Edward Goldring
Biographic Data
| ID | 278210 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Edward Goldring |
| GIVEN NAMES | Edward |
| FAMILY NAME | Goldring |
| SIGNATURE | GOLDRING E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Missouri |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7457-6809 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 95 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Succession in Uganda: What do Ugandans Think of Muhoozi Kainerugaba
IN JANUARY 2026, UGANDA’S 81-YEAR-OLD PRESIDENT YOWERI MUSEVENI WON HIS SEVENTH ELECTION under an internet blackout and allegations of fraud by the political opposition.1 As Museveni ages and refuses to cede power, the question of succession has become increasingly salient.2 The stakes are high: Uganda has never seen a peaceful leadership transition, and Museveni’s ruling coalition has grown frayed from decades of divide-and-rule tactics.3 In a c…
Authoritarian Survival and Leadership Succession in North Korea and Beyond
Authoritarian Survival and Leadership Succession in North Korea and Beyond examines how dictators manage elites to facilitate succession. Theoretically, it argues that personalistic incumbents facilitate the construction of a power base of elites from outside of their inner circle to help the successor govern once he comes to power. Then, once in office, successors consolidate power by initially relying on this power base to govern while marginal…
Blame Shifting in Autocracies following Large-Scale Disasters: Evidence from Turkey
Large-scale disasters, particularly when handled poorly, often spark popular outrage and threaten an autocrat’s hold on power. Autocrats frequently employ blame-shifting strategies to redirect public anger and weather these storms. We examine whether blame shifting after a large-scale disaster helps or hurts an autocrat’s popularity through a mixed-methods research design in the electoral autocracy of Turkey in April–July 2023, following the Febr…
Elite Management before Autocratic Leader Succession: Evidence from North Korea
How do dictators prepare for succession? Scholars have studied the determinants of succession, but we know little about the mechanisms, including elite management, of how succession occurs. The authors argue that incumbents prepare for succession by building a power base of elites outside their inner circle, for their preferred successor; doing so helps the successor to stabilize the regime. The authors test this argument by examining preparation…
Brothers in Arms No Longer: Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge
Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they pro…
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain sufficient competence in their regimes to alleviate popular and foreign threats, but also how dictators nullify elite threats. Dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites, who are more powerful because they can negotiate their role from a …
All Peacekeeping is Local: Measuring Subnational Variation in Peacekeeping Effectiveness
Understanding whether peacekeepers reduce fatalities at the local level is an important question. We can have increased confidence in peacekeepers’ capabilities by testing whether deaths decrease in the locations where peacekeepers are present. However, commonly used modeling techniques cannot easily test peacekeepers’ local effectiveness. Coefficients from methods such as linear regression, logit, and count models provide average estimates of pe…
Should we talk about the weather? How party competition and coalition participation influence parties’ attention to economic issues
Media narratives of political campaigns paint a complex picture of parties carefully selecting communication strategies in response to the current social and economic climate as well as the strategic choices made by rival parties. Current empirical efforts based on simple ordinary least squares, however, fail to honor those complexities. We argue that ignoring the spatial and temporal dynamics at play produces misleading inferences about parties’…
Rethinking Democratic Diffusion: Bringing Regime Type Back In
Studies of democratic diffusion often emphasize geographic proximity: democratization in a country or region makes democratization nearby more likely. We argue that regime type has been underappreciated; authoritarian breakdown and democratization often diffuse along networks of similar regimes. A regime’s type affects its vulnerability to popular challenge, and regime similarity increases the likelihood that protest strategies developed against …
Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems
Cross-national research on African electoral politics has argued that competition increases the prospects for pre-election violence. However, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effect of political competition on pre-election violence at the subnational level. We theorize that in African democracies characterized by competition at the national level but low subnational competitiveness (polarization), violence is often a manifestation …
Help is close at hand? Proximity and the effectiveness of peacekeepers
How do the national origins of peacekeepers influence peacekeeping operations’ success? We argue that peacekeeping operations better protect civilians when a higher percentage of peacekeepers come from geographically proximate countries. These peacekeepers have been exposed to similar societal and cultural norms and are more invested in preventing conflict diffusion. Peacekeepers from proximate countries can better collect and analyze intelligenc…
North Korea: Markets and military rule, by Hazel Smith
North Korea is not mad, bad, nor sad. Starting from this assertion, Smith’s book aims to accomplish two functions. First, so-called myths concerning North Korea’s strangeness are debunked as Smith
Fighting for a name on the ballot: Constituency-level analysis of nomination violence in Zambia
