 1979 regime change in Grenada
Party gatekeeping of working-class candidates under closed-list proportional representation
Law (15 works) · Political science (15 works) · Law (12 works) · Politics (12 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Democracy (6 works) · Elite (5 works)