Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10348377
AutoresBrian Cutter (0000-0002-5036-1141, University of Notre Dame, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen101
Número1
Páginas80-100
Fecha de publicación2019-01-17
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12573
OpenAlexW2909165514
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas52

This paper argues that nearly every proposition could in principle be known a priori , with exceptions for necessary falsehoods and a few other odd cases. The argument for this conclusion has two main premises: (i) Odd exceptions aside, if it is possible that p , then it is possible that someone knows innately that p . (ii) Necessarily, whatever is known innately is known a priori . After defending (i) and (ii), I conclude by suggesting that the best way to recover a reasonably limited and interesting conception of the a priori is to adopt an anthropocentric conception of a priori knowability, one that is relativized to our own innate cognitive capacities. However, this proposal has consequences that contradict prevailing views about the a priori . More importantly, this proposal has the result that many philosophical applications of the notion of apriority are misguided

A priori and a posteriori · Anthropocentrism · Argument (complex analysis · Aside · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Proposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science