Richard Potthoff
Biographic Data
| ID | 3558559 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard Potthoff |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard |
| FAMILY NAME | Potthoff |
| SIGNATURE | POTTHOFF R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7241-3459 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 102 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 16 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Clashes Involving National Popular Vote, Hare (“RCV”), Maine, Alaska
Apparently unnoticed by its advocates, a prominent effort to improve the troubled US presidential-election system—the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—is on a collision course with another effort at electoral change—“ranked-choice voting” (RCV, known previously by less ambiguous names). The NPVIC is a clever device intended, without constitutional amendment, to elect as president the nationwide popular-vote winner (i.e., the plura…
Condorcet Loser in 2016
Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, to Trump. Another surprise is that Johnson may have been the Condorcet winner. A minimal no…
Multiwinner approval voting
Three Bizarre Presidential-Election Scenarios
The 1968, 2000, and (future) 2024 U.S. presidential elections provide settings for deliberately provocative, offbeat scenarios that might have happened or could happen. Throughout, the Electoral College and plurality voting both receive blame. Scenario 1 exposes a quirk previously unnoticed: Under (albeit special) conditions, certain 1968 Humphrey voters could have made Humphrey rather than Nixon the election victor had they voted strategically f…
Estimating Ideal Points from Roll-Call Data
For two or more dimensions, the two main approaches to estimating legislators' ideal points from roll-call data entail arbitrary, yet consequential, identification and modeling assumptions that bring about both indeterminateness and undue constraints for the ideal points. This paper presents a simple and fast approach to estimating ideal points in multiple dimensions that is not marred by those issues. The leading approach at present is that of P…
Tests of whether candidate A or B would fare better against C—and other polling enrichments to open up party strategy
Our main setting is a single-winner election contested by two major parties. A goal is to find whether candidate A or B of one party would be the stronger opponent running against candidate C of the other party. A poll (as many polls do) asks the same set of respondents to choose both between A and C and between B and C. The classical McNemar test and two novel extensions thereof can evaluate the difference between A and B regarding their strengt…
Condorcet polling can yield serendipitous clues about voter views
The paradox of grading systems
An Underrated 1911 Relic Can Modify Divisor Methods to Prevent Quota Violation in Proportional Representation and U.S. House Apportionment
Allocating seats to parties and apportioning seats to geographic areas are equivalent processes mathematically. The Hamilton method, or method of largest remainders, provides one approach. The five ‘divisor’ methods—Adams, Dean, Hill-Huntington, Webster (Sainte-Laguë) and Jefferson (d'Hondt)—provide another. Either is imperfect: the former observes quota but allows paradoxes, whereas the latter allows quota violation but avoids paradoxes. A fresh…
Condorcet Polling
Scheduling of panels by integer programming
Voter Uncertainty Can Produce Preferences with More Than One Peak, but Not Preference Cycles
The one-dimensional Downsian spatial model entails single-peaked preferences for each voter. Consequently, the preference ranking of the electorate as a whole is also single-peaked, and Condorcet cycles in the preferences of the electorate are not possible. Our main theoretical results herein are that, if the model is generalized to allow for voter uncertainty about candidates' positions, then single-peakedness no longer exists invariably, either…
The components of elections
Use of Integer Programming to Optimize the Scheduling of Panels at Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society
The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence
The `Downsian' model is widely held to predict the convergence of parties to the median in two-party systems with unidimensional policy spaces. We show this is not true, if voters are uncertain. This paper gives an exposition of the two-party divergence results, including (1) if both candidates are free to move, but the incumbent has lower variance of policy action as perceived by voters, then there is no equilibrium, even if preferences are `sin…
Proportional Representation
Using a recent article by Monroe as a springboard, we extend and generalize his system of proportional representation (PR) by developing a general method for determining a set of winners from the ballots. Central to our analysis is the use of integer programming, which is a type of linear programming. Under Monroe's system and our generalizations of it, one minimizes total misrepresentation, where misrepresentation is based on approval votes, the…
The components of elections
The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence
The `Downsian' model is widely held to predict the convergence of parties to the median in two-party systems with unidimensional policy spaces. We show this is not true, if voters are uncertain. This paper gives an exposition of the two-party divergence results, including (1) if both candidates are free to move, but the incumbent has lower variance of policy action as perceived by voters, then there is no equilibrium, even if preferences are `sin…
Proportional Representation
Using a recent article by Monroe as a springboard, we extend and generalize his system of proportional representation (PR) by developing a general method for determining a set of winners from the ballots. Central to our analysis is the use of integer programming, which is a type of linear programming. Under Monroe's system and our generalizations of it, one minimizes total misrepresentation, where misrepresentation is based on approval votes, the…
Estimating Ideal Points from Roll-Call Data
For two or more dimensions, the two main approaches to estimating legislators' ideal points from roll-call data entail arbitrary, yet consequential, identification and modeling assumptions that bring about both indeterminateness and undue constraints for the ideal points. This paper presents a simple and fast approach to estimating ideal points in multiple dimensions that is not marred by those issues. The leading approach at present is that of P…
Condorcet Polling
Voter Uncertainty Can Produce Preferences with More Than One Peak, but Not Preference Cycles
The one-dimensional Downsian spatial model entails single-peaked preferences for each voter. Consequently, the preference ranking of the electorate as a whole is also single-peaked, and Condorcet cycles in the preferences of the electorate are not possible. Our main theoretical results herein are that, if the model is generalized to allow for voter uncertainty about candidates' positions, then single-peakedness no longer exists invariably, either…
Condorcet Loser in 2016
Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, to Trump. Another surprise is that Johnson may have been the Condorcet winner. A minimal no…
Three Bizarre Presidential-Election Scenarios
The 1968, 2000, and (future) 2024 U.S. presidential elections provide settings for deliberately provocative, offbeat scenarios that might have happened or could happen. Throughout, the Electoral College and plurality voting both receive blame. Scenario 1 exposes a quirk previously unnoticed: Under (albeit special) conditions, certain 1968 Humphrey voters could have made Humphrey rather than Nixon the election victor had they voted strategically f…
Condorcet polling can yield serendipitous clues about voter views
Multiwinner approval voting
The paradox of grading systems
An Underrated 1911 Relic Can Modify Divisor Methods to Prevent Quota Violation in Proportional Representation and U.S. House Apportionment
Allocating seats to parties and apportioning seats to geographic areas are equivalent processes mathematically. The Hamilton method, or method of largest remainders, provides one approach. The five ‘divisor’ methods—Adams, Dean, Hill-Huntington, Webster (Sainte-Laguë) and Jefferson (d'Hondt)—provide another. Either is imperfect: the former observes quota but allows paradoxes, whereas the latter allows quota violation but avoids paradoxes. A fresh…
Use of Integer Programming to Optimize the Scheduling of Panels at Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society
Proportional Representation
Using a recent article by Monroe as a springboard, we extend and generalize his system of proportional representation (PR) by developing a general method for determining a set of winners from the ballots. Central to our analysis is the use of integer programming, which is a type of linear programming. Under Monroe's system and our generalizations of it, one minimizes total misrepresentation, where misrepresentation is based on approval votes, the…
The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence
The `Downsian' model is widely held to predict the convergence of parties to the median in two-party systems with unidimensional policy spaces. We show this is not true, if voters are uncertain. This paper gives an exposition of the two-party divergence results, including (1) if both candidates are free to move, but the incumbent has lower variance of policy action as perceived by voters, then there is no equilibrium, even if preferences are `sin…
Use of Integer Programming to Optimize the Scheduling of Panels at Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society
Voter Uncertainty Can Produce Preferences with More Than One Peak, but Not Preference Cycles
The one-dimensional Downsian spatial model entails single-peaked preferences for each voter. Consequently, the preference ranking of the electorate as a whole is also single-peaked, and Condorcet cycles in the preferences of the electorate are not possible. Our main theoretical results herein are that, if the model is generalized to allow for voter uncertainty about candidates' positions, then single-peakedness no longer exists invariably, either…
The components of elections
Scheduling of panels by integer programming
Condorcet Polling
An Underrated 1911 Relic Can Modify Divisor Methods to Prevent Quota Violation in Proportional Representation and U.S. House Apportionment
Allocating seats to parties and apportioning seats to geographic areas are equivalent processes mathematically. The Hamilton method, or method of largest remainders, provides one approach. The five ‘divisor’ methods—Adams, Dean, Hill-Huntington, Webster (Sainte-Laguë) and Jefferson (d'Hondt)—provide another. Either is imperfect: the former observes quota but allows paradoxes, whereas the latter allows quota violation but avoids paradoxes. A fresh…
Condorcet polling can yield serendipitous clues about voter views
The paradox of grading systems
Tests of whether candidate A or B would fare better against C—and other polling enrichments to open up party strategy
Our main setting is a single-winner election contested by two major parties. A goal is to find whether candidate A or B of one party would be the stronger opponent running against candidate C of the other party. A poll (as many polls do) asks the same set of respondents to choose both between A and C and between B and C. The classical McNemar test and two novel extensions thereof can evaluate the difference between A and B regarding their strengt…
Estimating Ideal Points from Roll-Call Data
For two or more dimensions, the two main approaches to estimating legislators' ideal points from roll-call data entail arbitrary, yet consequential, identification and modeling assumptions that bring about both indeterminateness and undue constraints for the ideal points. This paper presents a simple and fast approach to estimating ideal points in multiple dimensions that is not marred by those issues. The leading approach at present is that of P…
Multiwinner approval voting
Three Bizarre Presidential-Election Scenarios
The 1968, 2000, and (future) 2024 U.S. presidential elections provide settings for deliberately provocative, offbeat scenarios that might have happened or could happen. Throughout, the Electoral College and plurality voting both receive blame. Scenario 1 exposes a quirk previously unnoticed: Under (albeit special) conditions, certain 1968 Humphrey voters could have made Humphrey rather than Nixon the election victor had they voted strategically f…
Clashes Involving National Popular Vote, Hare (“RCV”), Maine, Alaska
Apparently unnoticed by its advocates, a prominent effort to improve the troubled US presidential-election system—the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—is on a collision course with another effort at electoral change—“ranked-choice voting” (RCV, known previously by less ambiguous names). The NPVIC is a clever device intended, without constitutional amendment, to elect as president the nationwide popular-vote winner (i.e., the plura…
Condorcet Loser in 2016
Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, to Trump. Another surprise is that Johnson may have been the Condorcet winner. A minimal no…
Law (14 works) · Political science (13 works) · Economics (12 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (12 works) · Law (12 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Mathematical economics (9 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Politics (8 works)