Andy Egan
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597625 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andy Egan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andy |
| FAMILY NAME | Egan |
| SIGNATURE | EGAN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Australian National University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 85 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Might do better: Flexible relativism and the QUD
The past decade has seen a protracted debate over the semantics of epistemic modals. According to contextualists, epistemic modals quantify over the possibilities compatible with some contextually determined group’s information. Relativists often object that contextualism fails to do justice to the way we assess utterances containing epistemic modals for truth or falsity. However, recent empirical work seems to cast doubt on the relativist’s clai…
De Se Pragmatics
Epistemic Modality
How We Feel About Terrible, Non‐existent Mafiosi
Watching the bottom of the ninth inning of game four of the 2004 American League Championship Series between the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees, we were anxious. The Yankees were up 4–3, and New York's renowned closer, Mariano Rivera, was on the mound. The announcers were starting to talk about the Red Sox's history of tragic postseason disappointment since 1918. But the game wasn't over yet! The Sox could score at any moment, and all wo…
Billboards, bombs and shotgun weddings
Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion
Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory
Research Article| January 01 2007 Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory Andy Egan Andy Egan Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-023 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site …
Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error1
A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick—an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, …
Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location 1
There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically in…
Epistemic Modals in Context
In the 1970s David Lewis argued for a contextualist treatment of modals (Lewis, 1976, 1979a). Although Lewis was primarily interested in modals connected with freedom and metaphysical possibility, his arguments for contextualism could easily be taken to support contextualism about epistemic modals. In the 1990s Keith DeRose argued for just that position (DeRose, 1991, 1998). In all contextualist treatments, the method by which the contextual vari…
I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid 1
Prankster's Ethics
Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory
Research Article| January 01 2007 Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory Andy Egan Andy Egan Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-023 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site …
Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location 1
There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically in…
Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error1
A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick—an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, …
Billboards, bombs and shotgun weddings
How We Feel About Terrible, Non‐existent Mafiosi
Watching the bottom of the ninth inning of game four of the 2004 American League Championship Series between the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees, we were anxious. The Yankees were up 4–3, and New York's renowned closer, Mariano Rivera, was on the mound. The announcers were starting to talk about the Red Sox's history of tragic postseason disappointment since 1918. But the game wasn't over yet! The Sox could score at any moment, and all wo…
I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid 1
De Se Pragmatics
Prankster's Ethics
Epistemic Modals in Context
In the 1970s David Lewis argued for a contextualist treatment of modals (Lewis, 1976, 1979a). Although Lewis was primarily interested in modals connected with freedom and metaphysical possibility, his arguments for contextualism could easily be taken to support contextualism about epistemic modals. In the 1990s Keith DeRose argued for just that position (DeRose, 1991, 1998). In all contextualist treatments, the method by which the contextual vari…
I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid 1
Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location 1
There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically in…
Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion
Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory
Research Article| January 01 2007 Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory Andy Egan Andy Egan Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 93–114. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-023 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site …
Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error1
A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick—an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, …
Billboards, bombs and shotgun weddings
Epistemic Modality
How We Feel About Terrible, Non‐existent Mafiosi
Watching the bottom of the ninth inning of game four of the 2004 American League Championship Series between the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees, we were anxious. The Yankees were up 4–3, and New York's renowned closer, Mariano Rivera, was on the mound. The announcers were starting to talk about the Red Sox's history of tragic postseason disappointment since 1918. But the game wasn't over yet! The Sox could score at any moment, and all wo…
Might do better: Flexible relativism and the QUD
The past decade has seen a protracted debate over the semantics of epistemic modals. According to contextualists, epistemic modals quantify over the possibilities compatible with some contextually determined group’s information. Relativists often object that contextualism fails to do justice to the way we assess utterances containing epistemic modals for truth or falsity. However, recent empirical work seems to cast doubt on the relativist’s clai…
De Se Pragmatics
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Linguistics (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Citation (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works)