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James E Anderson

Biographic Data

ID3616635
NAMEJames E Anderson
GIVEN NAMESJames E
FAMILY NAMEAnderson
SIGNATUREANDERSON J E
AFFILIATIONSBoston College
ORCID0000-0002-7470-4532
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS41
TOTAL CITATIONS82
AUTHOR COUNT41
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1963
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX4
  • US graphite sourcing for electric vehicle battery applications

    Open Access•Sarah Gorman, Christian Hitt et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Industrial Ecology•2025

    Graphite is a key material in electric vehicle batteries. Currently, China dominates global graphite production, and US sourcing of graphite could mitigate geopolitical supply‐chain risk. We explore the feasibility of domestic natural graphite sourcing in North America by characterizing current deposits and modeling the expected demand from 2025 to 2040. The United States has 19 Mt of measured and inferred graphite resources in four deposits, and…

  • Latent Exports: Almost Ideal Gravity and Zeros

    James E Anderson, Penglong Zhang•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2025

    Export promotion at the extensive margin is a key concern of governments. We develop measures of how far firms in origin sectors are from break-even entry in destination markets. The measure is based on Almost Ideal gravity featuring heterogeneous price and income elasticities. Tobit estimation of 2006 trade flows for 75 countries and 25 sectors generates latent trade bias (LTB)—the latent (projected) trade share of nonpartners minus the as-if-fr…

  • Transitional Growth and Trade with Frictions: A Structural Estimation Framework

    Open Access•James E Anderson, Mario Larch et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 53

    We build and estimate a structural model of transitional growth and trade in a many-country world. The gravity model of trade is combined with a capital accumulation mechanism driving transition between steady states. Trade affects growth through changes in consumer and producer prices. Simultaneously, capital accumulation affects trade directly through changes in country size and indirectly through changes in the incidence of trade costs. Theory…

  • When Comparing Alternative Fuel‐Vehicle Systems, Life Cycle Assessment Studies Should Consider Trends in Oil Production

    Open Access•Timothy J Wallington, James E Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Industrial Ecology•2017

    Petroleum from unconventional reserves is making an increasingly important contribution to the transportation fuel supply, but is generally more expensive and has greater environmental burdens than petroleum from conventional sources. Life cycle assessments (LCAs) of alternative fuel‐vehicle technologies typically consider conventional internal combustion engine vehicles fueled by gasoline produced from the average petroleum slate used in refiner…

  • Terms of trade and global efficiency effects of free trade agreements, 1990–2002

    Open Access•James E Anderson, Yoto V Yotov•ARTICLE•Journal of International Economics•2016

  • The Gravity Model

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Economics•2011

    Gravity has long been one of the most successful empirical models in economics. Incorporating deeper theoretical foundations of gravity into recent practice has led to a richer and more accurate estimation and interpretation of the spatial relations described by gravity. Wider acceptance has followed. Recent developments are reviewed here, and suggestions are made for promising future research.

  • Political pressure deflection

    Open Access•James E Anderson, Maurizio Zanardi•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•References: 18

    Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence.…

  • Private enforcement and social efficiency

    Open Access•James E Anderson, Oriana Bandiera•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2005•Cited by: 1•References: 4

  • Trade Costs

    James E Anderson, Eric van Wincoop•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Literature•2004

    This paper surveys the measurement of trade costs: what we know and don't know but may usefully attempt to learn. Partial and incomplete data on direct measures of costs go with inference on implicit costs from trade flows and prices. Total trade costs in rich countries are large. The ad valorem tax equivalent is about 170 percent when pushing the data hard. Poor countries face even higher trade costs. There is a lot of variation across countries…

  • Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle

    James E Anderson, Eric van Wincoop•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2003

    Gravity equations have been widely used to infer trade flow effects of various institutional arrangements. We show that estimated gravity equations do not have a theoretical foundation. This implies both that estimation suffers from omitted variables bias and that comparative statics analysis is unfounded. We develop a method that (i) consistently and efficiently estimates a theoretical gravity equation and (ii) correctly calculates the comparati…

  • Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation

    James E Anderson, Douglas Marcouiller•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2002

    Corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade. This paper estimates the reduction using a structural model of import demand in which insecurity acts as a hidden tax on trade. We find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do. We also find that omission of indices of institutional quality biases the estimates of typical gravity models, obscuring a negative relationship between per ca…

  • The Uruguay Round and welfare in some distorted agricultural economies

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1998•Cited by: 1

  • Trade Restrictiveness Benchmarks

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 5

    Journal Article Trade Restrictiveness Benchmarks Get access James E. Anderson James E. Anderson Boston College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 449, 1 July 1998, Pages 1111–1125, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00332 Published: 27 December 2001

