Plantinga's version of the free-will argument

The good and evil that free beings do

Bibliographic Data

ID20310282
AuthorsKenneth Einar Himma (0000-0003-2517-6937, Seattle Pacific University, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume46
Issue1
Pages21-39
Publication date2010-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligious Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0034412509990230
OpenAlexW1980458088
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited2

According to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that Plantinga's version of the FWA succeeds as a theodicy. In particular, I argue that, given this understanding of Christian ethics, it seems reasonable to think it false that free beings are doing more good than evil in the world. While there are surely possible worlds in which free beings do more good than evil, this material world seems clearly not one of those. Thus, while Plantinga's version might succeed as a defence against the logical problem of evil, it will neither rebut the evidential problem of evil nor, without more, ground a successful theodicy that reconciles God's existence with the evil that occurs in this world

Argument (complex analysis) · Compatibilism · Epistemology · Existence of God · Free will · Good and evil · Moral evil · Political ponerology · Problem of Evil · Theism · Theodicy · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification

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