Do bureaucratic appointees change their minds? Preference stability at the NLRB
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10764142 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David C Nixon (0000-0003-4045-2370, Department of Public Administration University of Hawaii Honolulu Hawaii USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 702-715 |
| Publication date | 2023-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Science Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0038-4941 • E-ISSN: 1540-6237 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ssqu.13294 |
| OpenAlex | W4382561062 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
Objectives Questions of attitude stability for appointed decisionmakers are vital to our understanding of democracy. I test the assumption of bureaucratic preference stability that is widespread in formal and empirical analyses of the U.S. executive branch. Methods The study presents a qualitative analysis of quantitative voting data for members of the National Labor Relations Board from 1948 to 1988 Results Analysis reveals a few clear cases of permanent and important preference change and some evidence of change at the very beginning or very end of a few board members' careers. But overall there is remarkable stability in the relative levels of support for labor exhibited by board members as their careers unfold. Conclusions With some notable exceptions, an independent regulatory board member's revealed preferences tend to remain stable and consistent with the expectations that any observer would have had at the time of their initial appointment
Bureaucracy · Democracy · Economics · Empirical research · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Preference · Test (biology) · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Psychology
Deliberate Discretion?
Delegating Powers
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Changing minds? Not in Congress
Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Confirmation Dynamics
Strategic Appointments
The Dynamics of the "Revolving Door" on the FCC
The Who, When, and Where of Executive Nominations
A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC
Measuring Political Preferences
Influencing the Bureaucracy
The Determinants of NLRB Decision-Making Revisited
Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions
Spatial Models of Delegation
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation
| Highly cited | No |
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