Agustín Casas
Biographic Data
| ID | 3605077 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Agustín Casas |
| GIVEN NAMES | Agustín |
| FAMILY NAME | Casas |
| SIGNATURE | CASAS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | CUNEF Universidad |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8588-5562 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Judicial Decisions, Backlash and Secessionism: The Spanish Constitutional Court and Catalonia
We exploit a unique quasi-experiment to study the effects of judicial decisions on sensitive issues on political attitudes. In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court partially overruled the new Catalan Constitution—the Estatut—that granted further decentralisation. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that this ruling occurred amid a public opinion survey. We find that the ruling increased support for independence by 5 percentage points…
Incentivizing Brokers in Clientelist Parties
Local brokers are essential in the implementation of clientelist politics, but their efforts on parties' behalf are not fully observable. A growing literature studies how parties address this agency problem, highlighting two distinct reward schemes: allocating promotions or prizes based on observed vote shares or doing so based on inferred effort allocations. This article develops a formal model to examine the conditions under which one or the ot…
Rara Avis: Latin American populism in the 21st century
Since the beginning of the 21st century, many Latin American countries have been ruled by governments characterized as populist (the so-called new Latin American Left). We focus on the macroeconomic implications of the policies adopted by these governments (instead of their leaders’ rhetoric) and we investigate to what extent this characterization holds. In particular, we focus on their wage policies by doing a Structural Vector Autoregressive an…
The electoral benefits of unemployment, clientelism and distributive politics
Distributive Politics with Vote and Turnout Buying
The objective of this paper is to model the incumbent's allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying (persuasion) and turnout buying (mobilization). The existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts. This paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobiliza…
Distributive Politics with Vote and Turnout Buying
The objective of this paper is to model the incumbent's allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying (persuasion) and turnout buying (mobilization). The existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts. This paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobiliza…
Judicial Decisions, Backlash and Secessionism: The Spanish Constitutional Court and Catalonia
We exploit a unique quasi-experiment to study the effects of judicial decisions on sensitive issues on political attitudes. In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court partially overruled the new Catalan Constitution—the Estatut—that granted further decentralisation. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that this ruling occurred amid a public opinion survey. We find that the ruling increased support for independence by 5 percentage points…
The electoral benefits of unemployment, clientelism and distributive politics
Incentivizing Brokers in Clientelist Parties
Local brokers are essential in the implementation of clientelist politics, but their efforts on parties' behalf are not fully observable. A growing literature studies how parties address this agency problem, highlighting two distinct reward schemes: allocating promotions or prizes based on observed vote shares or doing so based on inferred effort allocations. This article develops a formal model to examine the conditions under which one or the ot…
Distributive Politics with Vote and Turnout Buying
The objective of this paper is to model the incumbent's allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying (persuasion) and turnout buying (mobilization). The existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts. This paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobiliza…
The electoral benefits of unemployment, clientelism and distributive politics
Rara Avis: Latin American populism in the 21st century
Since the beginning of the 21st century, many Latin American countries have been ruled by governments characterized as populist (the so-called new Latin American Left). We focus on the macroeconomic implications of the policies adopted by these governments (instead of their leaders’ rhetoric) and we investigate to what extent this characterization holds. In particular, we focus on their wage policies by doing a Structural Vector Autoregressive an…
Judicial Decisions, Backlash and Secessionism: The Spanish Constitutional Court and Catalonia
We exploit a unique quasi-experiment to study the effects of judicial decisions on sensitive issues on political attitudes. In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court partially overruled the new Catalan Constitution—the Estatut—that granted further decentralisation. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that this ruling occurred amid a public opinion survey. We find that the ruling increased support for independence by 5 percentage points…
Incentivizing Brokers in Clientelist Parties
Local brokers are essential in the implementation of clientelist politics, but their efforts on parties' behalf are not fully observable. A growing literature studies how parties address this agency problem, highlighting two distinct reward schemes: allocating promotions or prizes based on observed vote shares or doing so based on inferred effort allocations. This article develops a formal model to examine the conditions under which one or the ot…
Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Clientelism (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Democracy (2 works)