Matthew Kopec
Biographic Data
| ID | 372948 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Kopec |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Kopec |
| SIGNATURE | KOPEC M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Australian National University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6475-4368 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The effectiveness of embedded values analysis modules in Computer Science education: An empirical study
Embedding ethics modules within computer science courses has become a popular response to the growing recognition that computer science programs need to better equip their students to navigate the ethical dimensions of computing technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics. However, the popularity of this approach has outpaced the evidence of its positive outcomes. To help close that gap, this empirical s…
No Harm Done? An Experimental Approach to the Nonidentity Problem
Discussions of the nonidentity problem presuppose a widely shared intuition that actions or policies that change who comes into existence do not, thereby, become morally unproblematic. We hypothesize that this intuition is not generally shared by the public, which could have widespread implications concerning how to generate support for large-scale, identity-affecting policies relating to matters like climate change. To test this, we ran a versio…
Shared Intention Is Not Joint Commitment
Margaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action. This view has proven both influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purported counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterexamples to th…
A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
The Uniqueness Thesis
The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find …
Clines, Clusters, and Clades in the Race Debate
In this paper, I argue against Andreasen and Sesardic, who have both claimed that recent cluster results in population genetics serve as evidence that the human species contains, or at least once contained, subspecies. I show that the cluster results are in fact evidentially inert relative to each author’s preferred subspecies concept. I then sketch the kinds of biological facts that could be used to push the debate further
A More Fulfilling (and Frustrating) Take on Reflexive Predictions
Even though social scientists continue to discuss the problems posed by self-fulfilling and self-frustrating predictions, philosophers of science have ignored the topic since the 1970s. Back then, the prevailing view was that the methodological problems posed by reflexive predictions are either minor or easily avoided. I believe that this consensus was premature, ultimately relying on an overly narrow understanding of the phenomenon. I present an…
The Uniqueness Thesis
The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find …
A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
A More Fulfilling (and Frustrating) Take on Reflexive Predictions
Even though social scientists continue to discuss the problems posed by self-fulfilling and self-frustrating predictions, philosophers of science have ignored the topic since the 1970s. Back then, the prevailing view was that the methodological problems posed by reflexive predictions are either minor or easily avoided. I believe that this consensus was premature, ultimately relying on an overly narrow understanding of the phenomenon. I present an…
Clines, Clusters, and Clades in the Race Debate
In this paper, I argue against Andreasen and Sesardic, who have both claimed that recent cluster results in population genetics serve as evidence that the human species contains, or at least once contained, subspecies. I show that the cluster results are in fact evidentially inert relative to each author’s preferred subspecies concept. I then sketch the kinds of biological facts that could be used to push the debate further
A More Fulfilling (and Frustrating) Take on Reflexive Predictions
Even though social scientists continue to discuss the problems posed by self-fulfilling and self-frustrating predictions, philosophers of science have ignored the topic since the 1970s. Back then, the prevailing view was that the methodological problems posed by reflexive predictions are either minor or easily avoided. I believe that this consensus was premature, ultimately relying on an overly narrow understanding of the phenomenon. I present an…
Clines, Clusters, and Clades in the Race Debate
In this paper, I argue against Andreasen and Sesardic, who have both claimed that recent cluster results in population genetics serve as evidence that the human species contains, or at least once contained, subspecies. I show that the cluster results are in fact evidentially inert relative to each author’s preferred subspecies concept. I then sketch the kinds of biological facts that could be used to push the debate further
The Uniqueness Thesis
The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find …
Shared Intention Is Not Joint Commitment
Margaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action. This view has proven both influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purported counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterexamples to th…
A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
No Harm Done? An Experimental Approach to the Nonidentity Problem
Discussions of the nonidentity problem presuppose a widely shared intuition that actions or policies that change who comes into existence do not, thereby, become morally unproblematic. We hypothesize that this intuition is not generally shared by the public, which could have widespread implications concerning how to generate support for large-scale, identity-affecting policies relating to matters like climate change. To test this, we ran a versio…
The effectiveness of embedded values analysis modules in Computer Science education: An empirical study
Embedding ethics modules within computer science courses has become a popular response to the growing recognition that computer science programs need to better equip their students to navigate the ethical dimensions of computing technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics. However, the popularity of this approach has outpaced the evidence of its positive outcomes. To help close that gap, this empirical s…
Epistemology (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Sketch (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Engineering (2 works)