Anderson Frey
Biographic Data
| ID | 3626804 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anderson Frey |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anderson |
| FAMILY NAME | Frey |
| SIGNATURE | FREY A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Rochester |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0021-5004 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 38 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The Politicization of Bureaucrats
In developing countries, incumbents commonly exercise political influence over bureaucrats through monitoring or patronage hiring. We investigate a new politicization channel: a phenomenon where bureaucrats join political parties while in office. First, with a regression discontinuity design and administrative data on the universe of Brazilian municipal bureaucrats, we identify an incumbency advantage in their politicization. Second, we find larg…
Legislature Resizing with Rent-Seeking Politicians
Partisan Leaning
A decisive voter's exact ideological preferences can be hard to predict, even for seasoned candidates. We develop a novel theory of electoral competition where candidates are evaluated on ideological and nonideological dimensions. The key feature of our theory is that an electorate's partisan leaning serves as a signal of the median voter's ideological position where extreme leanings are more informative about voters than centrist leanings. We sh…
Larger Legislatures and the Cost of Political Brokerage
This article shows that larger legislatures reduce the electoral power of incumbent parties in the executive. The electoral effects of legislature size have been largely overlooked by a literature that emphasizes its impact on policies. I estimate the effects of municipal council size on the performance of the local incumbent party in gubernatorial, presidential, and mayoral races in Brazil. The regression discontinuity design exploits variation …
Sleeping with the Enemy
Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties – among other unconventional electoral strategies – may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics. However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations. We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short‐term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition part…
Can Descriptive Representation Help the Right Win Votes from the Poor? Evidence from Brazil
The electoral success of the Right in poor nations is typically attributed to nonpolicy appeals such as clientelism. Candidate profiles are usually ignored because if voters value class‐based descriptive representation, it should be the Left that uses it. In this article, we develop and test a novel theory of policy choice and candidate selection that defies this conventional wisdom: it is the Right that capitalizes on descriptive representation …
Strategic Allocation of Irrevocable and Durable Benefits
The logic behind redistribution theories is that incumbents target benefits to build and sustain linkages with voters. However, a recent literature shows that some benefits can have a countervailing effect in environments plagued by clientelism: by permanently boosting voters' incomes, irrevocable and durable benefits might reduce their dependence on incumbents. This article explains how parties strategically allocate these benefits when trading …
Do Reelection Incentives Improve Policy Implementation? Accountability versus Political Targeting
Although re-election prospects can improve policy implementation by incumbents, they can also create incentives for politically-motivated targeting, which might jeopardize distributional efficiency. While existing empirical tests typically focus on these potential countervailing incentives in isolation, this paper analyzes their net effect in the context of Bolsa Familia (BF) in Brazil, using a regression discontinuity design and data on seven mi…
Strategic Allocation of Irrevocable and Durable Benefits
The logic behind redistribution theories is that incumbents target benefits to build and sustain linkages with voters. However, a recent literature shows that some benefits can have a countervailing effect in environments plagued by clientelism: by permanently boosting voters' incomes, irrevocable and durable benefits might reduce their dependence on incumbents. This article explains how parties strategically allocate these benefits when trading …
Larger Legislatures and the Cost of Political Brokerage
This article shows that larger legislatures reduce the electoral power of incumbent parties in the executive. The electoral effects of legislature size have been largely overlooked by a literature that emphasizes its impact on policies. I estimate the effects of municipal council size on the performance of the local incumbent party in gubernatorial, presidential, and mayoral races in Brazil. The regression discontinuity design exploits variation …
Can Descriptive Representation Help the Right Win Votes from the Poor? Evidence from Brazil
The electoral success of the Right in poor nations is typically attributed to nonpolicy appeals such as clientelism. Candidate profiles are usually ignored because if voters value class‐based descriptive representation, it should be the Left that uses it. In this article, we develop and test a novel theory of policy choice and candidate selection that defies this conventional wisdom: it is the Right that capitalizes on descriptive representation …
Sleeping with the Enemy
Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties – among other unconventional electoral strategies – may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics. However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations. We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short‐term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition part…
Do Reelection Incentives Improve Policy Implementation? Accountability versus Political Targeting
Although re-election prospects can improve policy implementation by incumbents, they can also create incentives for politically-motivated targeting, which might jeopardize distributional efficiency. While existing empirical tests typically focus on these potential countervailing incentives in isolation, this paper analyzes their net effect in the context of Bolsa Familia (BF) in Brazil, using a regression discontinuity design and data on seven mi…
The Politicization of Bureaucrats
In developing countries, incumbents commonly exercise political influence over bureaucrats through monitoring or patronage hiring. We investigate a new politicization channel: a phenomenon where bureaucrats join political parties while in office. First, with a regression discontinuity design and administrative data on the universe of Brazilian municipal bureaucrats, we identify an incumbency advantage in their politicization. Second, we find larg…
Legislature Resizing with Rent-Seeking Politicians
Partisan Leaning
A decisive voter's exact ideological preferences can be hard to predict, even for seasoned candidates. We develop a novel theory of electoral competition where candidates are evaluated on ideological and nonideological dimensions. The key feature of our theory is that an electorate's partisan leaning serves as a signal of the median voter's ideological position where extreme leanings are more informative about voters than centrist leanings. We sh…
Do Reelection Incentives Improve Policy Implementation? Accountability versus Political Targeting
Although re-election prospects can improve policy implementation by incumbents, they can also create incentives for politically-motivated targeting, which might jeopardize distributional efficiency. While existing empirical tests typically focus on these potential countervailing incentives in isolation, this paper analyzes their net effect in the context of Bolsa Familia (BF) in Brazil, using a regression discontinuity design and data on seven mi…
Strategic Allocation of Irrevocable and Durable Benefits
The logic behind redistribution theories is that incumbents target benefits to build and sustain linkages with voters. However, a recent literature shows that some benefits can have a countervailing effect in environments plagued by clientelism: by permanently boosting voters' incomes, irrevocable and durable benefits might reduce their dependence on incumbents. This article explains how parties strategically allocate these benefits when trading …
Sleeping with the Enemy
Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties – among other unconventional electoral strategies – may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics. However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations. We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short‐term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition part…
Can Descriptive Representation Help the Right Win Votes from the Poor? Evidence from Brazil
The electoral success of the Right in poor nations is typically attributed to nonpolicy appeals such as clientelism. Candidate profiles are usually ignored because if voters value class‐based descriptive representation, it should be the Left that uses it. In this article, we develop and test a novel theory of policy choice and candidate selection that defies this conventional wisdom: it is the Right that capitalizes on descriptive representation …
Larger Legislatures and the Cost of Political Brokerage
This article shows that larger legislatures reduce the electoral power of incumbent parties in the executive. The electoral effects of legislature size have been largely overlooked by a literature that emphasizes its impact on policies. I estimate the effects of municipal council size on the performance of the local incumbent party in gubernatorial, presidential, and mayoral races in Brazil. The regression discontinuity design exploits variation …
The Politicization of Bureaucrats
In developing countries, incumbents commonly exercise political influence over bureaucrats through monitoring or patronage hiring. We investigate a new politicization channel: a phenomenon where bureaucrats join political parties while in office. First, with a regression discontinuity design and administrative data on the universe of Brazilian municipal bureaucrats, we identify an incumbency advantage in their politicization. Second, we find larg…
Legislature Resizing with Rent-Seeking Politicians
Partisan Leaning
A decisive voter's exact ideological preferences can be hard to predict, even for seasoned candidates. We develop a novel theory of electoral competition where candidates are evaluated on ideological and nonideological dimensions. The key feature of our theory is that an electorate's partisan leaning serves as a signal of the median voter's ideological position where extreme leanings are more informative about voters than centrist leanings. We sh…
Political science (8 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Public Administration (3 works)