What factors increase the likelihood of nomination violence? Nomination violence can be an expression of both horizontal conflict, between local political elites, and vertical conflict, between national and local elites. We theorize about factors that may increase the risks of vertical and horizontal conflict and leverage a unique dataset of constituency-level nomination violence obtained from surveys with 464 domestic election observers active i…
Democracy in Reverse: The 2016 General Election in Zambia
On 11 August 2016, Zambia held elections for the presidency, National Assembly, local councillors, and mayors. Concurrently, a referendum was held on whether to enhance the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of Zambia. The elections were significant for several reasons: It was the first contest under a newly amended Constitution, which introduced important changes to the electoral framework. It also marked a break with Zambia's positive historica…
Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems
Cross-national research on African electoral politics has argued that competition increases the prospects for pre-election violence. However, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effect of political competition on pre-election violence at the subnational level. We theorize that in African democracies characterized by competition at the national level but low subnational competitiveness (polarization), violence is often a manifestation …
Democracy in Reverse: The 2016 General Election in Zambia
On 11 August 2016, Zambia held elections for the presidency, National Assembly, local councillors, and mayors. Concurrently, a referendum was held on whether to enhance the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of Zambia. The elections were significant for several reasons: It was the first contest under a newly amended Constitution, which introduced important changes to the electoral framework. It also marked a break with Zambia's positive historica…
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain sufficient competence in their regimes to alleviate popular and foreign threats, but also how dictators nullify elite threats. Dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites, who are more powerful because they can negotiate their role from a …
Fighting for a name on the ballot: Constituency-level analysis of nomination violence in Zambia
What factors increase the likelihood of nomination violence? Nomination violence can be an expression of both horizontal conflict, between local political elites, and vertical conflict, between national and local elites. We theorize about factors that may increase the risks of vertical and horizontal conflict and leverage a unique dataset of constituency-level nomination violence obtained from surveys with 464 domestic election observers active i…
Rethinking Democratic Diffusion: Bringing Regime Type Back In
Studies of democratic diffusion often emphasize geographic proximity: democratization in a country or region makes democratization nearby more likely. We argue that regime type has been underappreciated; authoritarian breakdown and democratization often diffuse along networks of similar regimes. A regime’s type affects its vulnerability to popular challenge, and regime similarity increases the likelihood that protest strategies developed against …
All Peacekeeping is Local: Measuring Subnational Variation in Peacekeeping Effectiveness
Understanding whether peacekeepers reduce fatalities at the local level is an important question. We can have increased confidence in peacekeepers’ capabilities by testing whether deaths decrease in the locations where peacekeepers are present. However, commonly used modeling techniques cannot easily test peacekeepers’ local effectiveness. Coefficients from methods such as linear regression, logit, and count models provide average estimates of pe…
Elite Management before Autocratic Leader Succession: Evidence from North Korea
How do dictators prepare for succession? Scholars have studied the determinants of succession, but we know little about the mechanisms, including elite management, of how succession occurs. The authors argue that incumbents prepare for succession by building a power base of elites outside their inner circle, for their preferred successor; doing so helps the successor to stabilize the regime. The authors test this argument by examining preparation…
Brothers in Arms No Longer: Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge
Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they pro…
Should we talk about the weather? How party competition and coalition participation influence parties’ attention to economic issues
Media narratives of political campaigns paint a complex picture of parties carefully selecting communication strategies in response to the current social and economic climate as well as the strategic choices made by rival parties. Current empirical efforts based on simple ordinary least squares, however, fail to honor those complexities. We argue that ignoring the spatial and temporal dynamics at play produces misleading inferences about parties’…
Help is close at hand? Proximity and the effectiveness of peacekeepers
How do the national origins of peacekeepers influence peacekeeping operations’ success? We argue that peacekeeping operations better protect civilians when a higher percentage of peacekeepers come from geographically proximate countries. These peacekeepers have been exposed to similar societal and cultural norms and are more invested in preventing conflict diffusion. Peacekeepers from proximate countries can better collect and analyze intelligenc…
Democracy in Reverse: The 2016 General Election in Zambia
On 11 August 2016, Zambia held elections for the presidency, National Assembly, local councillors, and mayors. Concurrently, a referendum was held on whether to enhance the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of Zambia. The elections were significant for several reasons: It was the first contest under a newly amended Constitution, which introduced important changes to the electoral framework. It also marked a break with Zambia's positive historica…
Help is close at hand? Proximity and the effectiveness of peacekeepers
