Brothers in Arms No Longer

Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge

Bibliographic Data

ID6286249
AuthorsEdward Goldring (0000-0002-7457-6809, University of York, York, UK, corresponding author), Angela Sycafoose Matthews (0000-0001-8972-8329, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA)
Year2023
Publication date2023-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027231206775
OpenAlexW4388163929
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited53

Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they provide dictators in navigating outsider threats. Second, dictators benefit from purging elites who helped them seize power; the demonstrable willingness of these elites to overthrow an incumbent threatens the dictator and his ability to consolidate power. We find support for our argument from original quantitative data on 289 elites in 32 autocratic ruling institutions between 1948 and 2000. Our findings have important implications for the study of the large proportion of autocracies born of regime change coups, particularly topics on survival and state violence

Argument (complex analysis · Autocracy · Democracy · Dictator · Dictatorship · Economics · Elite · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Purge · Regime change · Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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Open DOIOpen Access