Michael G Titelbaum
Biographic Data
| ID | 453688 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael G Titelbaum |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael G |
| FAMILY NAME | Titelbaum |
| SIGNATURE | TITELBAUM M G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wisconsin–Madison |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 73 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Dutch Book Arguments
This chapter assesses Dutch Book arguments. We present Dutch Book arguments for probabilism and updating by Conditionalization. An attempt is made to “depragmatize” these arguments and present them with plausible epistemological conclusions. Objections to the arguments are surveyed and responded to where possible.
Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 1: Introducing Credences
This book introduces readers to the fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology. It begins by motivating and explaining the idea of a degree of belief (also known as a "credence"). It then presents Bayesians' five core normative rules governing degrees of belief: Kolmogorov's three probability axioms, the Ratio Formula for conditional credences, and Conditionalization for updating credences over time. After considering a few proposed additions to these…
Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 2: Arguments, Challenges, Alternatives
This book introduces readers to the fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology. It begins by motivating and explaining the idea of a degree of belief (also known as a "credence"). It then presents Bayesians' five core normative rules governing degrees of belief: Kolmogorov's three probability axioms, the Ratio Formula for conditional credences, and Conditionalization for updating credences over time. After considering a few proposed additions to these…
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals Is Counterintuitive
Roger White ([2010]) argued for a principle of indifference. Hart and Titelbaum ([2015]) showed that White’s argument relied on an intuition about conditioning on biconditionals that, while widely shared, is incorrect. Hawthorne, Landes, Wallmann, and Williamson ([2017]) argue for a principle of indifference. Remarkably, their argument relies on the same faulty intuition. We explain their intuition, explain why it’s faulty, and show how it genera…
The Uniqueness Thesis
The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find …
Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: (In Defense of Right Reason)
This article defends the Fixed Point Thesis: that it is always a rational mistake to have false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. The Fixed Point Thesis is inspired by logical omniscience requirements in formal epistemology. It argues to the Fixed Point Thesis from the Akratic Principle: that rationality forbids having an attitude while believing that attitude is rationally forbidden. It then draws out surprising consequences of the …
Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem
The Sleeping Beauty Problem attracts so much attention because it connects to a wide variety of unresolved issues in formal epistemology, decision theory, and the philosophy of science. The problem raises unanswered questions concerning relative frequencies, objective chances, the relation between self-locating and non-self-locating information, the relation between self-location and updating, Dutch Books, accuracy arguments, memory loss, indiffe…
Not Enough There There Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence: Not Enough There There: Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence
The maximum entropy approach was introduced in (Jaynes 1957a) and (Jaynes 1957b
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general framework for modeling stories involving context-sensitive claims. The key innovations are a revised conditionalization rule and a principle relating models of the same story wit…
What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general framework for modeling stories involving context-sensitive claims. The key innovations are a revised conditionalization rule and a principle relating models of the same story wit…
What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like
The Uniqueness Thesis
The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find …
Not Enough There There Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence: Not Enough There There: Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence
The maximum entropy approach was introduced in (Jaynes 1957a) and (Jaynes 1957b
Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem
The Sleeping Beauty Problem attracts so much attention because it connects to a wide variety of unresolved issues in formal epistemology, decision theory, and the philosophy of science. The problem raises unanswered questions concerning relative frequencies, objective chances, the relation between self-locating and non-self-locating information, the relation between self-location and updating, Dutch Books, accuracy arguments, memory loss, indiffe…
Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 1: Introducing Credences
This book introduces readers to the fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology. It begins by motivating and explaining the idea of a degree of belief (also known as a "credence"). It then presents Bayesians' five core normative rules governing degrees of belief: Kolmogorov's three probability axioms, the Ratio Formula for conditional credences, and Conditionalization for updating credences over time. After considering a few proposed additions to these…
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general framework for modeling stories involving context-sensitive claims. The key innovations are a revised conditionalization rule and a principle relating models of the same story wit…
What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like
Not Enough There There Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence: Not Enough There There: Evidence, Reasons, and Language Independence
The maximum entropy approach was introduced in (Jaynes 1957a) and (Jaynes 1957b
Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem
The Sleeping Beauty Problem attracts so much attention because it connects to a wide variety of unresolved issues in formal epistemology, decision theory, and the philosophy of science. The problem raises unanswered questions concerning relative frequencies, objective chances, the relation between self-locating and non-self-locating information, the relation between self-location and updating, Dutch Books, accuracy arguments, memory loss, indiffe…
Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: (In Defense of Right Reason)
This article defends the Fixed Point Thesis: that it is always a rational mistake to have false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. The Fixed Point Thesis is inspired by logical omniscience requirements in formal epistemology. It argues to the Fixed Point Thesis from the Akratic Principle: that rationality forbids having an attitude while believing that attitude is rationally forbidden. It then draws out surprising consequences of the …
The Uniqueness Thesis
The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find …
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals Is Counterintuitive
Roger White ([2010]) argued for a principle of indifference. Hart and Titelbaum ([2015]) showed that White’s argument relied on an intuition about conditioning on biconditionals that, while widely shared, is incorrect. Hawthorne, Landes, Wallmann, and Williamson ([2017]) argue for a principle of indifference. Remarkably, their argument relies on the same faulty intuition. We explain their intuition, explain why it’s faulty, and show how it genera…
Dutch Book Arguments
This chapter assesses Dutch Book arguments. We present Dutch Book arguments for probabilism and updating by Conditionalization. An attempt is made to “depragmatize” these arguments and present them with plausible epistemological conclusions. Objections to the arguments are surveyed and responded to where possible.
Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 1: Introducing Credences
This book introduces readers to the fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology. It begins by motivating and explaining the idea of a degree of belief (also known as a "credence"). It then presents Bayesians' five core normative rules governing degrees of belief: Kolmogorov's three probability axioms, the Ratio Formula for conditional credences, and Conditionalization for updating credences over time. After considering a few proposed additions to these…
Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 2: Arguments, Challenges, Alternatives
This book introduces readers to the fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology. It begins by motivating and explaining the idea of a degree of belief (also known as a "credence"). It then presents Bayesians' five core normative rules governing degrees of belief: Kolmogorov's three probability axioms, the Ratio Formula for conditional credences, and Conditionalization for updating credences over time. After considering a few proposed additions to these…
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works)