Self-Deception as a Moral Failure
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351867 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jordan Mackenzie (0000-0002-8065-5159, Virginia Tech, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 402-421 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqab024 |
| OpenAlex | W3159661186 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 16 |
In this paper, I defend the view that self-deception is a moral failure. Instead of saying that self-deception is bad because it undermines our moral character or leads to morally deleterious consequences, as has been argued by Butler, Kant, Smith, and others, I argue the distinctive badness of self-deception lies in the tragic relationship that it bears to our own values. On one hand, self-deception is motivated by what we value. On the other hand, it prevents us from valuing those things properly. I argue that we owe it ourselves to take seriously our own values, by striving to properly value them. This gives us both prudential and moral reasons to avoid self-deception
Character (mathematics) · Deception · Epistemology · Law and economics · Moral character · Self-deception · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |