Anirban Mitra
Biographic Data
| ID | 3605311 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anirban Mitra |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anirban |
| FAMILY NAME | Mitra |
| SIGNATURE | MITRA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Kent |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6297-1361 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 53 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Cash for Votes: Evidence from India
We examine consumption patterns around the time of elections to investigate vote-buying. Specifically, we combine data from state assembly elections in India with household-level consumer expenditure and employment surveys (conducted by the National Sample Survey Office) over the period 2004–12. Exploiting a difference-in-differences methodology, we estimate the positive effect elections have on reported consumption expenditures. We observe large…
Ethnic Diversity, Social Norms and Elite Capture: Theory and Evidence from Indonesia
Elite capture is a natural concern regarding decentralization. We highlight the effects of ethnic diversity and social norms on the extent of such capture. Ethnic diversity, through differences in the preference for public goods, facilitates capture. However, this may be counteracted by social norms that promote cooperative behaviour within communities. We test these theoretical predictions using community‐level data from the 1997 and 2007 Indone…
Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution
Mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority‐group candidates are permitted to contest. This paper builds a political‐economy model to analyse the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium. The model predicts that in situations where the minority is economically disadvantaged and where voters exhibit an in‐group bias, such a quota can reduce transfers…
Electoral Uncertainty, Income Inequality and The Middle Class
We investigate how electoral competition affects the income distribution in society. We utilise a standard probabilistic voting setup where parties compete at two stages. Our model delivers that greater electoral competition in a district results in equalisation of incomes therein. We check for these relationships using data from Indian national elections which are combined with consumption expenditure data rounds from the National Sample Survey …
Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India
We model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are low, increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it. We then apply the model to data on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict. An increase in Hindu expenditures…
Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India
We model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are low, increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it. We then apply the model to data on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict. An increase in Hindu expenditures…
Electoral Uncertainty, Income Inequality and The Middle Class
We investigate how electoral competition affects the income distribution in society. We utilise a standard probabilistic voting setup where parties compete at two stages. Our model delivers that greater electoral competition in a district results in equalisation of incomes therein. We check for these relationships using data from Indian national elections which are combined with consumption expenditure data rounds from the National Sample Survey …
Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India
We model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are low, increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it. We then apply the model to data on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict. An increase in Hindu expenditures…
Electoral Uncertainty, Income Inequality and The Middle Class
We investigate how electoral competition affects the income distribution in society. We utilise a standard probabilistic voting setup where parties compete at two stages. Our model delivers that greater electoral competition in a district results in equalisation of incomes therein. We check for these relationships using data from Indian national elections which are combined with consumption expenditure data rounds from the National Sample Survey …
Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution
Mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority‐group candidates are permitted to contest. This paper builds a political‐economy model to analyse the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium. The model predicts that in situations where the minority is economically disadvantaged and where voters exhibit an in‐group bias, such a quota can reduce transfers…
Ethnic Diversity, Social Norms and Elite Capture: Theory and Evidence from Indonesia
Elite capture is a natural concern regarding decentralization. We highlight the effects of ethnic diversity and social norms on the extent of such capture. Ethnic diversity, through differences in the preference for public goods, facilitates capture. However, this may be counteracted by social norms that promote cooperative behaviour within communities. We test these theoretical predictions using community‐level data from the 1997 and 2007 Indone…
Cash for Votes: Evidence from India
We examine consumption patterns around the time of elections to investigate vote-buying. Specifically, we combine data from state assembly elections in India with household-level consumer expenditure and employment surveys (conducted by the National Sample Survey Office) over the period 2004–12. Exploiting a difference-in-differences methodology, we estimate the positive effect elections have on reported consumption expenditures. We observe large…
Economics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works) · Demographic economics (2 works) · Inequality (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Sociology (2 works)