David C Nixon
Biographic Data
| ID | 3543200 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David C Nixon |
| GIVEN NAMES | David C |
| FAMILY NAME | Nixon |
| SIGNATURE | NIXON D C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgia State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4045-2370 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 203 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Do bureaucratic appointees change their minds? Preference stability at the NLRB
Objectives Questions of attitude stability for appointed decisionmakers are vital to our understanding of democracy. I test the assumption of bureaucratic preference stability that is widespread in formal and empirical analyses of the U.S. executive branch. Methods The study presents a qualitative analysis of quantitative voting data for members of the National Labor Relations Board from 1948 to 1988 Results Analysis reveals a few clear cases of …
State tax subsidies to bolster the long-term care insurance market
This paper examines long-term care insurance sales to assess whether state income tax subsidies are effective in encouraging the private purchase of long-term care insurance. Drawing from the most comprehensive available sales data on long-term care insurance policies, cross-state and over-time variation in sales data during the late 1990s and early 2000s are analysed. This analysis uses a panel model with fixed effects controls for potential end…
InstitutionalConflict andPerceivedPropertyRights inAppointmentPolitics
Despite the importance of political appointees in U.S. politics, most of what we know about bureaucratic appointment centers on institutional conflict between the separate legislative and executive branches, and ignores personal qualities of nominees that so often seem pivotal to the selection debate. Using data drawn from every appointment to four U.S. independent regulatory agencies, I present empirical evidence that perceived property rights r…
Separated Powers in the United States
Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats an…
With Strings Attached
While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter‐branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency au…
Appointment Delay and the Policy Environment of the National Transportation Safety Board
Appointments to regulatory agencies are rarely the subject of empirical analysis, and when they are scrutinized, the focus is institutional factors. Instead, the authors examine the policy environment to determine if external factors influence the appointment process. To illustrate this, accident rates are analyzed to determine their effect on appointment duration at the National Transportation Safety Board. The most important explanatory variabl…
The Supreme Court and Opinion Content
The Supreme Court and Opinion Content
Many scholars of the Supreme Court and many justices assert the importance of the Federalist Papers. They provide important evidence of original meaning and interpretation of the Constitution, and there is evidence that there is an increase in citations to the Federalist Papers in Supreme Court opinions. While some may view this increased citation use as a positive development because it demonstrates reliance on legal authority in judicial decisi…
Policy-Making by Different Means
Formal theories of majority voting suggest that the organizing rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCUS) present the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with the opportunity to sway the policy statements of the JCUS in favor of his preferred language. Existing political science literature on the Chief Justice demonstrates that Chiefs use their authority to pursue their policy agendas in a variety of other settings. The membershi…
Regional Court Influence over Bureaucratic Policymaking
Regional Court Influence Over Bureaucratic Policymaking
While there have been numerous studies demonstrating bureaucratic control of administrative and regulatory agencies, many argue that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency out of control, and one not subject to political constraints. However, some recent studies have shown that the IRS is subject to some political control in shifting policy between the often competing concerns of efficiency and fairness. We extend these studies to examine judi…
With Friends Like These
Structure and process theorists (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, among others), argue that the Administrative Procedures Act establishes a privileged position for the dominant organized interest of an industry in their dealings with regulatory agencies. We examined whether this was indeed the case with respect to the APA-required notice and comment period for rule making at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Based on an analysis of the …
Appointment Delay for Vacancies on the Federal Communications Commission
Confirmation politics for judicial appointees is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but the politics of appointment for independent agencies is less well understood, because nominees are very rarely rejected and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, alternative evidence of conflict between the president and the Senate is available: the length of time it takes to fill a vacancy on a board or commission. An em…
Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the Circuit Courts of Appeals
Supreme Court confirmation is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but lower court confirmation is less well understood, in part because lower court nominees are very rarely rejected, and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, the length of time it takes to fill a judicial vacancy serves as alternate evidence of conflict between the president and the Senate. We present an empirical assessment of appellate vacan…
Separated Powers in the United States
Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats an…
With Friends Like These
Structure and process theorists (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, among others), argue that the Administrative Procedures Act establishes a privileged position for the dominant organized interest of an industry in their dealings with regulatory agencies. We examined whether this was indeed the case with respect to the APA-required notice and comment period for rule making at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Based on an analysis of the …
The Supreme Court and Opinion Content
Many scholars of the Supreme Court and many justices assert the importance of the Federalist Papers. They provide important evidence of original meaning and interpretation of the Constitution, and there is evidence that there is an increase in citations to the Federalist Papers in Supreme Court opinions. While some may view this increased citation use as a positive development because it demonstrates reliance on legal authority in judicial decisi…
Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the Circuit Courts of Appeals
Supreme Court confirmation is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but lower court confirmation is less well understood, in part because lower court nominees are very rarely rejected, and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, the length of time it takes to fill a judicial vacancy serves as alternate evidence of conflict between the president and the Senate. We present an empirical assessment of appellate vacan…
Regional Court Influence Over Bureaucratic Policymaking
