Welfare and Rational Care
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10700396 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nishi Shah (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 577-582 |
| Publication date | 2004-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-113-4-577 |
| OpenAlex | W1986233270 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
Book Review| October 01 2004 Welfare and Rational Care Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xi, 135. Nishi Shah Nishi Shah Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 577–582. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-4-577 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Nishi Shah; Welfare and Rational Care. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2004; 113 (4): 577–582. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-4-577 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2004 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content
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Bienestar
Meriting Concern and Meriting Respect
Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value
The “Intrinsic” Bit
Axiology and Time
Idealization
A Defense of Subjectivism
Temporal Neutrality and The Demandingness of Prudence
Deontic and Maximizing
The “Prudential” Bit
The Possibility of Temporal Bias
The Valuing Attitude
Project-Oriented Subjectivism
What Is a Theory of Prudential Intrinsic Value?
The Morality of Unequal Autonomy
Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness
Theories of Well-Being and Descriptive Adequacy
Taking values seriously
| Citations per year | 1.13 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Highly cited | No |