Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location 1
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345337 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andy Egan (National University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 97-119 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00492.x |
| OpenAlex | W1964507164 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
| References cited | 18 |
There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling‐out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get
Aesthetics · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Existential quantification · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Observer (physics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Quality (philosophy · Spell · Spelling · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Representational Content and the Objects of Thought
On Content Uniformity for Beliefs and Desires
Self-ascription and primitiveness
Fixing internalism about perceptual content
Individual and Joint Situations
First-Person Perspective in Experience
Supervenience and Boolean Reduction
Daylight savings
Individuation by agreement and disagreement
Centred worlds, personal identity and imagination
What are centered worlds
Persistence and the First-Person Perspective
De Se Pragmatics
Relativism (And Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement
The Myth of the De Se
Relativity in a Fundamentally Absolute World
Realism, Relativism, Adverbialism
Defeating looks
Billboards, bombs and shotgun weddings
The limits of selflessness
In Defense of De Se Content
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality
Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori
Time's arrow and self‐locating probability
Experiential Attitude Reports
De Se Attitudes
Self-Location in Interactive Fiction
Relativism 2
Context and Content
Colour as a Secondary Quality 1
Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion
Epistemic Modals in Context
Two notions of necessity
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
Philosophy before Socrates
Philosophy Before Socrates
Context and content
Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others
The view from nowhere
| Unique citing works | 28 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,65 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2026 (18) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |