Experiential Attitude Reports

Bibliographic Data

ID5042689
AuthorsKristina Liefke (0000-0001-8802-8275, Ruhr University Bochum, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume18
Issue6
Publication date2023-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12913
OpenAlexW4379056237
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited69

One can remember events and one can remember facts: to remember an event (e.g. the barista's pouring my coffee this morning), one needs to have personally witnessed this event. To remember a fact (e.g. that the barista was trained in Italy), it suffices to have learned this fact from some other source. The distinction between event-directed (i.e.experiential) and fact-directed (orpropositional) attitudes is an established distinction in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that is also exemplified by other attitudes (incl. seeing, imagining, and dreaming). Until recently, semantics and the philosophy of language have assumed that experiential attitudes can be more or less straightforwardly reduced to propositional attitudes. However, new work has identified some key properties of experiential attitudes that cast doubt on this reducibility. The present paper discusses the most notable of these properties, focusing on experiential attitudereports. It links these properties to recent developments in formal and philosophical semantics in an effort to foster the development of a rigorous, empirically adequate account of experiential attitudes

Epistemology · Event (particle physics · Experiential learning · Mathematics education · Semantics (computer science · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Memory Processes and Influences · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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