David Christensen
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597627 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Christensen |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Christensen |
| SIGNATURE | CHRISTENSEN D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Brown University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5255-0029 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 311 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Thoroughly Modest Believing: Immodesty to the Rescue
In response to the self-undermining problem for modest accounts of rational belief, some have proposed that an agent may rationally lose confidence in the truth of these accounts, while continuing to believe as the accounts prescribe. Such agents believe akratically. Many reject the possibility of rational akrasia. Others have defended it—at least in cases where an agent rationally sees her own beliefs as more accurate than rational alternatives …
Epistemic akrasia: No apology required
Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required 1 Self-Aware Believers and AkrasiaWe think about the world; and we ourselves are parts of the world we think about.In some ways, our thinking about ourselves is much like our thinking about other people, or non-human animals, or inanimate things.I have beliefs about my age, the age of my partner, the age of my son's dog, and the age of my house.And when an epistemologist theorizes about what makes these vari…
Akratic (epistemic) modesty
The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality
Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth‐directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the r…
Rational Reflection1: Rational Reflection
Higher‐Order Evidence 1
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others - perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are - hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that pri…
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News
We all live out our lives in states of epistemic imperfection. Most obviously, this is true because the evidence on which we base our beliefs is limited. Only a little less obviously, we live in states of epistemic imperfection because we do not always respond to the evidence we have in the best way. Given that our epistemic condition consists in imperfect responses to incomplete evidence, part of being rational involves taking account of these s…
Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief
Are rational beliefs constrained by formal logic? This book argues that if beliefs are seen in a binary way (either one believes a proposition or one doesn't), then the standard constraints of ’deductive cogency’ (i.e. deductive consistency and deductive closure) are incompatible with epistemic rationality. If, however, beliefs are seen as graded, or coming in degrees, a probabilistic constraint (based on standard logic) is imposed by ideal ratio…
Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representat…
Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality
I'll use the term 'coherence' in an informal way to refer to
Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality
Research Article| July 01 2000 Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality David Christensen David Christensen Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-349 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation David Christensen; Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality. The Philoso…
Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory
Bayes' Bayesianism the machinery of modern Bayesianism success stories challenges met the problem of old evidence the rationality and objectivity of scientific inference a plea for eliminative induction normal science, scientific revolutions, and all that - Thomas Bayes versus Thomas Kuhn Bayesianism versus formal-learning theory a dialogue
Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions
Skeptics have often challenged our standard beliefs about the world by constructing alternative descriptions of how the world might be. The alternative description the skeptic offers is intended to have two essential features. First, the kind of world that would fit the skeptic's description would be very different from the kind of world we believe ourselves to inhabit. Second, a world fitting the skeptic's description would appear to its inhabit…
Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology
Much contemporary epistemology is informed by a kind of confirmational holism, and a consequent rejection of the assumption that all confirmation rests on experiential certainties. Another prominent theme is that belief comes in degrees, and that rationality requires apportioning one's degrees of belief reasonably. Bayesian confirmation models based on Jeffrey Conditionalization attempt to bring together these two appealing strands. I argue, howe…
Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs
Since the 1930s, Dutch Book arguments have been used to support the view that one's degrees of belief should conform to the probability calculus. These arguments show that if an agent's degrees of belief violate the probability calculus, then a clever bookie, knowing nothing beyond what the agent's degrees of belief are, can offer the agent a set of bets with the following two properties: (1) each of the bets in the set will be fair, given the ag…
The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping
The main appeal of the currently popular “bootstrap” account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisio…
The Rationality of Science
Glymour on Evidential Relevance
Glymour's “bootstrap” account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence , however, the “bootstrap” condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain …
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News
We all live out our lives in states of epistemic imperfection. Most obviously, this is true because the evidence on which we base our beliefs is limited. Only a little less obviously, we live in states of epistemic imperfection because we do not always respond to the evidence we have in the best way. Given that our epistemic condition consists in imperfect responses to incomplete evidence, part of being rational involves taking account of these s…
Higher‐Order Evidence 1
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others - perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are - hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that pri…
Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs
Since the 1930s, Dutch Book arguments have been used to support the view that one's degrees of belief should conform to the probability calculus. These arguments show that if an agent's degrees of belief violate the probability calculus, then a clever bookie, knowing nothing beyond what the agent's degrees of belief are, can offer the agent a set of bets with the following two properties: (1) each of the bets in the set will be fair, given the ag…
Rational Reflection1: Rational Reflection
Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology
Much contemporary epistemology is informed by a kind of confirmational holism, and a consequent rejection of the assumption that all confirmation rests on experiential certainties. Another prominent theme is that belief comes in degrees, and that rationality requires apportioning one's degrees of belief reasonably. Bayesian confirmation models based on Jeffrey Conditionalization attempt to bring together these two appealing strands. I argue, howe…
Glymour on Evidential Relevance
Glymour's “bootstrap” account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence , however, the “bootstrap” condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain …
Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representat…
Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality
Research Article| July 01 2000 Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality David Christensen David Christensen Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-349 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation David Christensen; Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality. The Philoso…
The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping
The main appeal of the currently popular “bootstrap” account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisio…
The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality
Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth‐directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the r…
Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions
Skeptics have often challenged our standard beliefs about the world by constructing alternative descriptions of how the world might be. The alternative description the skeptic offers is intended to have two essential features. First, the kind of world that would fit the skeptic's description would be very different from the kind of world we believe ourselves to inhabit. Second, a world fitting the skeptic's description would appear to its inhabit…
Glymour on Evidential Relevance
Glymour's “bootstrap” account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence , however, the “bootstrap” condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain …
The Rationality of Science
The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping
The main appeal of the currently popular “bootstrap” account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisio…
Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs
Since the 1930s, Dutch Book arguments have been used to support the view that one's degrees of belief should conform to the probability calculus. These arguments show that if an agent's degrees of belief violate the probability calculus, then a clever bookie, knowing nothing beyond what the agent's degrees of belief are, can offer the agent a set of bets with the following two properties: (1) each of the bets in the set will be fair, given the ag…
Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology
Much contemporary epistemology is informed by a kind of confirmational holism, and a consequent rejection of the assumption that all confirmation rests on experiential certainties. Another prominent theme is that belief comes in degrees, and that rationality requires apportioning one's degrees of belief reasonably. Bayesian confirmation models based on Jeffrey Conditionalization attempt to bring together these two appealing strands. I argue, howe…
Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions
Skeptics have often challenged our standard beliefs about the world by constructing alternative descriptions of how the world might be. The alternative description the skeptic offers is intended to have two essential features. First, the kind of world that would fit the skeptic's description would be very different from the kind of world we believe ourselves to inhabit. Second, a world fitting the skeptic's description would appear to its inhabit…
Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory
Bayes' Bayesianism the machinery of modern Bayesianism success stories challenges met the problem of old evidence the rationality and objectivity of scientific inference a plea for eliminative induction normal science, scientific revolutions, and all that - Thomas Bayes versus Thomas Kuhn Bayesianism versus formal-learning theory a dialogue
Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality
I'll use the term 'coherence' in an informal way to refer to
Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality
Research Article| July 01 2000 Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality David Christensen David Christensen Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 349–371. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-349 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation David Christensen; Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality. The Philoso…
Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representat…
Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief
Are rational beliefs constrained by formal logic? This book argues that if beliefs are seen in a binary way (either one believes a proposition or one doesn't), then the standard constraints of ’deductive cogency’ (i.e. deductive consistency and deductive closure) are incompatible with epistemic rationality. If, however, beliefs are seen as graded, or coming in degrees, a probabilistic constraint (based on standard logic) is imposed by ideal ratio…
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News
We all live out our lives in states of epistemic imperfection. Most obviously, this is true because the evidence on which we base our beliefs is limited. Only a little less obviously, we live in states of epistemic imperfection because we do not always respond to the evidence we have in the best way. Given that our epistemic condition consists in imperfect responses to incomplete evidence, part of being rational involves taking account of these s…
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others - perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are - hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that pri…
Rational Reflection1: Rational Reflection
Higher‐Order Evidence 1
The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality
Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth‐directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the r…
Akratic (epistemic) modesty
Epistemic akrasia: No apology required
Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required 1 Self-Aware Believers and AkrasiaWe think about the world; and we ourselves are parts of the world we think about.In some ways, our thinking about ourselves is much like our thinking about other people, or non-human animals, or inanimate things.I have beliefs about my age, the age of my partner, the age of my son's dog, and the age of my house.And when an epistemologist theorizes about what makes these vari…
Thoroughly Modest Believing: Immodesty to the Rescue
In response to the self-undermining problem for modest accounts of rational belief, some have proposed that an agent may rationally lose confidence in the truth of these accounts, while continuing to believe as the accounts prescribe. Such agents believe akratically. Many reject the possibility of rational akrasia. Others have defended it—at least in cases where an agent rationally sees her own beliefs as more accurate than rational alternatives …
Epistemology (17 works) · Philosophy (17 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (16 works) · Computer Science (12 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Rationality (6 works) · Contemporary philosophy (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works)