While there have been numerous studies demonstrating bureaucratic control of administrative and regulatory agencies, many argue that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency out of control, and one not subject to political constraints. However, some recent studies have shown that the IRS is subject to some political control in shifting policy between the often competing concerns of efficiency and fairness. We extend these studies to examine judi…
Appointment Delay and the Policy Environment of the National Transportation Safety Board
Appointments to regulatory agencies are rarely the subject of empirical analysis, and when they are scrutinized, the focus is institutional factors. Instead, the authors examine the policy environment to determine if external factors influence the appointment process. To illustrate this, accident rates are analyzed to determine their effect on appointment duration at the National Transportation Safety Board. The most important explanatory variabl…
Policy-Making by Different Means
Formal theories of majority voting suggest that the organizing rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCUS) present the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with the opportunity to sway the policy statements of the JCUS in favor of his preferred language. Existing political science literature on the Chief Justice demonstrates that Chiefs use their authority to pursue their policy agendas in a variety of other settings. The membershi…
InstitutionalConflict andPerceivedPropertyRights inAppointmentPolitics
Despite the importance of political appointees in U.S. politics, most of what we know about bureaucratic appointment centers on institutional conflict between the separate legislative and executive branches, and ignores personal qualities of nominees that so often seem pivotal to the selection debate. Using data drawn from every appointment to four U.S. independent regulatory agencies, I present empirical evidence that perceived property rights r…
Appointment Delay for Vacancies on the Federal Communications Commission
Confirmation politics for judicial appointees is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but the politics of appointment for independent agencies is less well understood, because nominees are very rarely rejected and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, alternative evidence of conflict between the president and the Senate is available: the length of time it takes to fill a vacancy on a board or commission. An em…
Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the Circuit Courts of Appeals
Supreme Court confirmation is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but lower court confirmation is less well understood, in part because lower court nominees are very rarely rejected, and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, the length of time it takes to fill a judicial vacancy serves as alternate evidence of conflict between the president and the Senate. We present an empirical assessment of appellate vacan…
Regional Court Influence over Bureaucratic Policymaking
Regional Court Influence Over Bureaucratic Policymaking
While there have been numerous studies demonstrating bureaucratic control of administrative and regulatory agencies, many argue that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency out of control, and one not subject to political constraints. However, some recent studies have shown that the IRS is subject to some political control in shifting policy between the often competing concerns of efficiency and fairness. We extend these studies to examine judi…
With Friends Like These
Structure and process theorists (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, among others), argue that the Administrative Procedures Act establishes a privileged position for the dominant organized interest of an industry in their dealings with regulatory agencies. We examined whether this was indeed the case with respect to the APA-required notice and comment period for rule making at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Based on an analysis of the …
Policy-Making by Different Means
Formal theories of majority voting suggest that the organizing rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCUS) present the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with the opportunity to sway the policy statements of the JCUS in favor of his preferred language. Existing political science literature on the Chief Justice demonstrates that Chiefs use their authority to pursue their policy agendas in a variety of other settings. The membershi…
The Supreme Court and Opinion Content
The Supreme Court and Opinion Content
Many scholars of the Supreme Court and many justices assert the importance of the Federalist Papers. They provide important evidence of original meaning and interpretation of the Constitution, and there is evidence that there is an increase in citations to the Federalist Papers in Supreme Court opinions. While some may view this increased citation use as a positive development because it demonstrates reliance on legal authority in judicial decisi…
Appointment Delay and the Policy Environment of the National Transportation Safety Board
Appointments to regulatory agencies are rarely the subject of empirical analysis, and when they are scrutinized, the focus is institutional factors. Instead, the authors examine the policy environment to determine if external factors influence the appointment process. To illustrate this, accident rates are analyzed to determine their effect on appointment duration at the National Transportation Safety Board. The most important explanatory variabl…
With Strings Attached
While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter‐branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency au…
Separated Powers in the United States
Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats an…
State tax subsidies to bolster the long-term care insurance market
This paper examines long-term care insurance sales to assess whether state income tax subsidies are effective in encouraging the private purchase of long-term care insurance. Drawing from the most comprehensive available sales data on long-term care insurance policies, cross-state and over-time variation in sales data during the late 1990s and early 2000s are analysed. This analysis uses a panel model with fixed effects controls for potential end…
InstitutionalConflict andPerceivedPropertyRights inAppointmentPolitics
Despite the importance of political appointees in U.S. politics, most of what we know about bureaucratic appointment centers on institutional conflict between the separate legislative and executive branches, and ignores personal qualities of nominees that so often seem pivotal to the selection debate. Using data drawn from every appointment to four U.S. independent regulatory agencies, I present empirical evidence that perceived property rights r…
Do bureaucratic appointees change their minds? Preference stability at the NLRB
Objectives Questions of attitude stability for appointed decisionmakers are vital to our understanding of democracy. I test the assumption of bureaucratic preference stability that is widespread in formal and empirical analyses of the U.S. executive branch. Methods The study presents a qualitative analysis of quantitative voting data for members of the National Labor Relations Board from 1948 to 1988 Results Analysis reveals a few clear cases of …
Law (13 works) · Political science (13 works) · Law (10 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (10 works) · Politics (10 works) · Economics (8 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (8 works) · Public Administration (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Bureaucracy (6 works)