Dylan Dodd
Biographic Data
| ID | 3589466 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dylan Dodd |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dylan |
| FAMILY NAME | Dodd |
| SIGNATURE | DODD D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of St Andrews |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Belief and certainty
Scepticism And Perceptual Justification
New essays on scepticism about the senses explore the problem of whether and how experience can provide knowledge or justification for belief about the objective world outside the experiencer's mind.
The Cookie Paradox
We’ve all been at parties where there's one cookie left on what was once a plate full of cookies, a cookie no one will eat simply because everyone is following a rule of etiquette, according to which you’re not supposed to eat the last cookie. Or at least we think everyone is following this rule, but maybe not. In this paper I present a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox, which is an argument that seems to prove that in any situation in which everyo…
Roger White's Argument against Imprecise Credences
According to the Imprecise Credence Framework (ICF), a rational believer's doxastic state should be modelled by a set of probability functions rather than a single probability function, namely, the set of probability functions allowed by the evidence (Joyce [2005]). Roger White ([2010]) has recently given an arresting argument against the ICF, which has garnered a number of responses. In this article, I attempt to cast doubt on his argument. Firs…
Evidentialism and skeptical arguments
Quasi-miracles, typicality, and counterfactuals
Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions
Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic
Journal Article Why Williamson Should be a Sceptic Get access Dylan Dodd Dylan Dodd Syracuse University, New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 229, October 2007, Pages 635–649, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.500.x Published: 03 May 2007
The Challenge of Concessive Knowledge Attributions
Belief and certainty
Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions
Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic
Journal Article Why Williamson Should be a Sceptic Get access Dylan Dodd Dylan Dodd Syracuse University, New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 229, October 2007, Pages 635–649, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.500.x Published: 03 May 2007
Quasi-miracles, typicality, and counterfactuals
Evidentialism and skeptical arguments
The Challenge of Concessive Knowledge Attributions
Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic
Journal Article Why Williamson Should be a Sceptic Get access Dylan Dodd Dylan Dodd Syracuse University, New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 229, October 2007, Pages 635–649, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.500.x Published: 03 May 2007
Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions
Quasi-miracles, typicality, and counterfactuals
Evidentialism and skeptical arguments
Roger White's Argument against Imprecise Credences
According to the Imprecise Credence Framework (ICF), a rational believer's doxastic state should be modelled by a set of probability functions rather than a single probability function, namely, the set of probability functions allowed by the evidence (Joyce [2005]). Roger White ([2010]) has recently given an arresting argument against the ICF, which has garnered a number of responses. In this article, I attempt to cast doubt on his argument. Firs…
Scepticism And Perceptual Justification
New essays on scepticism about the senses explore the problem of whether and how experience can provide knowledge or justification for belief about the objective world outside the experiencer's mind.
The Cookie Paradox
We’ve all been at parties where there's one cookie left on what was once a plate full of cookies, a cookie no one will eat simply because everyone is following a rule of etiquette, according to which you’re not supposed to eat the last cookie. Or at least we think everyone is following this rule, but maybe not. In this paper I present a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox, which is an argument that seems to prove that in any situation in which everyo…
Belief and certainty
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works)