  • The Struggle to Reform Regulatory Procedures, 1978–1998

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1998•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    This article examines the attempts between 1978 and 1998 to enact general regulatory procedural reform legislation. Two decades of off‐again, off‐again legislative efforts have yielded only fragments of reform. A major explanation for this, despite the official popularity of reform, seems to be the inability of putative reformers‐traditionalists, populists, and restrictivists‐to agree among themselves on the direction and content of general refor…

  • The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation

    B Dan Wood, James E Anderson•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1993•Cited by: 52•References: 9

    The purpose of antitrust regulation is to promote and maintain fair competition in the U.S. economy. Yet economists and political scientists have long been unable to identify economic determinants of antitrust activity. Recent studies have turned toward bureaucratic theory for explaining antitrust enforcement. However, we argue that both economic and bureaucratic theories of antitrust regulation fail because they ignore the overarching institutio…

  • The Carter Administration and Regulatory Reform: Searching for the Right Way

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1991•Cited by: 5•References: 3

    The Carter administration’s regulatory reform program comprised three interrelated segments: deregulation legislation, regulatory procedural reform legislation, and improved presidential supervision and control of the regulatory agencies. This article is concerned with the administration’s efforts to devise structures and procedures to enhance the president’s ability to coordinate the regulatory agencies and hold down the costs of regulation. The…

  • The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas

    David Greenaway, James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1989

    Journal Article The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas Get access The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas. By E. ANDERSON JAMES. (Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1988. Pp. xi + 225. £22.50 hardback. ISBN 0 262 01103 4). David Greenaway David Greenaway Brunei University of West London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 396, 1 June 1989, Pages 491–492, https://doi.org/10.230…

  • Die altenglischen Rätsel des Exeterbuchs . Hans Pinsker , Waltraud Ziegler

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Speculum•1988

  • Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency

    Jim F Heath, James E Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of American History•1987•Cited by: 3

    Journal Article Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency. By James E. Anderson and Jared E. Hazleton. (Austin: University of Texas Press. 1986. xv + 285 pp. $27.50.) Get access Jim F. Heath Jim F. Heath Portland State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 74, Issue 1, June 1987, Pages 227–228, https://doi.org/10.2307/1908617 Published: 01 June 1987

  • A Revised View of the Johnson Cabinet

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1986•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    The cabinet in the Johnson administration was used as an instrument for presidential management of the executive branch. Cabinet meetings are described. Functionalist theory is then used to analyze the cabinet as a collegial body, and several managerial functions are identified

  • The Management of Wage‐price Policies in the Johnson and Carter Administrations

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1984

  • Presidential Management of the Bureaucracy and the Johnson Presidency: A Preliminary Exploration

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1984•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    Drawing upon documentary sources and interviews with administrative officials, this article takes a broad look at presidential management of the bureaucracy during the Johnson presidency. The various managerial techniques used by President Johnson are examined, along with some of the purposes of presidential management. Contrary to the historical stereotype, Johnson was a managerial activist who had a substantial impact on the bureaucracy and “pe…

  • The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs. Herbert Kaufman

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1983

  • Agricultural Marketing Orders and the Process and Politics of Self-regulation

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•1982•Cited by: 1•References: 1

    Agricultural marketing orders, put into operation with the initiative and approval of affected producers, are a form of supervised self-regulation. The 47 orders in effect variously authorize quantity controls, quality controls, and market support activities for fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops. Administered by producer committees under the supervision of the Agricultural Marketing Service, for most of their history they produced l i t t l…

  • Presidential and Congressional Support for "Independent" Regulatory Commissions: Implications of the Budgetary Process

    Joseph Stewart, James E Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•The Western Political Quarterly•1982•Cited by: 4•References: 4

    SENATOR PROXMIRE: Now, you are required somehow to submit your budget to the Office of Management and Budget, and yet you are considered to be an independent agency. How do you reconcile that contradition? There is no greater power than the power to determine the budget of an agency, to destroy it, and to enfeeble it by simply denying it the resources it needs. How can you be independent in any real sense of the executive branch if the Office of …

Next
  • The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation

    B Dan Wood, James E Anderson•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1993•Cited by: 52•References: 9

    The purpose of antitrust regulation is to promote and maintain fair competition in the U.S. economy. Yet economists and political scientists have long been unable to identify economic determinants of antitrust activity. Recent studies have turned toward bureaucratic theory for explaining antitrust enforcement. However, we argue that both economic and bureaucratic theories of antitrust regulation fail because they ignore the overarching institutio…

  • Trade Restrictiveness Benchmarks

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 5

    Journal Article Trade Restrictiveness Benchmarks Get access James E. Anderson James E. Anderson Boston College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 449, 1 July 1998, Pages 1111–1125, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00332 Published: 27 December 2001

  • The Carter Administration and Regulatory Reform: Searching for the Right Way

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1991•Cited by: 5•References: 3

    The Carter administration’s regulatory reform program comprised three interrelated segments: deregulation legislation, regulatory procedural reform legislation, and improved presidential supervision and control of the regulatory agencies. This article is concerned with the administration’s efforts to devise structures and procedures to enhance the president’s ability to coordinate the regulatory agencies and hold down the costs of regulation. The…

  • Presidential and Congressional Support for "Independent" Regulatory Commissions: Implications of the Budgetary Process

    Joseph Stewart, James E Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•The Western Political Quarterly•1982•Cited by: 4•References: 4

    SENATOR PROXMIRE: Now, you are required somehow to submit your budget to the Office of Management and Budget, and yet you are considered to be an independent agency. How do you reconcile that contradition? There is no greater power than the power to determine the budget of an agency, to destroy it, and to enfeeble it by simply denying it the resources it needs. How can you be independent in any real sense of the executive branch if the Office of …

  • The Struggle to Reform Regulatory Procedures, 1978–1998

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1998•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    This article examines the attempts between 1978 and 1998 to enact general regulatory procedural reform legislation. Two decades of off‐again, off‐again legislative efforts have yielded only fragments of reform. A major explanation for this, despite the official popularity of reform, seems to be the inability of putative reformers‐traditionalists, populists, and restrictivists‐to agree among themselves on the direction and content of general refor…

  • Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency

    Jim F Heath, James E Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of American History•1987•Cited by: 3

    Journal Article Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency. By James E. Anderson and Jared E. Hazleton. (Austin: University of Texas Press. 1986. xv + 285 pp. $27.50.) Get access Jim F. Heath Jim F. Heath Portland State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 74, Issue 1, June 1987, Pages 227–228, https://doi.org/10.2307/1908617 Published: 01 June 1987

  • A Revised View of the Johnson Cabinet

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1986•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    The cabinet in the Johnson administration was used as an instrument for presidential management of the executive branch. Cabinet meetings are described. Functionalist theory is then used to analyze the cabinet as a collegial body, and several managerial functions are identified

  • Transitional Growth and Trade with Frictions: A Structural Estimation Framework

    Open Access•James E Anderson, Mario Larch et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 53

    We build and estimate a structural model of transitional growth and trade in a many-country world. The gravity model of trade is combined with a capital accumulation mechanism driving transition between steady states. Trade affects growth through changes in consumer and producer prices. Simultaneously, capital accumulation affects trade directly through changes in country size and indirectly through changes in the incidence of trade costs. Theory…

  • Private enforcement and social efficiency

    Open Access•James E Anderson, Oriana Bandiera•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2005•Cited by: 1•References: 4

  • The Uruguay Round and welfare in some distorted agricultural economies

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•1998•Cited by: 1

  • Presidential Management of the Bureaucracy and the Johnson Presidency: A Preliminary Exploration

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1984•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    Drawing upon documentary sources and interviews with administrative officials, this article takes a broad look at presidential management of the bureaucracy during the Johnson presidency. The various managerial techniques used by President Johnson are examined, along with some of the purposes of presidential management. Contrary to the historical stereotype, Johnson was a managerial activist who had a substantial impact on the bureaucracy and “pe…

  • Agricultural Marketing Orders and the Process and Politics of Self-regulation

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•1982•Cited by: 1•References: 1

    Agricultural marketing orders, put into operation with the initiative and approval of affected producers, are a form of supervised self-regulation. The 47 orders in effect variously authorize quantity controls, quality controls, and market support activities for fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops. Administered by producer committees under the supervision of the Agricultural Marketing Service, for most of their history they produced l i t t l…

  • General Equilibrium and the Effective Rate of Protection

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1970•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State

    Arnold M Paul, James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Mississippi Valley Historical…•1963

    Journal Article The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State. By James E. Anderson. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962. xii + 172 pp. Notes and index. $4.50.) Get access Arnold M. Paul Arnold M. Paul Rutgers—The State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 50, Issue 3, December 1963, Pages 519–520, https://doi.org/10.2307/1902641 Published: 01 December 1963

  • The Human Skeleton: A Manual for Archaeologists

    Open Access•Jan W Cornwall, James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Anthropologica•1963

