A puzzle about fickleness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21364095 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elise Woodard (0000-0002-5509-9963, University of Michigan Ann Arbor Michigan United States, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 323-342 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12359 |
| OpenAlex | W3109345678 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 42 |
In this paper, I motivate a puzzle about epistemic rationality. On the one hand, there seems to be something problematic about frequently changing your mind. On the other hand, changing your mind once is often permissible. Why do one‐off changes of mind seem rationally permissible, even admirable, while constant changes seem quintessentially irrational? The puzzle of fickleness is to explain this asymmetry. To solve the puzzle, I propose and defend the Ratifiable Reasoning Account . According to this solution, as agents redeliberate, they gain two types of evidence. First, they gain inductive evidence that they will not stably settle their belief. Second, this inductive evidence affords higher‐order evidence that they are unreliable at assessing the matter at hand. The fact that fickle agents gain this higher‐order evidence explains why fickleness can be epistemically—not just practically—irrational. In addition to solving the puzzle, my account captures a wide range of contextual factors that are relevant for our judgments
Cognitive psychology · Economics · Empirical evidence · Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Irrational number · Order (exchange) · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Normative Externalism
Belief and the Will
On Making the Right Choice
Respecting the Evidence
Unreasonable Knowledge
Epistemic Permissiveness
Revisions and Regret
Distorted Reflection
Higher‐Order Evidence 1
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat
Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality
The Puzzle of Metacoherence
Counterfactual Thinking and the First Instinct Fallacy
The Uniqueness Thesis
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |