The Uniqueness Thesis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4928828 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Kopec (0000-0002-6475-4368, Charles Sturt University, corresponding author), Michael G Titelbaum (University of Wisconsin–Madison) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 189-200 |
| Publication date | 2016-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12318 |
| OpenAlex | W2340777379 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 43 |
| References cited | 44 |
The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find them unconvincing. Last, we present some purported counterexamples that have been raised against Uniqueness and discuss some possible reasons why proponents of Uniqueness might find these similarly unconvincing
Algorithm · Combinatorics · Counterexample · Epistemology · Mathematical analysis · Mathematical economics · Sketch · Uniqueness · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Hybrid Impermissivism and the Diachronic Coordination Problem
Disagreement, Public Reason, and Epistemic Abstinence
Arbitrariness and Uniqueness
Unacknowledged Permissivism
Rational Slack and Doxastic Grain
A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism
Permissivism and the Truth-Connection
Resolutions Against Uniqueness
In Defense of Intrapersonal Permissivism
A Rational Agent With Our Evidence
A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager
Epistemic Permissivism and Symmetric Games
Permissive Divergence
Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic
Permissivism and self‐fulfilling propositions
Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle
Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory
Vindicating the verifiability criterion
Disagreements in understanding
Epistemology without guidance
Weighing and aggregating reasons under uncertainty
A puzzle about fickleness
After Pascal’s Wager
Permissivism and intellectual virtue
Ethics and epistemic hopelessness
Time-slice epistemology for Bayesians
Reframing Epistemic Partiality
Intellectual humility without limits
Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control
The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma
Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth
The trouble with standards of proof
The distinctly zetetic significance of disagreement
Elgin’s community-oriented steadfastness
Immodesty and permissivism
On the relationship between epistemology and science
The explanatory role of consistency requirements
On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefs
A deference model of epistemic authority
The precision fallacy
Judgement aggregation in scientific collaborations
Withhold by default
Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism
Evidentialism
Evidentialism
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
Belief and the Will
Reasonable Religious Disagreements
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
Not Enough There There Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence
Epistemic Permissiveness
The procedural epistemic value of deliberation
On “Epistemic Permissiveness”
A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
Epistemic instrumentalism
Disagreement, evidence, and agnosticism
Partiality and prejudice in trusting
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Epistemology of Disagreement
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations
Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality
Disagreement as Evidence
| Unique citing works | 43 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,78 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 42 |