  • The Politics of Water in Arizona. Dean E. Mann

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1964

  • Primatology and Physical Anthropology: Bone and Tooth: Proceedings of the First European Symposium held at Somerville College, Oxford, April 1963. H. J. J. Blackwood

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•American Anthropologist•1965

  • The Politics of Bureaucracy. Gordon Tullock

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1966

  • Poverty, Unemployment, and Economic Development: The Search for a National Antipoverty Policy

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1967

  • Early Skeletons from Tranquillity, California. J. L awrence A ngel

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•American Anthropologist•1968

  • Organizations in Action. James D. Thompson

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1968

  • General Equilibrium and the Effective Rate of Protection

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1970•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • The Politics of Fiscal Policy Formation. Lawrence C. Pierce

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1972

  • Sources for the Study of Economic Regulatory Policies

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1972

  • Coordinating the War on Poverty

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1974•References: 1

  • A. Introduction by the Symposium Editor

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1975

  • Public Policy: Its Formulation, Adoption, Implementation, and Evaluation

    Walter D Broadnax, James E Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•Public Administration Review•1976

  • Economic Regulatory Policies: A Selected Bibliography

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1979•References: 53

  • Quality of Service and the Demand for Air Travel

    James E Anderson, Marvin Kraus•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1981

    Q UALITY of service has been neglected in empirical studies of air travel. Travel demand depends on travel time as well as the usual price and activity variables. Travel time includes not only average en route time, but delay. Following Douglas-Miller (1974a,b), frequency delay is the gap between one's desired and the nearest offered departure time, while stochastic delay is time lost due to the nearest offered departure being unavailable. Their …

  • Agricultural Marketing Orders and the Process and Politics of Self-regulation

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Review of Policy Research•1982•Cited by: 1•References: 1

    Agricultural marketing orders, put into operation with the initiative and approval of affected producers, are a form of supervised self-regulation. The 47 orders in effect variously authorize quantity controls, quality controls, and market support activities for fruits, vegetables, and specialty crops. Administered by producer committees under the supervision of the Agricultural Marketing Service, for most of their history they produced l i t t l…

  • Presidential and Congressional Support for "Independent" Regulatory Commissions: Implications of the Budgetary Process

    Joseph Stewart, James E Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•The Western Political Quarterly•1982•Cited by: 4•References: 4

    SENATOR PROXMIRE: Now, you are required somehow to submit your budget to the Office of Management and Budget, and yet you are considered to be an independent agency. How do you reconcile that contradition? There is no greater power than the power to determine the budget of an agency, to destroy it, and to enfeeble it by simply denying it the resources it needs. How can you be independent in any real sense of the executive branch if the Office of …

  • The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs. Herbert Kaufman

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1983

  • The Management of Wage‐price Policies in the Johnson and Carter Administrations

    Open Access•James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1984

  • Presidential Management of the Bureaucracy and the Johnson Presidency: A Preliminary Exploration

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1984•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    Drawing upon documentary sources and interviews with administrative officials, this article takes a broad look at presidential management of the bureaucracy during the Johnson presidency. The various managerial techniques used by President Johnson are examined, along with some of the purposes of presidential management. Contrary to the historical stereotype, Johnson was a managerial activist who had a substantial impact on the bureaucracy and “pe…

  • A Revised View of the Johnson Cabinet

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1986•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    The cabinet in the Johnson administration was used as an instrument for presidential management of the executive branch. Cabinet meetings are described. Functionalist theory is then used to analyze the cabinet as a collegial body, and several managerial functions are identified

  • Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency

    Jim F Heath, James E Anderson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of American History•1987•Cited by: 3

    Journal Article Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency. By James E. Anderson and Jared E. Hazleton. (Austin: University of Texas Press. 1986. xv + 285 pp. $27.50.) Get access Jim F. Heath Jim F. Heath Portland State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 74, Issue 1, June 1987, Pages 227–228, https://doi.org/10.2307/1908617 Published: 01 June 1987

  • Die altenglischen Rätsel des Exeterbuchs . Hans Pinsker , Waltraud Ziegler

    James E Anderson•ARTICLE•Speculum•1988

  • The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas

    David Greenaway, James E Anderson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1989

    Journal Article The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas Get access The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas. By E. ANDERSON JAMES. (Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1988. Pp. xi + 225. £22.50 hardback. ISBN 0 262 01103 4). David Greenaway David Greenaway Brunei University of West London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 396, 1 June 1989, Pages 491–492, https://doi.org/10.230…

Political science (25 works) · Economics (24 works) · Law (21 works) · Law (18 works) · Computer Science (16 works) · Politics (15 works) · Library science (13 works) · Global trade and economics (11 works) · Sociology (10 works) · Business (8 works)

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