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Rachael Briggs

Biographic Data

ID3597582
NAMERachael Briggs
GIVEN NAMESRachael
FAMILY NAMEBriggs
SIGNATUREBRIGGS R
AFFILIATIONSAustralian National University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS39
AUTHOR COUNT6
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2009
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2012
H-INDEX4
  • Propositions and same-saying: Introduction

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs, Mark Jago•ARTICLE•Synthese•2012•References: 7

  • Truthmaking without necessitation

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Synthese•2012•Cited by: 5•References: 22

  • The Metaphysics of Chance: The Metaphysics of Chance

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2010•Cited by: 2•References: 31

    This article surveys several interrelated issues in the metaphysics of chance. First, what is the relationship between the probabilities associated with types of trials (for instance, the chance that a twenty‐eight‐year old develops diabetes before age thirty) and the probabilities associated with individual token trials (for instance, the chance that I develop diabetes before age thirty)? Second, which features of the the world fix the chances: …

  • The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Synthese•2009•Cited by: 4•References: 12

  • Distorted Reflection

    Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 20•References: 17

    Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulat…

  • Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes

    Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 8•References: 3

    It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometime…

  • Distorted Reflection

    Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 20•References: 17

    Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulat…

  • Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes

    Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 8•References: 3

    It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometime…

  • Truthmaking without necessitation

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Synthese•2012•Cited by: 5•References: 22

  • The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Synthese•2009•Cited by: 4•References: 12

  • The Metaphysics of Chance: The Metaphysics of Chance

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2010•Cited by: 2•References: 31

    This article surveys several interrelated issues in the metaphysics of chance. First, what is the relationship between the probabilities associated with types of trials (for instance, the chance that a twenty‐eight‐year old develops diabetes before age thirty) and the probabilities associated with individual token trials (for instance, the chance that I develop diabetes before age thirty)? Second, which features of the the world fix the chances: …

  • The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Synthese•2009•Cited by: 4•References: 12

  • Distorted Reflection

    Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 20•References: 17

    Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulat…

  • Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes

    Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2009•Cited by: 8•References: 3

    It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometime…

  • The Metaphysics of Chance: The Metaphysics of Chance

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2010•Cited by: 2•References: 31

    This article surveys several interrelated issues in the metaphysics of chance. First, what is the relationship between the probabilities associated with types of trials (for instance, the chance that a twenty‐eight‐year old develops diabetes before age thirty) and the probabilities associated with individual token trials (for instance, the chance that I develop diabetes before age thirty)? Second, which features of the the world fix the chances: …

  • Propositions and same-saying: Introduction

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs, Mark Jago•ARTICLE•Synthese•2012•References: 7

  • Truthmaking without necessitation

    Open Access•Rachael Briggs•ARTICLE•Synthese•2012•Cited by: 5•References: 22

Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Counterexample (2 works)

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