Cathy Mason
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597542 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Cathy Mason |
| GIVEN NAMES | Cathy |
| FAMILY NAME | Mason |
| SIGNATURE | MASON C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cambridge |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7272-1948 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Anscombe, joint action, and the guise of the good
Discussion of Anscombean joint action has thus far focused primarily on the possibility of joint practical knowledge. In this paper, I raise an under-recognised problem for theorists of Anscombean joint action: how can we make sense of the idea that action is taken under the guide of the good in cases of joint action? Considerable collaboration seems possible in the absence of any shared characterisation of the good to be achieved in thus acting.…
Is forgiveness openness to reconciliation
In a recent paper, Strabbing (2020) argues that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation relative to a relationship level. In this paper, we argue that the openness-to-reconciliation account of forgiveness does not constitute an improvement on the forswearing-resentment account. We argue that it does not fit well with our ordinary practices of forgiving and cannot allow for plausible cases of forgiveness without reconciliation. We also argue tha…
Moral Articulation
Journal Article Moral Articulation Get access Moral Articulation. By Matthew Congdon. (New York: OUP, 2024. Pp. xi + 244. Price $83.00.) Cathy Mason Cathy Mason Central European University https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7272-1948 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqae054, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae054 Published: 20 May 2024
Reconceiving Murdochian Realism
It can be tempting to read Iris Murdoch as subscribing to the same position as standard contemporary moral realists. Her language is often similar to theirs and they share some key commitments, most importantly the rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, it is a mistake to assume that her realism amounts to the same thing theirs does. In this paper I offer a sketch of her alternative conception of realism, which centres on the idea that t…
Murdoch's ontological argument
Anselm's ontological argument is an argument for the existence of God. This paper presents Iris Murdoch's ontological argument for the existence of the Good. It discusses her interpretation of Anselm's argument, her own distinctive appropriation of it, as well as some of the merits of her version of the argument. In doing so, it also shows how the argument integrates some key Murdochian ideas: morality's wide scope, the basicness of vision to mor…
On the basis of friendship – a reply to Phelan
What is common to all instances of friendship? Given their seemingly heterogeneous character, Phelan [2019. “Rethinking Friendship.” Inquiry] suggests that friendships are relationships that result from collaborative norm-manipulation. In this paper, I suggest that this proposal fails to account for all friendships without relying on the notion of some kind of care
Epistemic Partialism
Most of us are partial to our friends and loved ones: we treat them with special care, and we feel justified in doing so. In recent years, the idea that good friends are also epistemically partial to one another has been popular. Being a good friend, so-called epistemic partialists suggest, involves being positively biased towards one's friends - that is, involves thinking more highly of them than is warranted by the evidence. In this paper, I ou…
The Virtue of Hope in a Turbulent World
I argue that hope is an ethical virtue. Hope, I suggest, is necessary for engaging in a broad kind of project which is essential for living a meaningful human life, and this gives us reason to think that it is non-instrumentally valuable in our lives. Specifically, I claim that hope is well understood as a ‘structural virtue’ without which we are prone to slip into despair, fantasy and cynicism. Moreover, I argue that this virtue will be particul…
Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony
In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot be testimonially acquired
Hoping and Intending
Hope powerfully influences our lives, deeply shaping our actions, as well as being essential for social and political change. Many accounts of hope, however, fail to do justice to its active role, ignoring the connection between hope and action that makes it a significant feature of our lives. In this essay, I propose a new account of hope in which hopes characteristically shape and figure in intentions. I argue that this account does justice to …
What’s Bad about Friendship with Bad People
Is there something bad about being friends with seriously bad people? Intuitively, it seems so, but it is hard to see why this should be. This is especially the case since some other kinds of loving relationship with bad people look morally acceptable or even good. In this paper, I argue that friendship inherently involves taking one’s friends seriously, which involves openness to their beliefs, concerns, and subjective interests. Deeply immoral …
The epistemic demands of friendship: Friendship as inherently knowledge-involving
Many recent philosophers have been tempted by epistemic partialism. They hold that epistemic norms and those of friendship constitutively conflict. In this paper, I suggest that underpinning this claim is the assumption that friendship is not an epistemically rich state, an assumption that even opponents of epistemic partiality have not questioned. I argue that there is good reason to question this assumption, and instead regard friendship as ess…
Humility and Ethical Development
Humility can seem like a somewhat "unfashionable" virtue: the word can conjure an image of cringing servility, unduly romanticized feelings of inferiority, or a level of self-denial which seems ill-placed in a life well-lived. But the term can also capture something of great ethical importance. In this paper, I will propose an account of humility that attempts to capture this moral significance. I will then explore the connection between humility…
Responsibility and Comparative Pride – a Critical Discussion of Morgan-Knapp
Taking pride in being better than others in some regard is not uncommon. In a recent paper, Christopher Morgan-Knapp (2019) argues that such pride is misguided: it ‘presents things as being some way they are not’ (Morgan-Knapp 2019: 317). I argue that Morgan-Knapp's arguments do not succeed in showing that comparative pride is theoretically mistaken
Epistemic Partialism
Most of us are partial to our friends and loved ones: we treat them with special care, and we feel justified in doing so. In recent years, the idea that good friends are also epistemically partial to one another has been popular. Being a good friend, so-called epistemic partialists suggest, involves being positively biased towards one's friends - that is, involves thinking more highly of them than is warranted by the evidence. In this paper, I ou…
The epistemic demands of friendship: Friendship as inherently knowledge-involving
Many recent philosophers have been tempted by epistemic partialism. They hold that epistemic norms and those of friendship constitutively conflict. In this paper, I suggest that underpinning this claim is the assumption that friendship is not an epistemically rich state, an assumption that even opponents of epistemic partiality have not questioned. I argue that there is good reason to question this assumption, and instead regard friendship as ess…
Responsibility and Comparative Pride – a Critical Discussion of Morgan-Knapp
Taking pride in being better than others in some regard is not uncommon. In a recent paper, Christopher Morgan-Knapp (2019) argues that such pride is misguided: it ‘presents things as being some way they are not’ (Morgan-Knapp 2019: 317). I argue that Morgan-Knapp's arguments do not succeed in showing that comparative pride is theoretically mistaken
Humility and Ethical Development
Humility can seem like a somewhat "unfashionable" virtue: the word can conjure an image of cringing servility, unduly romanticized feelings of inferiority, or a level of self-denial which seems ill-placed in a life well-lived. But the term can also capture something of great ethical importance. In this paper, I will propose an account of humility that attempts to capture this moral significance. I will then explore the connection between humility…
Hoping and Intending
Hope powerfully influences our lives, deeply shaping our actions, as well as being essential for social and political change. Many accounts of hope, however, fail to do justice to its active role, ignoring the connection between hope and action that makes it a significant feature of our lives. In this essay, I propose a new account of hope in which hopes characteristically shape and figure in intentions. I argue that this account does justice to …
What’s Bad about Friendship with Bad People
Is there something bad about being friends with seriously bad people? Intuitively, it seems so, but it is hard to see why this should be. This is especially the case since some other kinds of loving relationship with bad people look morally acceptable or even good. In this paper, I argue that friendship inherently involves taking one’s friends seriously, which involves openness to their beliefs, concerns, and subjective interests. Deeply immoral …
The epistemic demands of friendship: Friendship as inherently knowledge-involving
Many recent philosophers have been tempted by epistemic partialism. They hold that epistemic norms and those of friendship constitutively conflict. In this paper, I suggest that underpinning this claim is the assumption that friendship is not an epistemically rich state, an assumption that even opponents of epistemic partiality have not questioned. I argue that there is good reason to question this assumption, and instead regard friendship as ess…
The Virtue of Hope in a Turbulent World
I argue that hope is an ethical virtue. Hope, I suggest, is necessary for engaging in a broad kind of project which is essential for living a meaningful human life, and this gives us reason to think that it is non-instrumentally valuable in our lives. Specifically, I claim that hope is well understood as a ‘structural virtue’ without which we are prone to slip into despair, fantasy and cynicism. Moreover, I argue that this virtue will be particul…
Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony
In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot be testimonially acquired
Reconceiving Murdochian Realism
It can be tempting to read Iris Murdoch as subscribing to the same position as standard contemporary moral realists. Her language is often similar to theirs and they share some key commitments, most importantly the rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, it is a mistake to assume that her realism amounts to the same thing theirs does. In this paper I offer a sketch of her alternative conception of realism, which centres on the idea that t…
Murdoch's ontological argument
Anselm's ontological argument is an argument for the existence of God. This paper presents Iris Murdoch's ontological argument for the existence of the Good. It discusses her interpretation of Anselm's argument, her own distinctive appropriation of it, as well as some of the merits of her version of the argument. In doing so, it also shows how the argument integrates some key Murdochian ideas: morality's wide scope, the basicness of vision to mor…
On the basis of friendship – a reply to Phelan
What is common to all instances of friendship? Given their seemingly heterogeneous character, Phelan [2019. “Rethinking Friendship.” Inquiry] suggests that friendships are relationships that result from collaborative norm-manipulation. In this paper, I suggest that this proposal fails to account for all friendships without relying on the notion of some kind of care
Epistemic Partialism
Most of us are partial to our friends and loved ones: we treat them with special care, and we feel justified in doing so. In recent years, the idea that good friends are also epistemically partial to one another has been popular. Being a good friend, so-called epistemic partialists suggest, involves being positively biased towards one's friends - that is, involves thinking more highly of them than is warranted by the evidence. In this paper, I ou…
Moral Articulation
Journal Article Moral Articulation Get access Moral Articulation. By Matthew Congdon. (New York: OUP, 2024. Pp. xi + 244. Price $83.00.) Cathy Mason Cathy Mason Central European University https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7272-1948 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqae054, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae054 Published: 20 May 2024
Is forgiveness openness to reconciliation
In a recent paper, Strabbing (2020) argues that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation relative to a relationship level. In this paper, we argue that the openness-to-reconciliation account of forgiveness does not constitute an improvement on the forswearing-resentment account. We argue that it does not fit well with our ordinary practices of forgiving and cannot allow for plausible cases of forgiveness without reconciliation. We also argue tha…
Anscombe, joint action, and the guise of the good
Discussion of Anscombean joint action has thus far focused primarily on the possibility of joint practical knowledge. In this paper, I raise an under-recognised problem for theorists of Anscombean joint action: how can we make sense of the idea that action is taken under the guide of the good in cases of joint action? Considerable collaboration seems possible in the absence of any shared characterisation of the good to be achieved in thus acting.…
Philosophy (11 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Social Psychology (6 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Ethics in medical practice (3 works)