Graham Bex‐priestley
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597515 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Graham Bex‐priestley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Graham |
| FAMILY NAME | Bex‐priestley |
| SIGNATURE | PRIESTLEY G B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leeds |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7731-5535 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree
It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively correct view. In this paper, we argue that it should not be. We have conducted two preregistered studies gauging English speakers’ intuitions about whether there is disagreement in a case where the parties have non-clashing beliefs …
Disagreement for Dialetheists
Dialetheists believe some sentences are both true and false. Objectors have argued that this makes it unclear how people can disagree with each other because, given the dialetheist’s commitments, if I make a claim and you tell me my claim is false, we might both be correct. Graham Priest (2006a) thinks that people disagree by rejecting or denying what is said rather than ascribing falsehood to it. We build on the work of Julien Murzi and Massimil…
Sidestepping the Frege-Geach Problem
Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege-Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto the belief-components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism's own commitments: That the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. We articulate a new approach. Instea…
Gender as Name
Many people believe that if you identify as a particular gender, then you are that gender. This paper is my attempt at making sense of this claim. I propose to conceive of genders as names: determined by the individual and not requiring any specific biological or psychological qualities, yet still important to the bearer
Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism
If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do not robustly represent reality. This gives rise to the problem of how to understand moral error. How can we be mistaken if there is no moral reality to be mistaken about? The standard expressivist explanation of moral doubt is couched in terms of our fear that our judgements may not survive improvements to our epistemic situation. There is a debate b…
Sidestepping the Frege-Geach Problem
Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege-Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto the belief-components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism's own commitments: That the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. We articulate a new approach. Instea…
Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism
If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do not robustly represent reality. This gives rise to the problem of how to understand moral error. How can we be mistaken if there is no moral reality to be mistaken about? The standard expressivist explanation of moral doubt is couched in terms of our fear that our judgements may not survive improvements to our epistemic situation. There is a debate b…
Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism
If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do not robustly represent reality. This gives rise to the problem of how to understand moral error. How can we be mistaken if there is no moral reality to be mistaken about? The standard expressivist explanation of moral doubt is couched in terms of our fear that our judgements may not survive improvements to our epistemic situation. There is a debate b…
Gender as Name
Many people believe that if you identify as a particular gender, then you are that gender. This paper is my attempt at making sense of this claim. I propose to conceive of genders as names: determined by the individual and not requiring any specific biological or psychological qualities, yet still important to the bearer
Sidestepping the Frege-Geach Problem
Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege-Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto the belief-components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism's own commitments: That the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. We articulate a new approach. Instea…
Disagreement for Dialetheists
Dialetheists believe some sentences are both true and false. Objectors have argued that this makes it unclear how people can disagree with each other because, given the dialetheist’s commitments, if I make a claim and you tell me my claim is false, we might both be correct. Graham Priest (2006a) thinks that people disagree by rejecting or denying what is said rather than ascribing falsehood to it. We build on the work of Julien Murzi and Massimil…
It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree
It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively correct view. In this paper, we argue that it should not be. We have conducted two preregistered studies gauging English speakers’ intuitions about whether there is disagreement in a case where the parties have non-clashing beliefs …
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Expressivism (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works)