Jordan Mackenzie
Biographic Data
| ID | 3592012 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jordan Mackenzie |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jordan |
| FAMILY NAME | Mackenzie |
| SIGNATURE | MACKENZIE J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Virginia Tech |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8065-5159 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1968 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Just humour me: Humour, humourlessness, and mutual recognition
We care about whether the people around us can take a joke. And this care has a moral tinge to it: we're more likely to trust good-humoured people, and are prone to accusing humourless people of being ‘sanctimonious buzzkills’ who need to ‘get over themselves’. But are these moralized reactions justified? And what, if anything, justifies them? This paper discusses the moral value of humour in terms of its connection to mutual recognition: by enga…
Giving the terminally ill access to euthanasia is not discriminatory: A response to Reed
Survivor guilt
Grief: A Philosophical Guide
Self-Deception as a Moral Failure
In this paper, I defend the view that self-deception is a moral failure. Instead of saying that self-deception is bad because it undermines our moral character or leads to morally deleterious consequences, as has been argued by Butler, Kant, Smith, and others, I argue the distinctive badness of self-deception lies in the tragic relationship that it bears to our own values. On one hand, self-deception is motivated by what we value. On the other ha…
Caring by lying
Caring for loved ones with dementia can sometimes necessitate a loose relationship with the truth. Some might view such deception as categorically immoral, and a violation of our general truth‐telling obligations. I argue that this view is mistaken. This is because truth‐telling obligations may be limited by the particular relationships in which they feature. Specifically, within caregiving relationships, we are often permitted (and sometimes obl…
Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations
In “Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue,” Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of…
Prescriptivism and Rational Behaviour
Journal Article Prescriptivism and Rational Behaviour Get access J. C. Mackenzie J. C. Mackenzie University of Alberta, Edmonton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 18, Issue 73, October 1968, Pages 310–319, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217792 Published: 01 October 1968
Self-Deception as a Moral Failure
In this paper, I defend the view that self-deception is a moral failure. Instead of saying that self-deception is bad because it undermines our moral character or leads to morally deleterious consequences, as has been argued by Butler, Kant, Smith, and others, I argue the distinctive badness of self-deception lies in the tragic relationship that it bears to our own values. On one hand, self-deception is motivated by what we value. On the other ha…
Prescriptivism and Rational Behaviour
Journal Article Prescriptivism and Rational Behaviour Get access J. C. Mackenzie J. C. Mackenzie University of Alberta, Edmonton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 18, Issue 73, October 1968, Pages 310–319, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217792 Published: 01 October 1968
Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations
In “Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue,” Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of…
Caring by lying
Caring for loved ones with dementia can sometimes necessitate a loose relationship with the truth. Some might view such deception as categorically immoral, and a violation of our general truth‐telling obligations. I argue that this view is mistaken. This is because truth‐telling obligations may be limited by the particular relationships in which they feature. Specifically, within caregiving relationships, we are often permitted (and sometimes obl…
Self-Deception as a Moral Failure
In this paper, I defend the view that self-deception is a moral failure. Instead of saying that self-deception is bad because it undermines our moral character or leads to morally deleterious consequences, as has been argued by Butler, Kant, Smith, and others, I argue the distinctive badness of self-deception lies in the tragic relationship that it bears to our own values. On one hand, self-deception is motivated by what we value. On the other ha…
Survivor guilt
Grief: A Philosophical Guide
Giving the terminally ill access to euthanasia is not discriminatory: A response to Reed
Just humour me: Humour, humourlessness, and mutual recognition
We care about whether the people around us can take a joke. And this care has a moral tinge to it: we're more likely to trust good-humoured people, and are prone to accusing humourless people of being ‘sanctimonious buzzkills’ who need to ‘get over themselves’. But are these moralized reactions justified? And what, if anything, justifies them? This paper discusses the moral value of humour in terms of its connection to mutual recognition: by enga…
Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Deception (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Grief, Bereavement, and Mental Health (2 works)