Tests of whether candidate A or B would fare better against C—and other polling enrichments to open up party strategy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12546346 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Potthoff (0000-0002-7241-3459, Duke University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 828-840 |
| Publication date | 2017-12-20 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Party Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1354-0688 • E-ISSN: 1460-3683 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354068817744200 |
| OpenAlex | W2776417544 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
Our main setting is a single-winner election contested by two major parties. A goal is to find whether candidate A or B of one party would be the stronger opponent running against candidate C of the other party. A poll (as many polls do) asks the same set of respondents to choose both between A and C and between B and C. The classical McNemar test and two novel extensions thereof can evaluate the difference between A and B regarding their strength against C. The first extension treats the case where some respondents answer one question but not both, a condition that the McNemar test itself does not handle well. The second covers the case where respondents who do not answer a question are probed further to see if they lean toward either candidate. We provide empirical examples related to the 2016 US presidential election. The A-versus-B strength difference vis-à-vis C can be statistically significant even if the difference between A’s showing against C and B’s showing against C is small. We argue finally that other insights helpful to party and candidate strategy can also emerge from novel augmentations to polling practices
Economics · Extension (predicate logic · Law and economics · McNemar's test · Political science · Politics · Polling · Presidential system · Set (abstract data type · Statistics · Test (biology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Media Influence and Politics · Psychology
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| Highly cited | No |
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