Nishi Shah
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597498 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nishi Shah |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nishi |
| FAMILY NAME | Shah |
| SIGNATURE | SHAH N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Amherst College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 161 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Constructivism in Ethics
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays writte…
A New Argument for Evidentialism
When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct i…
Doxastic Deliberation
Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true---or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We…
Welfare and Rational Care
Book Review| October 01 2004 Welfare and Rational Care Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xi, 135. Nishi Shah Nishi Shah Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 577–582. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-4-577 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook…
How Truth Governs Belief
Research Article| October 01 2003 How Truth Governs Belief Nishi Shah Nishi Shah Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 447–482. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-4-447 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Nishi Sha…
Doxastic Deliberation
Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true---or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We…
A New Argument for Evidentialism
When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct i…
How Truth Governs Belief
Research Article| October 01 2003 How Truth Governs Belief Nishi Shah Nishi Shah Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 447–482. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-4-447 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Nishi Sha…
How Truth Governs Belief
Research Article| October 01 2003 How Truth Governs Belief Nishi Shah Nishi Shah Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 447–482. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-4-447 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Nishi Sha…
Welfare and Rational Care
Book Review| October 01 2004 Welfare and Rational Care Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xi, 135. Nishi Shah Nishi Shah Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 577–582. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-4-577 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook…
Doxastic Deliberation
Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true---or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We…
A New Argument for Evidentialism
When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct i…
Constructivism in Ethics
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays writte…
Citation (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Download (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Icon (3 works) · Information retrieval (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 works) · Political science (3 works)