Murdoch's ontological argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21603192 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cathy Mason (0000-0001-7272-1948, Department of Philosophy Central European University Vienna Austria), Matt Dougherty (0000-0003-4224-687X, Department of Philosophy University of Vienna Vienna Austria, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 769-784 |
| Publication date | 2023-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12820 |
| OpenAlex | W4293009786 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 26 |
Anselm's ontological argument is an argument for the existence of God. This paper presents Iris Murdoch's ontological argument for the existence of the Good. It discusses her interpretation of Anselm's argument, her own distinctive appropriation of it, as well as some of the merits of her version of the argument. In doing so, it also shows how the argument integrates some key Murdochian ideas: morality's wide scope, the basicness of vision to morality, moral realism, and Platonism
Appropriation · Argument map · Epistemology · Linguistics · Morality · Ontological argument · Philosophy of religion · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Philosophy · Philosophy and Literary Analysis · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism
Ethics
Metaphysics as a guide to morals
A Philosophy to Live ByEngaging Iris Murdoch
‘The Women are Up to Something’
Getting the measure of Murdoch's Good
On the transcendental structure of Iris Murdoch's philosophical method
‘Ontological’ arguments from experience
The Logical Structure of Anselm's Arguments
Anselm's Ontological Arguments
Disunity of Virtue
The Full Unity of the Virtues
Finite and Infinite Goods
Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |