Joe Slater
Biographic Data
| ID | 3602107 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joe Slater |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joe |
| FAMILY NAME | Slater |
| SIGNATURE | SLATER J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2269-7235 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
LLMs Bullshit by Design
A Bit Less Clueless
The cluelessness argument implies that consequentialists are unable to know the moral status of any of their actions. Even trivial actions could be identity-affecting and are thus vulnerable to massive causal ramification. For such actions, we cannot – according to the proponent of the argument – even estimate the value of consequences; we are clueless. In this paper, I discuss two under-explored responses. First, it is open for consequentialists…
Another reason to call bullshit on AI “hallucinations”
Open-textured moral concepts
In this article, I apply the notion of open texture to the moral domain. I argue that moral concepts can exhibit open texture, and that recognising this can yield several explanatory advantages. To begin, I describe the notion of open texture, a type of indeterminacy some of our concepts seem to exhibit. I mention Friedrich Waismann’s original discussion of the notion, but particularly draw upon a recent exposition by Fenner Tanswell. Second, I p…
Kant and Overdemandingness II
In this paper, we consider how demandingness objections pertain to perfect duties in Kantian ethics. We revisit the framework of demandingness that we introduced in a previous paper, before introducing three cases that have been suggested to constitute problems for Kant, specifically regarding perfect duties. We argue that some of these cases do constitute problems for the Kantian framework, but the complaint of overdemandingness obfuscates other…
Satisficers Still Get Away with Murder
Recently, a few attempts have been made to rehabilitate satisficing consequentialism. One strategy, initially shunned by Tim Mulgan, is to suggest that agents must produce an outcome at least as good as they could at a particular level of effort. The effort-satisficer is able to avoid some of the problem cases usually deemed fatal to the view. Richard Yetter Chappell has proposed a version of effort-satisficing that not only avoids those problem …
ChatGPT is bullshit
Recently, there has been considerable interest in large language models: machine learning systems which produce human-like text and dialogue. Applications of these systems have been plagued by persistent inaccuracies in their output; these are often called “AI hallucinations”. We argue that these falsehoods, and the overall activity of large language models, is better understood as bullshit in the sense explored by Frankfurt (On Bullshit, Princet…
Kant and Overdemandingness I
The Overdemandingness Objection maintains that an ethical theory or principle that demands too much should be rejected, or at least moderated. Traditionally, overdemandingness is considered primarily a problem for consequentialist ethical theories. Recently, Kant and Kantian ethics have also become part of the debate. This development helps us better understand both overdemandingness and problems with Kant's ethics. In this, the first of a pair o…
Jamie Carlin Watson’s Winning Votes by Abusing Reason
Satisficing Consequentialism Still Doesn't Satisfy
Satisficing consequentialism is an unpopular theory. Because it permits gratuitous sub-optimal behaviour, it strikes many as wildly implausible. It has been widely rejected as a tenable moral theory for more than twenty years. In this article, I rehearse the arguments behind this unpopularity, before examining an attempt to redeem satisficing. Richard Yetter Chappell has recently defended a form of ‘effort satisficing consequentialism’. By incorp…
Kant and Overdemandingness I
The Overdemandingness Objection maintains that an ethical theory or principle that demands too much should be rejected, or at least moderated. Traditionally, overdemandingness is considered primarily a problem for consequentialist ethical theories. Recently, Kant and Kantian ethics have also become part of the debate. This development helps us better understand both overdemandingness and problems with Kant's ethics. In this, the first of a pair o…
Satisficing Consequentialism Still Doesn't Satisfy
Satisficing consequentialism is an unpopular theory. Because it permits gratuitous sub-optimal behaviour, it strikes many as wildly implausible. It has been widely rejected as a tenable moral theory for more than twenty years. In this article, I rehearse the arguments behind this unpopularity, before examining an attempt to redeem satisficing. Richard Yetter Chappell has recently defended a form of ‘effort satisficing consequentialism’. By incorp…
Jamie Carlin Watson’s Winning Votes by Abusing Reason
Satisficing Consequentialism Still Doesn't Satisfy
Satisficing consequentialism is an unpopular theory. Because it permits gratuitous sub-optimal behaviour, it strikes many as wildly implausible. It has been widely rejected as a tenable moral theory for more than twenty years. In this article, I rehearse the arguments behind this unpopularity, before examining an attempt to redeem satisficing. Richard Yetter Chappell has recently defended a form of ‘effort satisficing consequentialism’. By incorp…
Satisficers Still Get Away with Murder
Recently, a few attempts have been made to rehabilitate satisficing consequentialism. One strategy, initially shunned by Tim Mulgan, is to suggest that agents must produce an outcome at least as good as they could at a particular level of effort. The effort-satisficer is able to avoid some of the problem cases usually deemed fatal to the view. Richard Yetter Chappell has proposed a version of effort-satisficing that not only avoids those problem …
ChatGPT is bullshit
Recently, there has been considerable interest in large language models: machine learning systems which produce human-like text and dialogue. Applications of these systems have been plagued by persistent inaccuracies in their output; these are often called “AI hallucinations”. We argue that these falsehoods, and the overall activity of large language models, is better understood as bullshit in the sense explored by Frankfurt (On Bullshit, Princet…
Kant and Overdemandingness I
The Overdemandingness Objection maintains that an ethical theory or principle that demands too much should be rejected, or at least moderated. Traditionally, overdemandingness is considered primarily a problem for consequentialist ethical theories. Recently, Kant and Kantian ethics have also become part of the debate. This development helps us better understand both overdemandingness and problems with Kant's ethics. In this, the first of a pair o…
Another reason to call bullshit on AI “hallucinations”
Open-textured moral concepts
In this article, I apply the notion of open texture to the moral domain. I argue that moral concepts can exhibit open texture, and that recognising this can yield several explanatory advantages. To begin, I describe the notion of open texture, a type of indeterminacy some of our concepts seem to exhibit. I mention Friedrich Waismann’s original discussion of the notion, but particularly draw upon a recent exposition by Fenner Tanswell. Second, I p…
Kant and Overdemandingness II
In this paper, we consider how demandingness objections pertain to perfect duties in Kantian ethics. We revisit the framework of demandingness that we introduced in a previous paper, before introducing three cases that have been suggested to constitute problems for Kant, specifically regarding perfect duties. We argue that some of these cases do constitute problems for the Kantian framework, but the complaint of overdemandingness obfuscates other…
LLMs Bullshit by Design
A Bit Less Clueless
The cluelessness argument implies that consequentialists are unable to know the moral status of any of their actions. Even trivial actions could be identity-affecting and are thus vulnerable to massive causal ramification. For such actions, we cannot – according to the proponent of the argument – even estimate the value of consequences; we are clueless. In this paper, I discuss two under-explored responses. First, it is open for consequentialists…
Philosophy (6 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare and Education (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)