Kenneth Einar Himma
Biographic Data
| ID | 3468940 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kenneth Einar Himma |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kenneth Einar |
| FAMILY NAME | Himma |
| SIGNATURE | HIMMA K E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Seattle Pacific University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2517-6937 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 4 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Empire Strikes Back
This is a reply to La Torre’s criticisms of Anglo-American conceptual jurisprudence, which appeared in this journal as “The Law for Itself: Plea for a Pragmatic Jurisprudence.”1 I argue that he misconceives the fundaments of conceptual jurisprudence, as grounded in the works of Hart, Austin, and Dworkin. I then consider the various interpretations of the deontic operator should and show that none of them do any work in defense of the claim that c…
The Practical Otiosity of Exclusionary Reasons
One of Joseph Raz’s most influential contributions to legal philosophy is the Exclusionary Thesis, according to which any prescription that counts as mandatory is identical with an exclusionary reason that bars acting on certain reasons favoring noncompliance. This essay argues that exclusionary reasons are otiose in the sense there is no deliberative work they are ever needed to do under objective norms of practical reasoning
Coercion and the Nature of Law
Coercion and the Nature of Law argues that it is a conceptually necessary condition for something to count as a system of law according to our conceptual practices that it authorizes the imposition of coercive sanctions for violations of some mandatory norms governing non-official behavior (the Coercion Thesis). The book begins with an explication of the modest approach to conceptual analysis that is deployed throughout. The remainder of the book…
Law As an Artifact
Law and Morality
How much a theory of law can tell us about the nature of morality
In his outstanding paper "How Facts Make Law," Mark Greenberg argues for the antipositivist claim that descriptive facts about certain social practices are not the only necessary determinants of legal content; "value facts" - which he is committed to construing as moral facts - are another necessary determinant of legal content. In this essay, I argue that, construed as doing the work Greenberg believes it does in refuting positivism, his conclus…
Explaining why this body gives rise to me qua subject instead of someone else
Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to…
Plantinga's version of the free-will argument
According to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian eth…
Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria for moral agency
The free-will defence
One version of the free-will argument relies on the claim that, other things being equal, a world in which free beings exist is morally preferable to a world in which free beings do not exist (the ‘value thesis’). I argue that this version of the free-will argument cannot support a theodicy that should alleviate the doubts about God's existence to which the problems of evil give rise. In particular, I argue that the value thesis has no foundation…
The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics
Justifying legal protection of intellectual property
Whether or not intellectual property rights ought, as a matter of political morality, to be protected by the law surely depends on what kinds of interests the various parties have in intellectual content. Although theorists disagree on the limits of morally legitimate lawmaking authority, this much seems obvious: the coercive power of the law should be employed only to protect interests that rise to a certain level of moral importance. We have su…
The concept of information overload
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law brings together articles by twenty-six of the foremost legal theorists currently writing, to provide an overview of jurisprudential scholarship. Each article presents an account of the contending views and scholarly debates animating their field of enquiry as well as setting the agenda for further study. This publication covers the fields of legal theory and legal scholarship and philosop…
Eternally incorrigible
According to the proportionality objection to hell, infinite suffering is out of proportion to any wrong that finite human beings could commit and is hence unjust and inconsistent with God's moral perfection. The continuing-sin response concedes that eternal consignment to hell is out of proportion to the sins people commit during their earthly lives, but argues that people in hell continue to sin while in hell and, in this way, extend their cons…
Desert, Entitlement, and Affirmative Action
Finding a high road
Desert, Entitlement, and Affirmative Action
Finding a high road
Eternally incorrigible
According to the proportionality objection to hell, infinite suffering is out of proportion to any wrong that finite human beings could commit and is hence unjust and inconsistent with God's moral perfection. The continuing-sin response concedes that eternal consignment to hell is out of proportion to the sins people commit during their earthly lives, but argues that people in hell continue to sin while in hell and, in this way, extend their cons…
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law brings together articles by twenty-six of the foremost legal theorists currently writing, to provide an overview of jurisprudential scholarship. Each article presents an account of the contending views and scholarly debates animating their field of enquiry as well as setting the agenda for further study. This publication covers the fields of legal theory and legal scholarship and philosop…
The concept of information overload
The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics
Justifying legal protection of intellectual property
Whether or not intellectual property rights ought, as a matter of political morality, to be protected by the law surely depends on what kinds of interests the various parties have in intellectual content. Although theorists disagree on the limits of morally legitimate lawmaking authority, this much seems obvious: the coercive power of the law should be employed only to protect interests that rise to a certain level of moral importance. We have su…
Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria for moral agency
The free-will defence
One version of the free-will argument relies on the claim that, other things being equal, a world in which free beings exist is morally preferable to a world in which free beings do not exist (the ‘value thesis’). I argue that this version of the free-will argument cannot support a theodicy that should alleviate the doubts about God's existence to which the problems of evil give rise. In particular, I argue that the value thesis has no foundation…
Plantinga's version of the free-will argument
According to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian eth…
Explaining why this body gives rise to me qua subject instead of someone else
Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to…
How much a theory of law can tell us about the nature of morality
In his outstanding paper "How Facts Make Law," Mark Greenberg argues for the antipositivist claim that descriptive facts about certain social practices are not the only necessary determinants of legal content; "value facts" - which he is committed to construing as moral facts - are another necessary determinant of legal content. In this essay, I argue that, construed as doing the work Greenberg believes it does in refuting positivism, his conclus…
Law and Morality
Law As an Artifact
Coercion and the Nature of Law
Coercion and the Nature of Law argues that it is a conceptually necessary condition for something to count as a system of law according to our conceptual practices that it authorizes the imposition of coercive sanctions for violations of some mandatory norms governing non-official behavior (the Coercion Thesis). The book begins with an explication of the modest approach to conceptual analysis that is deployed throughout. The remainder of the book…
The Practical Otiosity of Exclusionary Reasons
One of Joseph Raz’s most influential contributions to legal philosophy is the Exclusionary Thesis, according to which any prescription that counts as mandatory is identical with an exclusionary reason that bars acting on certain reasons favoring noncompliance. This essay argues that exclusionary reasons are otiose in the sense there is no deliberative work they are ever needed to do under objective norms of practical reasoning
The Empire Strikes Back
This is a reply to La Torre’s criticisms of Anglo-American conceptual jurisprudence, which appeared in this journal as “The Law for Itself: Plea for a Pragmatic Jurisprudence.”1 I argue that he misconceives the fundaments of conceptual jurisprudence, as grounded in the works of Hart, Austin, and Dworkin. I then consider the various interpretations of the deontic operator should and show that none of them do any work in defense of the claim that c…
Law (11 works) · Political science (11 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Sociology (9 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law in Society and Culture (4 works) · Morality (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works)