Fiona S Cunningham
Biographic Data
| ID | 3491698 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fiona S Cunningham |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fiona S |
| FAMILY NAME | Cunningham |
| SIGNATURE | CUNNINGHAM F S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Fiona S. Cunningham is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 49 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Escalate to Survive
Why do great powers believe it is necessary to have nuclear first-use options? What explains the different types of first-use options in the nuclear force postures of Russia and the United States? Why did China not develop a first-use option in the post-Cold War era? Existing literature focuses on whether great power nuclear strategies should entrench mutually assured destruction or compete for superiority, but it does not fully explain variation…
Other than Law
China’s test of the nuclear revolution
Accommodative Signaling in Cyberspace and the Role of Risk
Strategic Substitution
China's approach to gaining coercive leverage in the limited wars that it has planned to fight against nuclear-armed adversaries differs from the choices of other states. A theory of strategic substitution explains why China relied on threats to use information-age weapons strategically instead of nuclear threats or conventional victories in the post–Cold War era. Information-age weapons (counterspace weapons, large-scale cyberattacks, and precis…
Cooperation under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations
Warning signs that nuclear weapons could become a key component of US-China competition have appeared in the last two years, after those weapons have remained firmly in the background of the relati
The Maritime Rung on the Escalation Ladder
What options do great powers have to end future conflicts over limited political objectives without resorting to nuclear threats? This article examines a naval blockade as an option for militarized coercion that has been largely overlooked in existing scholarship on the conflict escalation ladder for great-power war in the nuclear era. Some US scholars have recommended a naval blockade of Chinese merchant shipping to coerce Beijing in a future wa…
Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation
Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be re…
Assuring Assured Retaliation
Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An e…
The trinity and the dragon
This article considers the Equator Principles experiment in forging a ‘trinity’ of corporate responsibilities – financial, social and environmental – and in particular, the importance of China's commercial banks to the future of the Equator Principles. The authors explore the obstacles that appear to be preventing those banks from adopting the Principles, suggesting that such an examination casts an important and unique light upon how a non-Weste…
Assuring Assured Retaliation
Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An e…
Strategic Substitution
China's approach to gaining coercive leverage in the limited wars that it has planned to fight against nuclear-armed adversaries differs from the choices of other states. A theory of strategic substitution explains why China relied on threats to use information-age weapons strategically instead of nuclear threats or conventional victories in the post–Cold War era. Information-age weapons (counterspace weapons, large-scale cyberattacks, and precis…
Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation
Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be re…
The Maritime Rung on the Escalation Ladder
What options do great powers have to end future conflicts over limited political objectives without resorting to nuclear threats? This article examines a naval blockade as an option for militarized coercion that has been largely overlooked in existing scholarship on the conflict escalation ladder for great-power war in the nuclear era. Some US scholars have recommended a naval blockade of Chinese merchant shipping to coerce Beijing in a future wa…
The trinity and the dragon
This article considers the Equator Principles experiment in forging a ‘trinity’ of corporate responsibilities – financial, social and environmental – and in particular, the importance of China's commercial banks to the future of the Equator Principles. The authors explore the obstacles that appear to be preventing those banks from adopting the Principles, suggesting that such an examination casts an important and unique light upon how a non-Weste…
Assuring Assured Retaliation
Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An e…
Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation
Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be re…
The Maritime Rung on the Escalation Ladder
What options do great powers have to end future conflicts over limited political objectives without resorting to nuclear threats? This article examines a naval blockade as an option for militarized coercion that has been largely overlooked in existing scholarship on the conflict escalation ladder for great-power war in the nuclear era. Some US scholars have recommended a naval blockade of Chinese merchant shipping to coerce Beijing in a future wa…
Cooperation under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations
Warning signs that nuclear weapons could become a key component of US-China competition have appeared in the last two years, after those weapons have remained firmly in the background of the relati
Accommodative Signaling in Cyberspace and the Role of Risk
Strategic Substitution
China's approach to gaining coercive leverage in the limited wars that it has planned to fight against nuclear-armed adversaries differs from the choices of other states. A theory of strategic substitution explains why China relied on threats to use information-age weapons strategically instead of nuclear threats or conventional victories in the post–Cold War era. Information-age weapons (counterspace weapons, large-scale cyberattacks, and precis…
Other than Law
China’s test of the nuclear revolution
Escalate to Survive
Why do great powers believe it is necessary to have nuclear first-use options? What explains the different types of first-use options in the nuclear force postures of Russia and the United States? Why did China not develop a first-use option in the post-Cold War era? Existing literature focuses on whether great power nuclear strategies should entrench mutually assured destruction or compete for superiority, but it does not fully explain variation…
Nuclear Issues and Defense (8 works) · China (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Law (6 works) · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies (5 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Nuclear weapon (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Business (4 works)