Distributive Politics with Vote and Turnout Buying
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3355780 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Agustín Casas (0000-0001-8588-5562, CUNEF Universidad, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1111-1119 |
| Publication date | 2018-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055418000291 |
| OpenAlex | W2883344418 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 22 |
The objective of this paper is to model the incumbent's allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying (persuasion) and turnout buying (mobilization). The existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts. This paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobilization strategies, and the ideology of voters is unknown to the incumbent party, a third option should be taken into account. In fact, the optimal allocation of resources-rather than focusing on safe or swing districts-should target opposition strongholds, that is, the incumbent should try to sway voters in those districts in which the challenger is favored. The intuition for this result is simple. Since the incumbent does not know individual preferences (he only observes the distribution of preferences in the districts), all voters in a given district look identical to him. Hence, when approaching voters in a district to buy their vote, the incumbent always faces the risk of buying the vote of his supporters (who would have voted for him anyway
Business · Distribution (mathematics · Distributive property · Economics · Ideology · Intuition · Microeconomics · Opposition (politics · Persuasion · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Turnout · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Psychology · Social Psychology · Taxation and Compliance Studies
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Vote Buying
Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
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Electoral Rules and the Calculus of Mobilization
Party machines and voter-customized rewards strategies
Distributive Politics Around the World
Varieties of Clientelism
Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment
Is There a Secret Ballot? Ballot Secrecy Perceptions and Their Implications for Voting Behaviour
Pork-Barrel Politics in Semi-Democracies
Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns
Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot
Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency
Perverse Accountability
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,86 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |