Steffen Huck
Biographic Data
| ID | 3604822 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Steffen Huck |
| GIVEN NAMES | Steffen |
| FAMILY NAME | Huck |
| SIGNATURE | HUCK S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7586-7985 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 96 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 21 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Discrimination, Narratives, and Family History: An Experiment with Jordanian Host and Syrian Refugee Children
We measure the prevalence of discrimination between Jordanian host and Syrian refugee children attending school in Jordan. Using a simple sharing experiment, we find only a small degree of out-group discrimination. However, Jordanian children with Palestinian roots do not discriminate at all, suggesting that a family history of refugee status can generate solidarity with new refugees. We also find that parents’ narratives about the refugee crisis…
The Standard Portfolio Choice Problem in Germany
We study an investment experiment with a representative sample of German households. Respondents invest in a safe asset and a risky asset whose return is tied to the German stock market. Experimental investments correlate with beliefs about stock market returns and exhibit desirable external validity at least in one respect: they predict real-life stock market participation. But many households are unresponsive to an exogenous increase in the ris…
Though This Be Madness, Yet There is Method In't: A Counterfactual Analysis of Richard Wagner's 'Tannhauser
Much like Wagner himself, the eponymous hero of Tannhäuser treads a path of stark contrasts and \nrapid swings. From Wartburg to the Venusberg and to the Vatican, the gifted bard transforms from \nself-centered artist to seduced disciple, disillusioned devotee, hopeful lover, self-loathing pilgrim and \nfinally redeemed martyr. He tries everything and everything is trying. These contrasts reach a peak in \nthe opera‟s central episode, the song co…
Elsa's reason: On beliefs and motives in Wagner's Lohengrin
Once Wagner's most popular opera, Lohengrin has suffered scholarly neglect in the post-war period. This essay re-engages with the work from the novel perspective of game theory analysis. Centring on Elsa's breach of the Frageverbot , it offers a close epistemological study of the opera's main characters. As an alternative to traditional interpretations of the heroine's fatal decision, we propose a complex and psychologically more compelling accou…
Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement
We propose a dynamic model of neighbourhood watch schemes. While the state chooses punishment levels, apprehension of criminals depends on the watchfulness of citizens. We show that, contrary to standard intuition, crime levels can increase in punishments. This is because neighbourhood watch schemes can fall victim to their own success if recruitment of new members is driven by fear of crime – a finding that is in line with the empirical literatu…
The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory
We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi's bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. Standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts total outputs well. However, merged firms produce significantly more output than their competitors. As a result, mergers are not unprofitable. By analysing control treatments, we provide an explanation for these result…
Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing
We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (OSBORNE [1993]) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the …
Endogenous Leadership in Teams
We study the mechanics of leading by example in teams. Leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents are conformists, i.e., dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader benefits a team most.
Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from an investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But in some situations there are also some small moral costs for those who vote in favor of default. For the symmetric equilibrium, for given benefits of default, time-consistent default can be ruled out for sufficientl…
Learning to Like What You Have – Explaining the Endowment Effect
The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect. The reason is that an endowment effect improves one's bargaining position in bilateral trades. We show that for a g…
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information and Market Structure
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare‐improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions …
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Could the Florida Election Disaster have been Avoided by Competition Among Polling Stations
Merger and Collusion in Contests
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.
Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matchi…
More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law," it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. We examine a contractual relationship in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze…
Informational cascades in the laboratory: Do they occur for the right reasons
Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information
Risk, complexity, and deviations from expected-value maximization: Results of a lottery choice experiment
Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study
Journal Article Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study Get access Werner Güth, Werner Güth Humboldt University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Steffen Huck, Steffen Huck Humboldt University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Peter Ockenfels Peter Ockenfels Goethe University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Acad…
More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law," it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. We examine a contractual relationship in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze…
Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study
Journal Article Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study Get access Werner Güth, Werner Güth Humboldt University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Steffen Huck, Steffen Huck Humboldt University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Peter Ockenfels Peter Ockenfels Goethe University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Acad…
Learning to Like What You Have – Explaining the Endowment Effect
The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect. The reason is that an endowment effect improves one's bargaining position in bilateral trades. We show that for a g…
Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matchi…
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information and Market Structure
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare‐improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions …
Risk, complexity, and deviations from expected-value maximization: Results of a lottery choice experiment
Informational cascades in the laboratory: Do they occur for the right reasons
The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory
We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi's bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. Standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts total outputs well. However, merged firms produce significantly more output than their competitors. As a result, mergers are not unprofitable. By analysing control treatments, we provide an explanation for these result…
Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information
The Standard Portfolio Choice Problem in Germany
We study an investment experiment with a representative sample of German households. Respondents invest in a safe asset and a risky asset whose return is tied to the German stock market. Experimental investments correlate with beliefs about stock market returns and exhibit desirable external validity at least in one respect: they predict real-life stock market participation. But many households are unresponsive to an exogenous increase in the ris…
Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study
Journal Article Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study Get access Werner Güth, Werner Güth Humboldt University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Steffen Huck, Steffen Huck Humboldt University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Peter Ockenfels Peter Ockenfels Goethe University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Acad…
Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information
Risk, complexity, and deviations from expected-value maximization: Results of a lottery choice experiment
Informational cascades in the laboratory: Do they occur for the right reasons
Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matchi…
More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law," it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. We examine a contractual relationship in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze…
Merger and Collusion in Contests
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Could the Florida Election Disaster have been Avoided by Competition Among Polling Stations
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information and Market Structure
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare‐improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions …
Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from an investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But in some situations there are also some small moral costs for those who vote in favor of default. For the symmetric equilibrium, for given benefits of default, time-consistent default can be ruled out for sufficientl…
Learning to Like What You Have – Explaining the Endowment Effect
The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect. The reason is that an endowment effect improves one's bargaining position in bilateral trades. We show that for a g…
Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing
We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (OSBORNE [1993]) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the …
Endogenous Leadership in Teams
We study the mechanics of leading by example in teams. Leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents are conformists, i.e., dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader benefits a team most.
The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement
We propose a dynamic model of neighbourhood watch schemes. While the state chooses punishment levels, apprehension of criminals depends on the watchfulness of citizens. We show that, contrary to standard intuition, crime levels can increase in punishments. This is because neighbourhood watch schemes can fall victim to their own success if recruitment of new members is driven by fear of crime – a finding that is in line with the empirical literatu…
The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory
We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi's bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. Standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts total outputs well. However, merged firms produce significantly more output than their competitors. As a result, mergers are not unprofitable. By analysing control treatments, we provide an explanation for these result…
Elsa's reason: On beliefs and motives in Wagner's Lohengrin
Once Wagner's most popular opera, Lohengrin has suffered scholarly neglect in the post-war period. This essay re-engages with the work from the novel perspective of game theory analysis. Centring on Elsa's breach of the Frageverbot , it offers a close epistemological study of the opera's main characters. As an alternative to traditional interpretations of the heroine's fatal decision, we propose a complex and psychologically more compelling accou…
Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
Though This Be Madness, Yet There is Method In't: A Counterfactual Analysis of Richard Wagner's 'Tannhauser
Much like Wagner himself, the eponymous hero of Tannhäuser treads a path of stark contrasts and \nrapid swings. From Wartburg to the Venusberg and to the Vatican, the gifted bard transforms from \nself-centered artist to seduced disciple, disillusioned devotee, hopeful lover, self-loathing pilgrim and \nfinally redeemed martyr. He tries everything and everything is trying. These contrasts reach a peak in \nthe opera‟s central episode, the song co…
The Standard Portfolio Choice Problem in Germany
We study an investment experiment with a representative sample of German households. Respondents invest in a safe asset and a risky asset whose return is tied to the German stock market. Experimental investments correlate with beliefs about stock market returns and exhibit desirable external validity at least in one respect: they predict real-life stock market participation. But many households are unresponsive to an exogenous increase in the ris…
Discrimination, Narratives, and Family History: An Experiment with Jordanian Host and Syrian Refugee Children
We measure the prevalence of discrimination between Jordanian host and Syrian refugee children attending school in Jordan. Using a simple sharing experiment, we find only a small degree of out-group discrimination. However, Jordanian children with Palestinian roots do not discriminate at all, suggesting that a family history of refugee status can generate solidarity with new refugees. We also find that parents’ narratives about the refugee crisis…
Economics (13 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (10 works) · Microeconomics (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Political science (8 works) · Game Theory and Applications (7 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Business (5 works)