How do the national origins of peacekeepers influence peacekeeping operations’ success? We argue that peacekeeping operations better protect civilians when a higher percentage of peacekeepers come from geographically proximate countries. These peacekeepers have been exposed to similar societal and cultural norms and are more invested in preventing conflict diffusion. Peacekeepers from proximate countries can better collect and analyze intelligenc…
North Korea: Markets and military rule, by Hazel Smith
North Korea is not mad, bad, nor sad. Starting from this assertion, Smith’s book aims to accomplish two functions. First, so-called myths concerning North Korea’s strangeness are debunked as Smith
Fighting for a name on the ballot: Constituency-level analysis of nomination violence in Zambia
What factors increase the likelihood of nomination violence? Nomination violence can be an expression of both horizontal conflict, between local political elites, and vertical conflict, between national and local elites. We theorize about factors that may increase the risks of vertical and horizontal conflict and leverage a unique dataset of constituency-level nomination violence obtained from surveys with 464 domestic election observers active i…
Should we talk about the weather? How party competition and coalition participation influence parties’ attention to economic issues
Media narratives of political campaigns paint a complex picture of parties carefully selecting communication strategies in response to the current social and economic climate as well as the strategic choices made by rival parties. Current empirical efforts based on simple ordinary least squares, however, fail to honor those complexities. We argue that ignoring the spatial and temporal dynamics at play produces misleading inferences about parties’…
Rethinking Democratic Diffusion: Bringing Regime Type Back In
Studies of democratic diffusion often emphasize geographic proximity: democratization in a country or region makes democratization nearby more likely. We argue that regime type has been underappreciated; authoritarian breakdown and democratization often diffuse along networks of similar regimes. A regime’s type affects its vulnerability to popular challenge, and regime similarity increases the likelihood that protest strategies developed against …
Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems
Cross-national research on African electoral politics has argued that competition increases the prospects for pre-election violence. However, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effect of political competition on pre-election violence at the subnational level. We theorize that in African democracies characterized by competition at the national level but low subnational competitiveness (polarization), violence is often a manifestation …
All Peacekeeping is Local: Measuring Subnational Variation in Peacekeeping Effectiveness
Understanding whether peacekeepers reduce fatalities at the local level is an important question. We can have increased confidence in peacekeepers’ capabilities by testing whether deaths decrease in the locations where peacekeepers are present. However, commonly used modeling techniques cannot easily test peacekeepers’ local effectiveness. Coefficients from methods such as linear regression, logit, and count models provide average estimates of pe…
Brothers in Arms No Longer: Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge
Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they pro…
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain sufficient competence in their regimes to alleviate popular and foreign threats, but also how dictators nullify elite threats. Dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites, who are more powerful because they can negotiate their role from a …
Elite Management before Autocratic Leader Succession: Evidence from North Korea
How do dictators prepare for succession? Scholars have studied the determinants of succession, but we know little about the mechanisms, including elite management, of how succession occurs. The authors argue that incumbents prepare for succession by building a power base of elites outside their inner circle, for their preferred successor; doing so helps the successor to stabilize the regime. The authors test this argument by examining preparation…
Authoritarian Survival and Leadership Succession in North Korea and Beyond
Authoritarian Survival and Leadership Succession in North Korea and Beyond examines how dictators manage elites to facilitate succession. Theoretically, it argues that personalistic incumbents facilitate the construction of a power base of elites from outside of their inner circle to help the successor govern once he comes to power. Then, once in office, successors consolidate power by initially relying on this power base to govern while marginal…
Blame Shifting in Autocracies following Large-Scale Disasters: Evidence from Turkey
Large-scale disasters, particularly when handled poorly, often spark popular outrage and threaten an autocrat’s hold on power. Autocrats frequently employ blame-shifting strategies to redirect public anger and weather these storms. We examine whether blame shifting after a large-scale disaster helps or hurts an autocrat’s popularity through a mixed-methods research design in the electoral autocracy of Turkey in April–July 2023, following the Febr…
Succession in Uganda: What do Ugandans Think of Muhoozi Kainerugaba
IN JANUARY 2026, UGANDA’S 81-YEAR-OLD PRESIDENT YOWERI MUSEVENI WON HIS SEVENTH ELECTION under an internet blackout and allegations of fraud by the political opposition.1 As Museveni ages and refuses to cede power, the question of succession has become increasingly salient.2 The stakes are high: Uganda has never seen a peaceful leadership transition, and Museveni’s ruling coalition has grown frayed from decades of divide-and-rule tactics.3 In a c…
Political science (12 works) · Law (10 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (9 works) · Politics (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Democracy (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Autocracy (4 works)