Distorted Reflection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10695319 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rachael Briggs (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 59-85 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-2008-029 |
| OpenAlex | W4254920458 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 42 |
| References cited | 17 |
Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new “Qualified Reflection” principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence. In response to the second question, the essay argues that contrary to a common misconception, not all Dutch books dramatize incoherence—some dramatize a less blameworthy sort of epistemic frailty that the essay calls “self-doubt.” The distinction between Dutch books that dramatize incoherence and those that dramatize self-doubt cross-cuts the distinction between synchronic and diachronic Dutch books. The essay explains why the Dutch book for conditionalization reveals true incoherence, whereas the Dutch book for Reflection reveals only self-doubt
Counterexample · Epistemology · Reflection (computer programming) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief
Rational Slack and Doxastic Grain
The Value of Evidence and Ratificationism
Bayesian Updating When What You Learn Might Be False (Forthcoming in Erkenntnis)
Bayesian Beauty
An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization
Coherent combination of experts’ opinions
Superconditioning
Evidence and truth
Local and global deference
A puzzle about fickleness
Reflecting on diachronic Dutch books
Isaac Levi Prize 2024
The Value of Normative Information
Radically insensitive theists
Deference Done Better
Changes in attitude
The Eternal Coin
The Paradox of Luminosity
Externalism and exploitability
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs
Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief
Basic‐Know And Super‐Know
Comparative opinion loss
Some attitudes we usually do not have
Options and Diachronic Tragedy
Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences
Rational Polarization
On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation
Cogito and Moore
Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism
A modesty proposal
The value of cost-free uncertain evidence
How to lose your memory without losing your money
Reflecting on finite additivity
The problem of perception and the no-miracles principle
On the proper formulation of conditionalization
Generalized Learning and Conditional Expectation
In Defense of Reflection
Against the truth norm
Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments
Rational Aversion to Information
| Unique citing works | 42 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,63 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 41 |