Roger White's Argument against Imprecise Credences
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399418 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dylan Dodd (University of Aberdeen, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 69-77 |
| Publication date | 2013-03-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axs014 |
| OpenAlex | W2329080376 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
According to the Imprecise Credence Framework (ICF), a rational believer's doxastic state should be modelled by a set of probability functions rather than a single probability function, namely, the set of probability functions allowed by the evidence (Joyce [2005]). Roger White ([2010]) has recently given an arresting argument against the ICF, which has garnered a number of responses. In this article, I attempt to cast doubt on his argument. First, I point out that it's not an argument against the ICF per se, but an argument for the Principle of Indifference. Second, I present an argument that's analogous to White's. I argue that if White's premises are true, the premises of this argument are too. But the premises of my argument entail something obviously false. Therefore, White's premises must not all be true. 1 Introduction 2 White's Argument 3 A Counterargument
Argument (complex analysis) · Credence · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Statistics · White (mutation) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Highly cited | No |
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